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Abstract
The existing theoretical and empirical literature to investigate the existence of local mar-
ket power is typically based on spatial competition models in the tradition of Hotelling’s
(1929) linear city and Salop’s (1979) circular city. In models of this kind, strong assump-
tions are made that lead to a spatial homogeneity (symmetry) of firms in a highly stylized
one-dimensional market space. However, some of these assumptions are hardly satisfied
in many (retail) markets. The present thesis builds on a recent model by Chen and Ri-
ordan (2007), in which the market is characterized by a star-shaped graph with a central
intersection. In an extension of Chen and Riordan, I distinguish between firms close to the
center and firms in the periphery of a spatial market. This spatial heterogeneity leads to
an asymmetric competition between firms. A central firm directly competes with a larger
number of firms than remote firms do.
The implications of the theoretical model are tested in two empirical applications to the
retail gasoline market of Vienna and Austria. Using station level data on diesel prices, I
estimate price reaction functions for gasoline stations in two different approaches. In the
first approach the Austrian retail gasoline market is divided into numerous highly localized
and delimited markets. The second approach analyzes the metropolitan area of Vienna
and treats the whole market as one big network of gasoline stations, which are connected
through the road network. In both approaches I apply econometric spatial autoregressive
(SAR) models. The estimated parameters of the slopes of the reaction functions are used
to evaluate the impact of individual gasoline stations on equilibrium market prices depend-
ing on their location within the market (network). All results obtained provide evidence
for (more) central suppliers serving as a stronger reference in pricing than (rather) remote
suppliers. Thus, the assumption of a symmetry in spatial competition which is usually
implied by spatial competition models in theoretical and applied research, is rejected.
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Kurzfassung
Die bestehende theoretische wie empirische Literatur, die sich mit der Existenz von lokaler
Marktmacht von Firman beschäftigt, basiert typischerweise auf räumlichen Wettbewerb-
smodellen nach Tradition von Hotelling’s (1929) linearer Stadt und Salop’s (1979) kreis-
förmiger Stadt. Modelle dieser Art treffen üblicherweise eine Reihe von Annahmen, die zu
einer homogenen (symmetrischen) räumlichen Verteilung der Anbieter im Raum führen. In
vielen Märkten jedoch, insbesondere im klassischen Einzelhandel, erscheinen diese Annah-
men allerdings fragwürdig. Die vorliegende Dissertation baut auf einem aktuellen Modell
von Chen und Riordan (2007) auf, das den Markt als sternförmigen Graphen mit einer
zentralen Kreuzung beschreibt. Dieses Modell wird dahingehend erweitert, dass zwischen
Firmen unterschieden wird, die nahe bzw. weit von diesem Zentrum entfernt gelegen sind.
Die dadurch entstehende räumliche Heterogenität führt zu einer Asymmetrie im Wettbe-
werb zwischen den Firmen. Eine zentral gelegene Firma steht dabei mit mehr Firmen im
direkten Wettbewerb als Firmen an abgelegenen Positionen.
Die Implikationen, die sich aus diesem theoretischen Modell ergeben, werden im An-
schluss in zwei empirischen Anwendungen für den Treibstoffeinzelhandel in Wien bzw.
in Österreich getestet. Mit Hilfe von Daten zu Dieselpreisen auf Tankstellen-Basis wer-
den in zwei unterschiedlichen Herangehensweisen Preisreaktionsfunktionen der Tankstellen
geschätzt. Im ersten Ansatz wird der österreichweite Markt in unzählige kleine Lokalmärkte
unterteilt und abgegrenzt. Der zweite Ansatz untersucht den Markt der Stadt Wien und be-
handelt den gesamten Markt als ein großes Netzwerk aus Tankstellen, die über das Straßen-
netz miteinander verbunden sind. In beiden Ansätzen werden ökonometrische, räumlich
autoregressive (SAR) Modelle verwendet. Die so geschätzten Steigungs-Parameter der
Reaktionsfunktionen werden zur Beurteilung des Einflusses einzelner Tankstellen auf die
Gleichgewichtspreise herangezogen und in Bezug zu ihrer räumlichen Position innerhalb
des Marktes bzw. des Netzwerks gesetzt. Die Ergebisse lassen starke Anzeichen dafür
erkennen, dass zentralere Anbieter eine stärkere Referenz in der Preissetzung ihrer Nach-
barn bilden, als weniger zentrale Anbieter. Daher wird die Annahme eines symmetrischen
räumlichen Wettbewerbs, der üblicherweise in theoretischen räumlichen Modellen, wie auch
in der angewandten Forschung angenommen wird, verworfen.
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1 Introduction and Motivation1
In many (retail) markets, consumers have to travel from their own location to the location
of a supplier of their choice in order to consume a product. These travels imply trans-
portation costs, which can be either monetary or time costs. Transportation costs lower
the utility of the product consumed. Therefore, firms gain local market power as con-
sumers prefer to consume near their own location. The existing theoretical and empirical
literature to investigate the existence of local market power is typically based on models of
localized competition in the tradition of Hotelling’s (1929) linear city and Salop’s (1979)
circular city model of spatial competition.
In these models strong assumptions are made which lead to a spatial symmetry (ho-
mogeneity) of firms in a highly stylized one-dimensional market space. However, neither
the assumptions about the nature of the market space nor the assumptions leading to
such a symmetric distribution of firms are likely to hold in many markets, especially re-
tail markets. In Hotelling’s and Salop’s models – and in most other spatial competition
models that have evolved from these canonical models – firms are distributed equidistantly
throughout the market. Spatial differentiation (or any other form of horizontal product
differentiation) is therefore the same for all firms. This result arises from a uniform distri-
bution of consumers and from the possibility of a costless relocation of firms as soon as a
new store opens up or an existing one shuts down. However, the establishment (closure) of
a new store is a quite costly endeavor in most situations. Thus, unless all incumbents relo-
cate, the entry or exit of a single firm leads to an asymmetric distribution of firms in space.
Additionally, in models of localized competition, each firm is assumed to directly com-
pete with its direct neighbors only and, due to the stylized 1-dimensional spatial structure,
each firm has the same number of direct rivals. One firm competes with a neighboring firm
with the same intensity as the other way around. Therefore, competition between firms is
symmetric and despite being spatially differentiated the location of a particular firm is de
facto irrelevant.
1This section is based on the introduction of the paper “Centrality and Pricing in Differentiated Markets:
The Case of Gasoline” by Firgo et al. (2011).
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Consumers and firms are connected through a network of roads and intersections. Some
firms are located at or near an intersection of roads while other firms are located somewhere
along a single road. A firm located close to an intersection tends to have more directly
neighboring firms – i.e. firms located at other roads leading to the same intersection – than
firms located far from intersections, which have one neighbor on each side along the road at
most. This nature of the market space leads to an asymmetric number of neighbors a firm
directly competes with. Thus, spatial heterogeneities arise in two dimensions: First, firms
differ in the distance they are located from other firms. Second, if direct competition is
assumed to take place between neighboring firms only, firms differ in their number of direct
competitors. The first dimension is commonly known as the degree of differentiation. I
refer to the second dimension as differences in the (network) centrality of firms because
analyzing competition in a spatial framework of roads and intersections implies an analysis
of spatial competition in a network or on a graph.
In the theoretical literature on spatial competition, a number of studies have analyzed
either the first or the second type of asymmetry. However, to my knowledge, a theoretical
model that includes both dimensions of spatial heterogeneity does not exist. While a large
number of empirical studies have analyzed the impact of the first dimension of spatial
asymmetries on price levels for several industries, the effect of the latter – differences in
the number of neighbors and thus, differences in the degree of (network) centrality – has
been widely ignored in the empirical literature. The empirical literature completely lacks
of investigations of the impact of network centrality on price levels and on the strategic
interaction between firms.
This lack of literature is surprising considering the fact that the importance of network
centrality has been widely analyzed in other disciplines such as neurobiology and psy-
chology, in business-related fields such as transport management and operations research
and, with an increasing intensity, in the literature on social networks as a consequence
of their growing importance in everyday life. Networks involving social interaction are
characterized by agents that are connected through friendship, acquaintanceship or pro-
fessional links. The role of centrality in social networks has been recently analyzed, for
instance, in the context of peer-group smoking behavior (Christakis and Fowler, 2008), and
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the individual impact of scientists in co-authorship networks (Yan and Ding, 2009). In the
context of industrial organization the social network literature has analyzed the influence
of individuals within organizations depending on their location within the organizational
structure (Brass, 1984), and the impact of centrality on firm’s innovations (Valente, 1996).
Brass and Burkhardt (1992, p. 191) argue that, looking at a star-shaped network struc-
ture, most people simply declare the central node (agent) the most influential and powerful
one without even asking for the context and type of network represented by the star-graph.
If strategic interaction between firms in a pricing game is considered as social inter-
action then it is obvious that the impact of centrality on the behavior of firms deserves
more attention than it has received in the literature on spatial competition. The present
thesis is a first attempt to investigate asymmetries in the strategic interaction between
spatially differentiated firms arising from differences in their relative positions within the
market space. Centrality is therefore not associated with a firm’s ability to access a higher
level of demand, but with a firm’s location in the network (market) space relative to the
locations of other firms. The following questions are to be addressed in the analysis: How
does centrality influence the strategic interaction between firms in pricing? What impact
does centrality have on equilibrium prices and price levels? I attempt to model the impact
of centrality on firms’ pricing decisions both theoretically and empirically. The implica-
tions of the theoretical model introduced in this thesis are applied to the Austrian retail
gasoline market using two different approaches. All results obtained provide evidence that
the strategic interaction between suppliers is strongly related to their positions within the
market.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of
related theoretical work on spatial competition and a short review of related empirical
studies analyzing pricing in retail gasoline markets. Chapter 2 concludes with reasoning on
the importance of explicitly considering centrality in the context of the existing literature.
Chapter 3 introduces an extension of the so-called ‘spokes model’ by Chen and Riordan
(2007) as a first theoretical approach to integrate both dimensions of spatial asymmetries
discussed above. This model leads to three propositions about the impact of centrality
on asymmetries in the strategic interaction between firms in pricing, on asymmetries in
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the transmission of shocks, and on the impact of centrality on the price levels of firms.
This asymmetric spokes model is estimated empirically for the Austrian retail gasoline
market in Chapter 5. It is also applied in a more general framework analyzing the retail
gasoline market of Vienna as one interconnected network in Chapter 6. Before the empirical
applications are conducted, Chapter 4 discusses econometric issues that are relevant for the
empirical analysis. Chapter 7 summarizes the results and discusses the policy implications
that can be drawn from these results. Chapter 7 also discusses the limitations of this thesis
and considerations for further research.
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2 Related Literature - Pricing in Spatially Differentiated
Markets
2.1 Theoretical Models
The first economist to discuss product differentiation was Piero Sraffa in 1926. Sraffa
pointed out that markets are usually divided into different regions in which a seller “enjoys
a privileged position whereby it obtains advantages which – if not in extent, at least in their
nature – are equal to those enjoyed by the ordinary monopolist” (Sraffa, 1926, p. 545).
A region is regarded as a certain range of consumer preferences that is matched best by
the product offered by a particular seller.2 Hotelling (1929) adds a spatial aspect to these
considerations, even though his model of a linear city, with its consumers and suppliers
distributed along a horizontal axis, only serves as a “figurative term for a great congeries
of qualities” (Hotelling, 1929, p. 54). Since the days of Sraffa and Hotelling, spatial
economics has evolved as an entire sub-discipline of economics. Usually the literature on
spatial competition is divided into two types of models. In localized competition models in
the tradition of Hotelling (1929) competition takes place between neighboring firms only.
In models of non-localized (global) competition in the tradition of Chamberlin (1948),
every firm competes directly with all other firms in the market. This division, however,
is not very fruitful for the purpose of this thesis. I rather split the theoretical literature
on spatial competition into models with spatially homogeneous firms (Section 2.1.1) and
models in which firms are heterogeneous in terms of their location within the market space
(Section 2.1.2). These two sections discuss a selection of models that are relevant for the
theoretical and/ or the empirical analysis later in this thesis. Graphical illustrations of
all models are provided in Figure 1 on page 8. A detailed survey of spatial competition
models is provided by Biscaia and Mota (2011).
2.1.1 Spatial Homogeneity
In his seminal paper, Hotelling (1929) analyzes the market space as a 1-dimensional line
(see Figure 1(a)), the so-called linear city.3 With the assumption of a uniform distribution
2Product differentiation can take place on a vertical (quality) and horizontal level (characteristics/ space).
As this thesis deals with spatial competition I will focus on models analyzing horizontal product differ-
entiation only. For a survey of models on vertical differentiation see Martin (2004).
3Even though Hotelling does not consider a physical line (street) but rather an axis reflecting the charac-
teristics of a product (e.g. milk ranging from zero-fat milk to whole milk) the idea can be and has been
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of consumers facing linear transportation costs along the line, Hotelling (1929) studies the
equilibrium outcomes if two firms provide their products within this market space. He
concludes that the equilibrium locations of firms are back-to-back at the center of the line
as each firm, if not located at the center, can increase its profit by moving closer to the
market center. This result is known as the principle of minimum differentiation. However,
fifty years later it was proven by d’Aspremont et al. (1979) that Hotelling was incorrect: If
the distance between firms is small4, firms have incentives to undercut the price of the other
firm and steal all consumers from this firm. As a result d’Aspremont et al. (1979) show
that a Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist in the Hotelling (1929) model,
without making additional assumptions on the pricing behavior of firms. Under the as-
sumption of quadratic rather than linear transportation costs, the authors demonstrate
that a Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies exists in the so-called principle of maximum
differentiation, i.e. firms locate at the opposite ends of the line.
The framework of the linear city still serves as a standard approach in modeling spatial
competitions and has been modified and extended numerous times.5 The most prominent
of all extensions is the circular city model by Salop (1979), which is illustrated in Figure
1(b). In this model the pricing decision of firms depends on whether they compete with
their neighbors or not. If the number of firms in the market is low or if transportation
costs are high, firms might act as monopolies for consumers located close-by.6 Salop as-
sumes that relocation costs are zero and that firms chose maximum differentiation. Thus,
firms are located symmetrically around the circle. As more firms enter the market, the
distance between firms decreases and it might become more profitable for firms to compete
for consumers with their neighboring firms on both sides of the circle. In this case, firms
find themselves in a pricing game: each firm has the same number of competitors, i.e. the
nearest firm on the left and on the right, irrespective of the total number of firms in the
market. Thus, competition is localized.
translated into spatial markets in a narrower sense without changing any of the variables.
4In the case of symmetric locations if the distance between firms is smaller than half of the length of the
line (d’Aspremont et al., 1979, p. 1147);
5Vickrey (1964) and Salop (1979) consider a line that is curved to a circle to avoid the consequences of
asymmetries implied by edges when the analysis is generalized to more than two firms. Eaton and Lipsey
(1975), among others, analyze the linear city models with several different numbers of firms in the market.
Anderson et al. (1997) replace the assumption of a uniform distribution of consumers by a symmetric
log-concave consumer density.
6In Salop’s (1979) model consumers have the choice between the differentiated product offered by the firms
in the market and a homogeneous outside good.
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In contrast to the family of models of localized competition, models of non-localized
(global) competition describe markets in which each firm directly competes with all other
firms in the market. Based on the seminal works of Chamberlin (1948) and Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), von Ungern-Sternberg (1991) and Chen and Riordan (2007) analyze non-
localized competition in a spatial setting. In such spatial settings non-localized competition
can be described as fully-connected graphs in which firms compete more or less symmet-
rically with one another, as depicted in Figure 1(d), 1(e) and 1(f).
von Ungern-Sternberg (1991) choses a Pyramid-shaped market with one firm at the top
and one firm in each corner of the triangular bottom of the pyramid. Consumers’ locations
reflect their order of preferences. Their first preference is the firm closest to their own
location. Their second preference is the second-nearest firm. The two remaining firms are
located at an equidistance and reflect their least (third) preferred choice.
Chen and Riordan (2007) introduce the so-called ‘spokes model’ as “a new analytical
tool for differentiated oligopoly and a representation of spatial monopolistic competition”
(Chen and Riordan, 2007, p. 897). Their spokes model is a star-shaped graph with a
central intersection and a number of N ≥ 2 spokes of length l. The end of each spoke
hosts at most one of n firms in the market, thus n ≤ N . Firms produce a horizontally
differentiated product. Consumers are distributed equidistantly across the spokes network
and each spoke represents different product characteristics. Consumers located on spoke
i have a taste for product i no matter if the product is available (the spoke hosts a firm)
or not. The location of a particular consumer (the distance the consumer is located from
the center) reflects the strength of the preference for product i. The further the consumer
is located from the center, the stronger is the preference for i and the higher are the
transportation costs (the lower is the net utility) of consuming a product different from
i. Under the assumption of zero entry costs, the effects of entry on equilibrium prices
depend on the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the variety preferred.7 As the results of
7Chen and Riordan (2007) assume that consumers only have a willingness to pay for two varieties: for the
variety represented by the spoke they are located on and for a second variety which may also be either
available or not. If the willingness-to-pay for these varieties is high, the entry of another firm reduces
market prices. However, if the willingness-to-pay for the preferred varieties is low, new entry leads to
higher prices. Therefore, the number of firms can be either to high or too low in comparison to the social
optimum under free entry.
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the spokes model are not of particular interest to the focus of this thesis, I will not discuss
these results in more detail. However, the spatial framework of the spokes model serves as
the basis for the theoretical model introduced in Chapter 3.
Figure 1: Spatial competition models at a glance
(a) Hotelling (1929) (b) Salop (1979) (c) Fik (1991b)
(d) Chamberlin (1948) (e) von Ungern-Sternberg (1991) (f) Chen and Riordan (2007)
(g) Braid (1989) (h) Fik (1991a) (i) Balasubramanian (1998);
Bouckaert (2000); Madden and
Pezzino (2011)
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2.1.2 Spatial Heterogeneity
In all models presented in the section above, firms are spatially differentiated. However,
they are located equidistantly throughout the market space. No firm has a locational
advantage over another firm. Compared to the great number of models assuming such a
spatial homogeneity of firms, only a limited number of models elaborate spatial patterns
in which firms actually face different circumstances in terms of demand and competition
because of heterogeneous locations.
Braid (1989) introduces a star-shaped market space similar to the spokes model by Chen
and Riordan (2007), in which one firm is located at the central intersection and each spoke
hosts an arbitrary and symmetrically distributed number of firms (Figure 1(g) for the case
of three spokes). Unlike in Chen and Riordan (2007), all spokes are occupied by firms. In
the pricing sub-game, Braid (1989) shows that the first order condition for the central firm
is a function of the average prices of all neighbors of first order (i.e. the innermost firm
on each spoke), while the first order condition for firms along the spokes is a function of
the average price of the interior and the exterior neighbor. Formally: pi ≡ f(1/(2n)
∑
pj),
where pi is the price of firm i and where n is the number of adjacent neighbors of firm i,
with j = 1, . . . , n and j 6= i. The outermost firm of each spoke has only an interior but no
exterior neighbor, and thus considers the price of one firm only. All firms except for the
central and the outermost firm on each spoke find themselves in situations identical to firms
in the Salop (1979) model. In the short-run analysis Braid (1989) assumes that locations
are fixed. Under Braid’s assumptions equilibrium prices are the same for all firms but the
profits of the firm in the center are higher. For the long run, when firm choose locations in
a first stage and prices in a second stage of the game, Braid (1989) concludes that a Nash-
equilibrium in locations for an intersection of more than two spokes (N > 2) does not exist.
Fik and Mulligan (1991) analyze a linear city with five firms and a linear city with four
firms which is intersected by an orthogonal road that hosts an additional firm. As in Braid
(1989) firms differ in their number of neighbors. The two firms at the edges of the linear
city and the firm at the orthogonal road have one neighbor. The interior firm at the in-
tersection has three neighbors, while the other interior firm has two neighbors. The slope
of the reaction function of firm i again is given by pi ≡ f(1/(2n)
∑
pj). Fik and Mulligan
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(1991) study the equilibrium prices of firms in different combinations of individual firms’
price conjectures through numerical simulations.8 The authors find that, all other things
constant, equilibrium prices decline for firms with a higher number of adjacent neighbors.
The contradiction of the uniform pricing in Braid (1989) results from the difference in the
spatial structure. While Braid’s (1989) market reflects a perfectly symmetric star graph,
the intersection in Fik and Mulligan (1991) is not at the center of the linear city, which
results in a non-symmetric star-shaped graph.
Fik (1991a) extends the framework of Braid (1989) and Fik and Mulligan (1991) and
applies pricing games to networks (graphs) in general.9 An example is illustrated in Figure
1(h). Under Nash-Bertrand competition10 the profit maximizing price (pi) of firm i with
n direct (adjacent) neighbors again is a function of pi ≡ f(1/(2n)
∑
pj). As in Fik and
Mulligan (1991), numerical simulations of price levels of individual firms are performed
for a number of different (grid) networks and for different compositions of individual price
conjectures. Fik (1991a) is unable to draw general conclusions about the price levels of
central and remote firms for different network (market) structures. Price levels are found
to depend on the specification of the network and on the price conjectures.
Apart from the three studies discussed in this section, theoretical considerations of spatial
asymmetries are restricted to modifications of the circular city model. Fik (1991b) relaxes
Salop’s (1979) assumption of an equidistant distribution of firms along the circle (Figure
1 (c)). Still, the distribution of firms is symmetric in his clustered linear city. Several
models (Figure 1(i)) extend the Salop (1979) model to a circular city with a city center
(Balasubramanian, 1998; Bouckaert, 2000; Madden and Pezzino, 2011). Firms along the
circle are considered as classical retailers (mall or high street shops), and firms in the center
as direct marketers (mail delivery). While firms on the circle face localized competition
with an additional neighbor in the center, the central firm finds itself in a situation of
non-localized competition with all firm on the circle. For consumers, transportation costs
for purchasing at a firm on the circle depend on their own and on the firm’s location.
Transportation costs for purchasing at the center are the same for all consumers and can
8The authors allow firms to differ in their price conjectures (near Löschian, Hotelling-Smithies (Nash-
Betrand), Greenhut-Ohta). See Greenhut et al. (1989) for details on price conjectures in spatial models.
9Section 6.3 of this thesis gives an introduction into networks (graphs) and their characteristics.
10Like in Fik and Mulligan (1991) price conjectures of of firms may vary individually.
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be interpreted as fixed shipping costs.
2.2 Empirics - The Retail Gasoline Market
The retail gasoline market is the most popular retail industry subject to the empirical
analysis of firms’ behavior in spatially (horizontally) differentiated markets. Besides the
strategic interaction of gasoline stations, which will be the focus of the empirical analysis
of this thesis, a number of other aspects of price competition have been analyzed for this
industry, including the impact of the degree of differentiation on prices, market concentra-
tion, and dynamic pricing (price cycles). Clemenz and Gugler (2006, p. 292) emphasize
four reasons in favor of employing this industry in the analysis of empirical issues of spatial
competition:
• In terms of its physical and chemical properties, gasoline is a nearly perfectly homo-
geneous good.
• Due to this homogeneity, consumer preferences particularly rely on the price and on
transportation costs. Therefore, in accordance with localized competition models,
competition is likely to take place between neighboring gasoline stations.
• Considering the enormous entry and exit costs, the two-stage decisions often modeled
– with the locational choice first, followed by (price) competition – reflect some key
aspects of strategic interaction in oligopoly markets.
• Gasoline prices are well monitored and documented. Thus, comprehensive data on
this retail industry are available.
The arguments of Clemenz and Gugler are supported by a Sheffield, UK household survey
conducted by Ning and Haining (2003). It reveals that a great majority of consumers regard
gasoline as a homogeneous product. Thus, the actual purchase decision strongly depends
on the locations of and distances between consumers and firms. Therefore, firms gain local
market power and have incentives to set prices strategically even if the total number of
firms in the market is large. In the remainder of this chapter, some of the key findings of
empirical studies on spatial price competition in retail gasoline markets are presented.11 A
11Empirically several retail industries selling rather homogeneous products have been analyzed in terms of
spatial competition using dependent variables such as prices, quality differences, the density of retailers,
entry and exit decisions, market shares of different companies or franchises, etc. The analysis includes,
11
very comprehensive review of literature related to the retail gasoline market was recently
published by Eckert (2011).
2.2.1 Strategic Interaction in Pricing
A rather small number of studies have tried to model strategic interaction in the pric-
ing decisions of gasoline stations beyond focusing on price levels. Based on field surveys
at gasoline stations, a questionnaire survey for the operators of gasoline stations, and a
household survey, Ning and Haining (2003) conduct a profound analysis of the Sheffield,
UK retail gasoline market. Their questionnaire survey reveals that over 80% of gasoline
stations claim to consider prices of the nearest station in their own pricing decision. Also,
more than 60% indicate that they consider more than one gasoline station, mostly stations
located at the same or at nearby roads. Regression analysis of prices confirms not only the
evidence for nearest neighbor competition, but also the evidence for competition among
stations within geographically defined groups or clusters. Additionally, Ning and Haining
(2003) highlight the importance of location attributes. According to their field survey,
the lowest prices are being charged at sites attached to supermarkets and at stations on
main roads. The authors further conclude that station characteristics (e.g. the existence
of a car sale, a garage, etc.) and some demand-side variables (the number of cars and the
percentage of high income households in a market) do not contribute to explaining retail
price variations in their sample.
Atkinson et al. (2009) collected price data for 27 of 28 gasoline stations in Guelph,
Canada, eight times per day for a period of 103 days in 2005, along with the characteristics
of each station. They find that stations “tend to match (or set a small differential with) a
small number of other stations” (Atkinson et al., 2009, p. 586). However, the authors point
out that there is little evidence that these other stations need to be the nearest ones. They
claim that responses to changes by stations of the same chain are found to be correlated
to a higher degree than responses to close stations. Finally, they find asymmetries in the
adjustments following price changes. While they find evidence for a ‘domino effect’ of price
decreases in space, price increases are claimed to follow different patterns. More empir-
among others, retail food (Fik, 1991b) and hamburger prices (Kalnins, 2003; Thomadsen, 2005), payoffs
of motels along highways (Mazzeo, 2002) and of the video retail industry (Seim, 2006), prices of movie
theaters Davis (2006), tuition fees at private U.S. universities (McMillen et al., 2007) and bank interest
on borrowings (Richards et al., 2008).
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ical results on the dynamics of pricing and price cycles are discussed in Section 2.2.4 below.
Lee (2009) estimates price reaction functions of gasoline stations using a spatial autore-
gressive (SAR) model – as will be specified in this thesis – to confirm the findings of Ning
and Haining (2003). His results for the county of San Diego, California show that gasoline
stations do not only compete with the closest station. However, by using different critical
radii in the spatial weights matrices of the SAR model12, Lee (2009) finds that competi-
tion is highly localized and is strongest between stations within a 1 mile radius. A similar
result – highly localized competition – is found by Pinkse et al. (2002), who estimate price
reaction functions (SAR models) for the American wholesale gasoline market. Netz and
Taylor (2002) and Pennerstorfer (2009) also estimate price reaction functions using SAR
models, but focus on different aspects of competition in the retail gasoline market (see
sections below).
2.2.2 Spatial Differentiation and Price Dispersion
As mentioned above, a number of gasoline market related studies focus on the importance
of spatial differentiation and station density for price levels. For the Los Angeles metropoli-
tan area, Netz and Taylor (2002) present three measures of the intensity of competition
a particular gasoline station faces: the total number of stations within a certain radius,
the rate of non-major brand and independent stations within this radius, and the rate
of stations of the same brand as the focal station. The authors show that the degree of
differentiation (spatially and via station characteristics) increases if competition increases.
Barron et al. (2004) analyze the effect of the number of gasoline stations on local market
prices for four U.S. metropolitan areas. The authors prove that a higher number of stations
leads to lower average prices and lower price dispersion. They include the distance to the
next rival as an indicator for the degree of spatial differentiation. However, the expected
impact of spatial differentiation – decreasing prices following from a decreasing distance
to rivals – is not statistically significant in most specifications. Lewis (2008) confirms the
results of Barron et al. (2004) on price dispersion for the Los Angeles retail gasoline mar-
12For more details on SAR models and the spatial econometrics literature see Chapter 4.
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ket, but dividing stations into two categories, major brands and discounters/independents,
Lewis (2008) finds that price dispersion is only lower if there are more competitors from
the stations’s own category nearby.
Using Austrian municipality and district averages, Clemenz and Gugler (2006) observe a
negative impact of station density on prices. Another finding of their paper is that station
density is significantly related to the population density, but the former increases propor-
tionally less than the latter. Most recently, the results for prices obtained by Clemenz and
Gugler (2006) were confirmed by Sen and Townley (2010) for the Canadian retail gasoline
market. Their analysis focuses on the impacts of outlet rationalization on retail gasoline
prices. For several Canadian metropolitan areas, they find evidence that the decrease in
the number of gasoline stations during the 1990s led – all other things equal – to a signifi-
cant increase in retail gasoline prices.
The dimensions of horizontal/spatial and vertical differentiation are put together by Iyer
and Seetharaman (2008). Using data for the St. Louis metropolitan area, they integrate
both dimensions of differentiation (horizontal/ spatial and vertical) by allowing for con-
sumer heterogeneity. The authors find evidence that the dispersion of prices charged in
a local market, as well as the dispersion of quality characteristics such as brand, services,
etc., are positively related to the dispersion of the per-capita income within a local market
area. Additionally, they show that the dispersion is higher if stations are clustered together
(minimal horizontal differentiation), which suggests that firms differentiate vertically to a
higher degree when horizontal differentiation is low. This result is consistent with the stan-
dard literature on multiple dimensions of differentiation, e.g. Irmen and Thisse (1998), in
which firms differentiate maximally in one dimension and minimally in all other dimensions.
Another recent study by Verlinda (2008) analyzes the extent to which local market
power resulting from (spatial) differentiation contributes to the fact that retail gasoline
prices rise much faster when stations’ costs (wholesale prices) increase than they fall when
costs decrease, a fact that was previously detected by Borenstein et al. (1997) and con-
firmed in recent publications by Deltas (2008) and Alm et al. (2009). For the south of
Orange County, California, the author finds evidence that effects of branding, a greater
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geographic distance to rivals, and characteristics which further differentiate a station (e.g.
service bays) support these asymmetries in price responses.
2.2.3 Market Concentration and the Role of Independent Stations
The work by Barron et al. (2004) and Lewis (2008) already discussed above emphasizes the
effect of independent (or non-major brand) gasoline stations in a market. On the one hand
the presence of stations of this category reduces the concentration and the market share
of major brand stations. This aspect is expected to increase competition. On the other
hand, as Netz and Taylor (2002) point out, a higher market share of independent stations
can soften price competition among branded stations, at least if consumers treat branded
and unbranded gasoline as non-homogeneous products. Pennerstorfer (2009) refers to the
former aspect as the ‘competition effect’ and to the latter as the ‘composition effect’ when
analyzing the role of independent stations in the retail gasoline market of Lower Austria.
In a related study analyzing the Greater Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas,
Hastings (2004) finds evidence that the presence of independent stations in a local mar-
ket reduces the average market price. However, in a recent comment Taylor et al. (2010)
contradict the results of Hastings (2004) using different data covering the same period of
time and the same area. They do not find a significant effect similar to the one in Hastings
(2004). Also, Clemenz and Gugler (2006) add the degree of market concentration to their
analysis and do not find an immediate consistent impact of market concentration on prices.
However, they find that concentration has a negative influence on the density of stations,
which in turn has an observable negative influence on prices. In a very recent contribution,
Houde (2011) compares the effects of an increased market concentration after a merger in
the Quebec metropolitan area and finds a significant increase in prices post merger.13
Still, there is more evidence for a significant role of non-major and independent stations
on market prices: Sen (2005) studies gasoline prices of eleven Canadian cities and concludes
that an increase in the market share of non-major brand gasoline stations leads to lower
average market prices even though prices within the group of non-major brand gasoline
13Houde (2011) defines consumers’ locations as commuter paths rather than as fixed locations, which is
the standard (single-address) approach in spatial models and also in this thesis.
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stations increase due to a higher concentration in this group. On the other hand, prices
of major brands decline due to a lower degree of market concentration. This decline
outweighs the price increase in the former group for a negative net effect of non-major
brand stations on prices. The results obtained by Pennerstorfer (2009) are different at first
glance: The author also concludes that an increase in the market share of independent
stations leads to lower average market prices (competition effect), but in addition shows
that this increase leads to higher prices among branded stations (composition effect) due
to less competition among branded stations. However, unlike Sen (2005), Pennerstorfer
(2009) separates unbranded (independent) and branded stations, so non-major and major
brands are assigned to the same group. Thus, the results of Pennerstorfer (2009) are not a
contradiction of the results of Sen (2005). Lewis (2008) finds evidence that having a higher
number of discounters and independents close-by leads to higher price dispersion among
major brands.
2.2.4 Dynamic Pricing and Price Cycles
Besides the main characteristics of the retail gasoline market pointed out by Clemenz and
Gugler (2006) and discussed above, this industry has another interesting feature: “Retail
gasoline markets are unique in that the price for the product is broadcast for all to see,
including competitors.”(Doyle et al., 2010, p.660). The transparency of prices facilitates
price competition as well as collusion. Within the last years, a large number of studies
have analyzed pricing behavior using price data with highly frequent observations. This
data allows the study of dynamics in pricing that could not otherwise be observed.
High-frequency price data reveals two effects that are worth to be highlighted: First,
there are obvious asymmetries in the time it takes until rises and declines in wholesale
prices are passed-through to retail prices (recently Verlinda (2008), Deltas (2008) and Alm
et al. (2009) as briefly discussed above). Second, a great deal of studies find evidence for
price cycles that are characterized by few substantial rises in price, each followed by a large
number of small declines. This phenomenon is known as Edgeworth price cycles14. Noel
(2009) shows that there is a link between the first and the second dynamic. Analyzing the
metropolitan area of Toronto, the author concludes that Edgeworth cycles are one of the
14See Maskin and Tirole (1988) for details.
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main reasons for asymmetries in the pass-through time of changes in the wholesale price to
retail prices. According to Noel (2009) these asymmetries are found to be higher if cycles
are present. However, the author points out that Edgeworth cycles are not the reason for
the existence of these asymmetries. Based on data on U.S. cities, Lewis and Noel (2011)
compare cities with and without cycling behavior and find that cities with Edgeworth
price cycles respond to changes in the wholesale prices much quicker than (similar) cities
where prices do not experience such cycles (up to three times faster). They conclude that
Edgeworth cycles reduce the inefficiencies of slow pass-through of cost shocks. To some
degree these results seem to contradict the findings of Noel (2009), which surprisingly is
not commented upon at all in Lewis and Noel (2011).
Price cycles (sticky prices) are very often associated with the absence (presence) of a
dominant market leader. Based on weekly data, Noel (2007a) analyzes nineteen Canadian
cities to detect higher cycling activities in cities in which a higher proportion of gasoline
stations is operated by small firms. Doyle et al. (2010) confirm the relevance of market
concentration to the occurrence of Edgeworth cycles. They also confirm that markets with
a high concentration (i.e. markets with dominant firms) are less likely to cycle due to a
facilitation of tacit collusion. However, the authors also detect that a very low concentra-
tion (i.e. markets with a large share of independents) leads to a low probability of cycling
behavior. The latter aspect of these findings can be related to the findings in Noel (2007b),
i.e. a new cycle (a rise in prices) is more likely to be initiated by a large firm (a firm
operating many gasoline stations) than by small firms.
Apart from cycling behavior, Hosken et al. (2008) reveal that pricing behaviors differ
significantly among gasoline stations. They demonstrate that, within the suburbs of Wash-
ington, DC, stations at both ends of the price range are characterized by smaller jumps in
their price rankings over time than stations charging closer to the mean. In other words,
stations charging very high (low) prices in one period are more like to charge very high
(low) prices in other periods. Nevertheless, Hosken et al. (2008) conclude that stations
change their relative prices frequently and that movements in the price ranking may be
very large.
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2.3 Conclusion: The Need for Real World Patterns
Both the theoretical literature and empirical studies analyzing pricing in markets with spa-
tial competition place restrictive assumptions on the spatial patterns and on a symmetry
in competition, at least implicitly. Most theoretical models are characterized by making
explicit assumptions about a symmetric distribution of firms in space or by assuming a
costless relocation of firms which leads to a symmetric spatial distribution of firms. In
models characterized by a spatial homogeneity (see Section 2.1.1), firms are differentiated
but they are ‘equally different’. Neither their own location in the market nor the location
of their neighbors is relevant and competition between firms is perfectly symmetric. To
maintain a symmetric distribution of firms, all incumbents must relocate as soon as one
firm enters (leaves) the market. However, an asymmetric distribution of firms in space
becomes most likely as soon as relocation is costly. Even if the assumption of a symmetric
distribution of firms is relaxed, firms still have a symmetric number of neighbors in models
assuming a one-dimensional market space, such as a line or a circle.
A symmetry in competition between firms in a spatial market resulting from a symmetric
number of neighbors appears questionable in many markets, especially in traditional retail
markets: Due to a complex network of roads and intersections, some locations might be
considered as the center of a local market (e.g. a central square or the intersection of two
major roads). Clearly, a firm located close to such central locations has more neighboring
firms than a firm somewhere along a single road. Theoretical models that pick up on
such considerations are rare; the few existing exceptions were introduced in Section 2.1.2
above. However, even though some of them model realistic geographical structures, such
an intersection (Braid, 1989; Fik and Mulligan, 1991) or networks in general (Fik, 1991a),
they still place strong assumptions on the spatial distribution of firms: They allow firms to
differ in the number of neighbors but they assume firms to be distributed equidistantly and
symmetrically throughout the market. Also, these models assume that one firm is located
directly at the intersection of two or more lines (spokes), but they do not allow for a case
in which an intersections is not occupied by a firms. In a nutshell, the existing theoretical
literature on spatial competition fails to account for asymmetries that doubtlessly arise
when the market space is analyzed in the context of a network of roads and intersections
that characterizes many markets in which consumers must frequent the location of the
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suppliers in order to consume. These asymmetries may not only be reflected in the price
levels of central and less central (remote) firms, but are also likely to influence the intensity
of interaction between firms. As Fik and Mulligan (1991, p. 87) put it:
“Highly accessible firms in the market have the advantage of competing for a
larger share of the market and yet have the disadvantage of interacting with
the greatest number of firms directly. This further complicates the nature of
price competition, since the equilibrium conditions and market share are de-
pendent upon many factors; namely (i) the number and length of network links
associated with any node/firm (on an individual and aggregate basis); (ii) the
relative positioning of that node with respect to all other nodes/firms in the
network; (iii) the direct and indirect influences of price linkages; . . . ”
While the empirical literature has analyzed the impact of spatial differentiation and other
aspects of spatial competition on price levels, very few studies have model the strategic
interaction between suppliers. Out of the great number of econometric works conducted
on retail gasoline markets that use prices as the dependent variable, only Netz and Tay-
lor (2002), Pennerstorfer (2009) and Lee (2009) explicitly model price reaction functions
to account for strategic interaction between stations. The results presented in Netz and
Taylor (2002) and Lee (2009) show the strong differences in sign, magnitude and signif-
icance of the estimated coefficients that occur if the existence of strategic interactions
between gasoline stations are ignored and only price levels are estimated using standard
techniques such as OLS estimation. Therefore, the empirical literature needs to model
strategic interaction properly in order to obtain meaningful results. Yet, the studies ex-
plicitly modeling price reaction functions also assume a symmetric competition between
firms as each study estimates only a single coefficient for the slope of the reaction functions
of all firms, instead of allowing for asymmetries as a result of spatially heterogeneous firms.
The next chapter presents an extension of the spokes model by Chen and Riordan (2007)
which allows for an asymmetric spatial distribution of firms. To my knowledge, this ex-
tension is the first attempt to model spatial competition in an environment in which firms
differ 1) in their number of neighbors 2) in their degree of spatial differentiation, i.e. firms
are neither distributed equidistantly nor symmetrically. The propositions resulting from
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this model will be tested for the retail gasoline market because of the special characteristics
of this market, which were discussed at the beginning of Section 2.2 above.
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3 Centrality and Pricing in a Theoretical Spokes Model15
The original spokes model introduced by Chen and Riordan (2007), which was briefly
discussed in Section 2.1.1, is of particularly relevance in situations of non-localized com-
petition. For instance, symmetrical competition between firms as modeled by Chen and
Riordan (2007) is likely to exist in online markets, in which different retailers sell similar
products, or in conventional retailing if one shop sells a number of similar products of
different brands. For instance, a consumer who wants to purchase a white shirt at a de-
partment store of his choice has to decide between shirts of different brands. However, this
thesis is focused on spatially differentiated markets characterized by localized competition.
In such markets retailers are distributed throughout the market space, which is defined by
a network of roads and intersections. Due to the spatial structure of the road network,
spatial asymmetries arise in two dimensions in many (retail) markets:
1. Some firms are closer to other firms
2. Some firms have more neighboring firms than others
The first type of asymmetry has been considered theoretically by Fik (1991b) and ana-
lyzed in several empirical applications (see the discussion of related empirical literature
in Section 2.2.2). Very few theoretical models (see Section 2.1.2) tackle the strong as-
sumptions of a strictly one-dimensional space that by its nature does not allow more than
one competitor on each side of a line or a circle and in which the only difference in the
number of neighbors is that the outermost firms on a line have one neighbor while all other
firms have two neighbors. The models in Section 2.1.2, e.g. Braid (1989), Fik (1991a) or
Balasubramanian (1998), allow firms to differ in their centrality (i.e. the number of direct
competitors) but again, firms are distributed symmetrically throughout a highly stylized
market space.
The modified spokes model presented in this chapter is the first attempt to model com-
petition between spatially heterogeneous firms in a framework that incorporates both di-
mensions of asymmetry. The market structure is simple but quite realistic for markets
in which space is the main source of differentiation. Firms differ in the degree of spatial
15This chapter is based on the paper “Centrality and Pricing in Differentiated Markets: The Case of
Gasoline” by Firgo et al. (2011).
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differentiation, i.e. their distance to adjacent neighbors, and in the degree of network
centrality, i.e. the number of neighbors. While some firms are located close to a central
intersection of spokes (roads), some firms are located further off. Figure 2 shows the idea
of this asymmetric spokes model in detail.
Figure 2: An asymmetric spokes model
Figure 2 describes an asymmetric spokes model for N = 4 spokes, the central firm (C),
and n = 2 remote (peripheral) firms (Ri), with i = 1, ..., n. For central and remote firms I
will stick to the following notation: C is the unique central firm, R refers to remote firms
in general, Ri refers to one particular and Rj , with j 6= i, to all other remote firms. C is
defined as the firm closest to the market center; all other firms in the market are considered
as remote firms.16 A number of assumptions for this model are presented in the following
Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 I derive price reaction (best response) functions for central and
remote firms that lead to a set of propositions, which are discussed in Section 3.4.
16The linear city model by Hotelling (1929) with dC 6= di is a special case of the asymmetric spokes model
with N = 2 and n = 1. The star-shaped model by Braid (1989) corresponds to an asymmetric spokes
model with N = n− 1, dC = 0 and di = dj∀i, i.e. all spokes are occupied by a firm, the central firm is
located right at the center and all remote firms are located equidistantly.
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3.1 Framework and Assumptions
This section lists the assumptions of the asymmetric spokes model:
a) N ≥ 2 spokes of standardized length l are connected through a central intersection,
the market center.
b) Each spoke hosts one firm at most and 0 ≤ d ≤ l is the distance a firm is located
away from the center.
c) Consumers are uniformly distributed throughout the spokes network.
d) Search costs are zero. Consumers have perfect information about the utility sC (si)
and the price pC (pi) of the product sold by each firm.
e) Consumers face constant transportation costs t per unit of distance they have to
travel from their own location x to the location of the firm of their choice.
f) For each consumer the net utility of consumption is strictly positive and each con-
sumer purchases exactly one unit of the product per period, i.e. the market is covered.
g) Firms sell a spatially differentiated but otherwise homogeneous product, thus sC =
si = s.17
h) Firms have constant marginal costs cC (ci). Fixed costs are normalized to zero for
convenience.
i) Locations of firms are fixed and there is no entry or exit.
j) There is always exactly one central firm C and a finite number of 1 ≤ n < N remote
firms Ri with i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The central firm is the firm located closest to the
market center, thus dC < di,∀i.
k) Each firm sells a strictly positive quantity and there exists a Nash-equilibrium in
prices with the central firm serving consumers on empty spokes.
l) To ensure the existence of a Nash-Equilibrium a so-called Modified Zero Conjectural
Variation (MZCV) behavior is assumed18, i.e. firms do not undercut rivals’ prices to
17With respect to the empirical applications to the retail gasoline market this assumption seems very
plausible. According to a 1997 Sheffield, England household survey only 20% of respondents believe that
there are quality differences between gasoline station brands at all (Ning and Haining, 2003).
18See Eaton and Lipsey (1978) and Braid (1989) for details on the MZCV, which is also known in the
literature as the ‘no mill-price undercutting assumption’.
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steal consumers on empty spokes or in the hinterland of a rival. A justification of
the MZCV in the setting of the asymmetric spokes model is given in Appendix A.
Further, the existence of a Nash-equilibrium is assured by restricting N/n ≤ 2. The
necessity of this restriction is discussed in detail at the end of Section 3.2.
3.2 Pricing in a Nash-Bertrand Equilibrium
As illustrated by the short orthogonal lines in Figure 2 and following assumption k), the
market area of C borders with all R, but the market areas of each Ri do not border with
one another as the market area of C extends its own spoke. The boundary of the market
area of each firm can be identified by calculating the location of the marginal consumer,
who is exactly indifferent between buying at C or at the Ri closest to him. The location
of the marginal consumer is at the location (xi) where the net utility of consuming at C
is equal to the net utility of consuming at Ri,
s− pC − t(dC + xi) = s− pi − t(di − xi). (1)
The left-hand side of equation (1) describes the net utility of a consumer buying the
product at C. The utility (s) is reduced by the price pC and the transportation costs,
which are a product of the distance the consumer has to travel to the location of C times
the transportation costs per unit. The travel distance is equal to the distance the consumer
has to travel to the center (xi) plus the distance (dC) that C is located from the center.19
The right hand side describes the net utility of consuming at Ri. As the marginal consumer
xi is located on the same spoke as Ri, the distance from xi to Ri is given by di − xi.
Rearranging equation (1) and solving for xi leads to
xi =
pi − pC + t(di − dC)
2t
. (2)
In other words, the locations of the marginal consumers and thus the location of the market
boundaries depend on differences in the prices charged by C and Ri, and on differences in
the distances they are located from the center.
In modeling competition I build on a standard Bertrand-model of price competition with
19Due to assumption k) the marginal consumer is always located at a spoke different from C.
24
differentiated products. This model typically starts with the demand function, in which
demand for a firm depends negatively on its own price, and positively on those of its rivals.
I begin with modeling consumers’ choice, which allows me to stick to the notation above.
A firm’s profit function can be denoted as the profit per unit (assumption h)) times the
number of units sold, which is equal to the number of consumers purchasing the product
at the respective firm (assumption f)). With the information given, the profit and reaction
function of each firm can be derived. By the nature of the model, different functions must
be considered for C and R. The profit function of C can be denoted as follows:
πC = (pC − cC)
[
n∑
i=1
xi + l(N − n)
]
. (3)
The first term within the square brackets accounts for all consumers located at the spoke of
Ri who consume at C. The second term accounts for all spokes on which remote firms are
absent, as consumers located along these spokes always purchase at C. Inserting equation
(2) into equation (3), the profit function of C can be rewritten as
πC = (pC − cC)


n∑
i=1
pi − npC + t
(
n∑
i=1
di − ndC
)
2t
+ l(N − n)

 . (4)
In order to obtain the price reaction function of C, the first order condition of the profit
function has to be derived.
∂πC
∂pC
=
1
2t
[
n∑
i=1
pi − 2npC + t
(
n∑
i=1
di − ndC
)
+ ncC
]
+ l(N − n) = 0 (5)
Rearranging terms and solving for pC leads to the reaction function of C:
pC =
1
2
[∑n
i=1 pi
n
+ t
(∑n
i=1 di
n
− dC
)
+ cC
]
+ tl
(
N − n
n
)
. (6)
The profit maximizing price of C increases with the average price of the R and with the
ratio of spokes not occupied by remote firms. The average degree of spatial differentiation
(the distance to the center) of the R increases the profit maximizing price of C while C’s
own degree of spatial differentiation decreases this price. The profit maximizing price also
increases with the per unit transportation costs t, with the marginal costs cC and with the
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length of the spokes l.
As the market area of Ri never exceeds its own spoke, it only borders with the market
area of C. The profit function of Ri is given by
πi = (pi − ci)(l − xi). (7)
Inserting equation (2) into (7) leads to the profit function of Ri:
πi = (pi − ci)
(
l −
pi − pC + t(di − dC)
2t
)
. (8)
The first order condition of this function is given by
∂πi
∂pi
= l −
2pi − pC + t(di − dC)− ci
2t
= 0. (9)
Rearranging terms and solving for pi yields the price reaction function of Ri:
pi =
1
2
[pC + t(dC − di) + ci] + tl. (10)
The profit maximizing price of Ri increases with the price charged by C and with C’s de-
gree of spatial differentiation, but decreases with Ri’s own degree of spatial differentiation.
The constant terms ci, t and l also increase Ri’s profit maximizing price.
Based on the price reaction functions, the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium prices can be
solved. However, the calculations of equilibrium prices would yield quite complex results
with little illustrative power because of the asymmetries in the distance firms are located
from the center. Thus, in a fist step I calculate equilibrium prices of central and remote
firms under the assumption of an equidistant distribution of the remote firms. In a second
step I relax this assumption and simulate equilibrium prices for a set of different scenarios
with predetermined numerical values of the key parameters.
Inserting equation (10) into equation (6) and solving for pC and pi leads to the equi-
librium prices of central (p∗C) and remote firms (p
∗
i ) under the assumption of di = dj ,∀j,
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with j = {1, ..., n}.
p∗C = cC +
1
3
t
(
di − dC − 2l +
4lN
n
)
, (11)
p∗i = ci +
1
3
t
(
dC − di + 2l +
2lN
n
)
.
Assuming cC = ci, the difference in equilibrium prices of central and remote firms under
the assumption of di = dj ,∀j, with j = {1, ..., n} is thus given by
p∗C − p
∗
i =
2t
3
(di − dC − 2l) +
2Ntl
3n
, (12)
with −4tl/3 < 2t(di − dC − 2l)/3 ≤ −2tl/3,20 and with 2Ntl/(3n) > 2tl/3, as N > n.
Thus, under the assumptions of di = dj ,∀j, and cC = ci, the price charged by C is higher
than the price charged by Ri, if and only if N/n > 2− (di − dc)/l.
From the equilibrium prices p∗C and p
∗
i , it is also possible to calculate the location of xi.
Inserting these equilibrium prices of the equations in (11) into equation (2), the equilibrium
location of the marginal consumer (x∗i ) results in
x∗i =
1
6
(
di − dC + 4l −
2lN
n
)
> 0, (13)
as for assumption k) to hold it is required that xi > 0. Otherwise the empty spokes and
central parts of occupied spokes are not served by the central firm and the profit functions
in equations (3) and (7) would be wrong. From (13) it follows that in order to assure that
xi > 0, it is necessary that the condition N/n < 2 + (di − dC)/(2l) is true. Note that
N/n ≤ 2 is a sufficient condition for xi > 0 as (di − dC)/(2l) > 0.
3.3 Some Numerical Simulations
An illustration of the findings about equilibrium prices if the assumption of di = dj ,∀j
is relaxed, can be achieved through numerical simulations. Table 1 shows the results of
several numerical simulations testing the changes in prices, profits and locations of the
marginal consumer if ceteris paribus changes are made in the number of spokes (N), the
20It is true that −4tl/3 < 2t(di − dC − 2l)/3 rather than −4tl/3 ≤ 2t(di − dC − 2l)/3 because assumption
j) assures that dC < di∀i.
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number of remote firms (n), or the firms’ distances to the center (dC and di).
Table 1: Numerical simulations of equilibrium prices and profits
N=7 N=6 N=5
Firm Distance xi Price Profits xi Price Profits xi Price Profits
C dc = 0.10 1.833 6.722 1.500 4.500 1.167 2.722
R1 d1 = 0.30 0.092 1.817 1.650 0.175 1.650 0.209 0.258 1.483 0.188
R2 d2 = 0.50 0.142 1.717 1.473 0.225 1.550 0.196 0.308 1.383 0.175
R3 d3 = 0.70 0.192 1.617 1.307 0.275 1.450 0.184 0.358 1.283 0.162
R4 d5 = 0.90 0.242 1.517 1.150 0.325 1.350 0.171 0.400 1.183 0.150
N=6 N=6 N=6
Firm Distance xi Price Profits xi Price Profits xi Price Profits
C dc = 0.10 1.500 4.500 1.689 3.356 3.433 11.788
R1 d1 = 0.30 0.175 1.650 0.209 0.128 1.744 0.187 -0.308 2.617 3.423
R2 d2 = 0.50 0.225 1.550 0.196 0.178 1.644 0.174 -0.258 2.517 3.167
R3 d3 = 0.70 0.275 1.450 0.184 0.228 1.544 0.162
R4 d5 = 0.90 0.325 1.350 0.171
N=4
Firm Distance xi Price Profits
C dc = 0.10 2.283 5.214
R1 d1 = 0.90 0.129 1.742 1.517
R2 d2 = 1.00 0.154 1.692 1.431
N=4
Firm Distance xi Price Profits
C dc = 0.10 2.025 4.101
R1 d1 = 0.15 0.006 1.988 1.975
R2 d2 = 0.20 0.019 1.963 1.926
N=4
Firm Distance xi Price Profits
C dc = 0.90 2.025 4.101
R1 d1 = 0.95 0.006 1.988 1.975
R2 d2 = 1.00 0.019 1.963 1.926
While N , n, dC and di may vary, t = 1, l = 1, and cC = Ci = 0 are held constant
throughout all simulations as changes resulting from varying these parameters are not of
particular interest at this point. The top section of Table 1 shows that, for n = 4 and the
given di, the central firm charges the highest price in the market when N = 7. If N is
reduced to N = 6 the number of spokes completely served by the central firm decreases
from 3 to 2. This loss of consumers on an additional empty spoke makes it attractive for
the central firm to gain consumers on the n spokes hosting the remote firms by lowering
its price. If the number of spokes is reduced to N = 5, all spokes are occupied by firms.
The central firm now charges the lowest price of all firms in the market in order to steal
consumers from the spokes of the remote firms. In a nutshell, the higher the number of
empty spokes, which raises the demand for the central firm, the less attractive it is for this
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firm to compete for consumers at the spokes of remote firms.
The middle section of Table 1 shows that if the number of spokes is held constant (N = 6)
while n is reduced, at some point the price difference between central and remote firms
becomes too big to assure that the marginal consumer xi is located at the spoke of firm
i but it rather moves to the spoke of C. This scenario, however, is not compatible with
assumption k) and leads to profit functions different from equations (3) and (7). Therefore,
I impose the restriction of N/n ≤ 2 in assumption l) which is sufficient for assumption k)
to hold, irrespective of relative differences in dC and di.
The bottom section of Table 1 varies the absolute and relative distances of the central
and remote firms. Profits for the central firm (remote firms) are higher (lower) if the
remote firms are located further from the center or if the central firm is located closer
to the center. However, the results remain unchanged if all firms move equally and the
distances between firms do not change. Thus, the profit maximizing prices only change
with changes in the relative distances C and Ri are located from the center.
3.4 Propositions
A comparison of the price reaction functions and the equilibrium prices of C and Ri in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 highlights the impact of centrality on firms’ pricing behavior. Three
effects are worth to be highlighted:
Proposition 1 - Centrality and asymmetric competition: Firms respond more
strongly to price changes by a central firm than to price changes by a remote
firm. Centrality implies an asymmetry in the firms’ price reaction functions, given by
∂pi
∂pC
=
1
2
>
1
2n
=
∂pC
∂pi
,
∂pj
∂pi
= 0, ∀n > 1. (14)
The price reaction function of a remote firm (Ri) in equation (10) and Figure 3 illustrates
that two remote firms never compete for the same customer. A price change of one remote
firm Ri thus has no direct impact on another remote firm Rj . Remote firms have only
one competitor, namely the central firm, and the price response of the remote firm to a
change in the price of the central firm will thus be relatively strong. The central firm C,
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on the other hand, has n direct competitors. If n is large, a change in the price of one
remote competitor will be of relatively minor importance and will trigger a relatively small
price response by the central firm. Thus, the optimal price of a central firm becomes less
sensitive to price changes of an individual remote firm if the number of remote firms (n)
increases. The asymmetries in the price reaction functions are illustrated in Figure 3(a)
and 3(b).
Figure 3: Price reaction functions of central and remote firms
(a) Central and Remote Firm (b) Two Remote Firms
Proposition 2 - Centrality and the transmission of shocks: The impact of
an individual exogenous shock21 on equilibrium prices will depend on whether
the shock originates from the central or a remote firm. The fact that centrality is
associated with a larger number of direct competitors also implies that a shock by a single
firm will diffuse differently if originating from a central or a remote firm, respectively.
Starting from equilibrium prices, in the counterfactual experiment that the marginal costs
of C change by ∂cC , the change in the price of C is ∂pC = (1/2)∂cC . The reaction of
each Ri is equal to (1/2)∂pC and thus (1/2)(1/2)∂cC . However, the reaction of each Ri
again causes a reaction by C, which again causes a reaction in the prices of every Ri.
The process continues until a new equilibrium is reached. The total impact of ∂cC on
equilibrium prices (p∗C) and (p
∗
i ) is denoted in the equations in (15), and the total impact
21E.g. a cost shock of one particular gasoline station after a change in the ownership (a takeover).
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of ∂ci on equilibrium prices (p∗C) and (p
∗
i ) in the equations in (16).
∂p∗C +
n∑
i=1
∂p∗i
∂cC
=
1
2
∂cC + n
1
22
∂cC +
1
23
∂cC + n
1
24
∂cC +
1
25
∂cC + . . . , (15)
∂p∗C +
n∑
i=1
∂p∗i
∂cC
=
1
2
(
∞∑
a=0
(
1
2
)2a
+ n
∞∑
a=0
(
1
2
)2a+1)
∂cC ,
∂p∗C +
n∑
i=1
∂p∗i
∂ci
=
1
2
∂ci +
1
22n
∂ci +
1
23
∂ci +
1
24n
∂ci +
1
25
∂ci + . . . , (16)
∂p∗C +
n∑
i=1
∂p∗i
∂ci
=
1
2
(
∞∑
a=0
(
1
2
)2a
+
1
n
∞∑
a=0
(
1
2
)2a+1)
∂ci.
Assuming that ∂cC = ∂ci = ∂c, the difference between the total impact of a shock origi-
nating from C and Ri is equal to
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂p∗C +
n∑
i=1
∂p∗i
∂cC
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂p∗C +
n∑
i=1
∂p∗i
∂ci
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ∂c
n2 − 1
2n
∞∑
a=0
(
1
2
)2a+1
> 0,∀n > 1, (17)
lim
a→∞
∞∑
a=0
(
1
2
)2a+1
=
2
3
.
Proposition 3 - Centrality and price levels: The effect of centrality on firms’
equilibrium prices is ambiguous. A shorter distance to the center, i.e. a more central
location, increases a firm’s demand, which leads to higher prices, ceteris paribus. This
effect comes from the fact that firms do not lose consumers in the hinterland of their spoke
when they are located closer to the center, but C (Ri) gains consumers on the spokes
occupied by remote firms (on its own spoke) when it is located closer to the center. The
analysis of equilibrium price levels (equation (12) and simulations in Section 3.3) shows
that C charges lower prices than (some of) the remote firms if the ratio of empty spokes
to firms is low. In other words, if – all other things equal – the number of remote firms
increases or the number of consumers lacking nearby firms decreases, the equilibrium price
of the central firm can be lower than equilibrium prices of remote firms. Therefore, no
clear-cut conclusion can be drawn on differences in the price levels of central and remote
firms.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter I have extended the spokes model by Chen and Riordan (2007) to allow for
spatial asymmetries between firms in a sense that firms differ 1) in the number of neighbors
and 2) in the distances between firms. Calculating the price reaction functions and equilib-
rium prices leads to three propositions about the consequences of these spatial asymmetries
for the strategic interaction between central and remote firms, for price the levels of these
two groups of firms, and for their role in the transmission of shocks on equilibrium prices.
These propositions suggest that there are substantial differences in the role of central and
remote firms in a localized competition market. The model suggests that the central firm
acts like a market-leader kind of firm by the sole fact that its pricing decision affects all
other firms in the market, while the influence of an individual non-central (remote) firm
decreases with the number of remote firms in the market. The three propositions made
in this chapter will be tested in two empirical analyses on the retail gasoline market in
Chapters 5 and 6.
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4 Selected Aspects of Spatial Econometrics
The main goal of this thesis is to investigate differences in the pricing behavior of firms
depending on their location in a market space. As proposed in the theoretical model of
Chapter 3, firms play a pricing game and consider the prices of rivals in their own pricing
decision. In the firms’ price reaction functions in equations (6) and (10), the variable
price appears on both sides of each of the equations. In order to test the propositions
of Section 3.4, I focus on estimating price reaction functions for a sample or population
of different firms rather than the price reaction function of an individual firm. If firms
in a market set their prices simultaneously and conditionally upon the expected prices of
other firms, then the economic problem is a spatial one from an econometric point of view
(Pinkse and Slade, 2010, p. 108). The term spatial does not necessarily refer to space
in the narrower sense but to a dependence of actions of an individual agent on actions of
other agents. The existence of spatial dependence has a number of consequences for the
econometric analysis of a problem. These consequences and the econometric specification
of price reaction functions shall be discussed in the following subsections.22
4.1 Spatial Dependence and Spatial Models
The standard linear regression model23 assumes that in a sample of n observations a
variable y depends on a set of k exogenous variables stored in the matrix X (including or
excluding a constant) and is usually denoted as
y = Xβ + ǫ, (18)
ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2I),
where y is of dimension n× 1 and X of dimension n× k. β is the k× 1 vector of the coef-
ficients of the exogenous variables and ǫ is the n× 1 vector of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) error terms with zero mean, E(ǫ) = 0, and a homoskedastic variance
σ2, with E(ǫǫ′) = σ2I, where I is an n×n identity matrix. In case of spatial dependence24
22As a basis for further reading in the field of spatial econometrics I recommend a recent publication by
Anselin (2010) titled ‘Thirty years of spatial econometrics’. In this paper Anselin provides a comprehen-
sive review of advances of all kinds in the field of spatial econometrics in their chronological order, from
its beginning in the late 1970s to most recent findings.
23See e.g. Greene (2008).
24‘Spatial dependence’ and ‘spatial autocorrelation’ are commonly used synonymously in the literature and
are also used as synonyms in this thesis.
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of the dependent variable y on the values of y and/ or on (some variables in) X of other
observations, not all relevant information determining y is included in the set of explana-
tory variables X. The spatial dependence will enter the error term ei, which violates the
assumption of i.i.d. error terms and will thus lead to an inefficiency in the variance of the
coefficients estimated. Therefore, t-statistics and several tests for misspecification will be
biased (Anselin and Rey, 1991, p. 113). As a consequence, the necessity of accounting for
spatial dependence in the regression model arises from a statistical motivation. A violation
of the assumption of i.i.d. error terms due to spatial dependence can be detected by a set
of different specification tests introduced in Section 4.3 below. However, modeling spatial
dependence may also be motivated economically. LeSage and Pace (2009, chap. 2) list the
main motivations based on theoretical grounds for considering spatial models. These can
be an expected spatial heterogeneity of observations due to regional differences or similari-
ties, interaction and spillovers between observations in the dependent variable, externalities
in the exogenous variables and diffusion in a space-time context. Depending on the na-
ture of spatial dependence, different specifications for a correct regression model must be
considered.25 These shall be introduced and labeled as in LeSage and Pace (2009, p. 32f).26
If spatial dependence cannot be related to any observable variable but is likely to arise
from an unobserved spatial heterogeneity of observations, the correct model is the so-called
spatial error model (SEM):
y = Xβ + u, (19)
u = λWu+ ǫ,
ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2I).
In the second equation of (19), W is an n× n spatial weights matrix storing the informa-
tion of the spatial relationships between the n observations. wij is different from zero if
observation j is relevant for i in the determination of the spatial dependence. I stick to
the term ‘neighbors’ if i and j interact and thus if wij 6= 0. Details on possible designs of
W will be given in Section 4.2 below. λ is the coefficient of spatial autocorrelation of the
25I focus on local spatial autocorrelation. For a survey of specifications modeling global spatial autocorre-
lation see Anselin (2003).
26I deviate from LeSage and Pace (2009) by including a constant into the matrix of exogenous variables
X.
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error terms.
In many cases, however, the value of yi of observation i explicitly depends on the value
yj of another observation, e.g. the output or pricing decision of one firm in a duopoly
depends on the price of the other firm in the market. Thus, a correct specification requires
an inclusion of the values of y of other observations influencing a particular observation’s
y. The values of y of other relevant observations usually enter the equation as a (weighted)
sum or average (Anselin and Rey, 1991, p. 113). The specification in equation (20) is
known as a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model.
y = ρWy +Xβ + ǫ, (20)
y = (I − ρW )−1(Xβ + ǫ),
ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2I).
Wy is the spatial lag of the dependent variable and ρ is the coefficient of spatial au-
tocorrelation of the dependent variable. The reduced form equation in (20) shows the
multidirectional character of spatial dependence. (I − ρW )−1 can be interpreted similarly
to a Leontief-Inverse and is serves as a spatial multiplier because
(I − ρW )−1 = I + ρW + ρ2W 2 + ρ3W 3 + . . . . (21)
As a consequence all observations are connected to each other indirectly via W unless the
sample consists of different ‘islands’ that do not interact with each other. In such a case
W is block diagonal and interaction takes place within blocks only. With usually |ρ| < 1
and with W usually being row-normalized, the influence of neighbors of higher order will
become the smaller, the higher the order of neighborhood (Anselin, 2003, p. 155f).
If there is a suspicion that spatial dependence exists in both in observable and unob-
servable factors, a general (SAC) model including a spatial lag and a spatial error can be
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applied.
y = ρW1y +Xβ + u, (22)
u = λW2u+ ǫ,
y = (I − ρW1)
−1Xβ + (I − ρW1)
−1(I − λW2)ǫ,
ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2I).
The spatial pattern leading to a spatial dependence in y can be different from the pattern
leading to spatial dependence in the error terms. Thus,W1 may or may not be equal toW2.
In some cases y may also depend on WX, e.g. due to externalities. The specification
that accounts for this extension of the SAR model is known as the spatial Durbin model
(SDM)
y = ρWy +Xβ +WXγ + ǫ, (23)
y = (I − ρW )−1(Xβ +WXγ + ǫ),
ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2I),
where γ is the k × 1 vector of coefficients of WX. In case ρ = 0, there is only a spatial
lag of X (a so-called SLX model). Some models, e.g. the empirical models introduced in
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, may require more than one spatial lag. A SAR or SDM
model with more than one spatial lag can be formulated as follows (LeSage and Pace, 2009,
p. 52):
y =
L∑
l
ρlWly +Xβ +
L∑
l
WlXγl + ǫ, (24)
ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2I),
where l ≤ L is the index of the lag and L is the total number of lags.
The actual choice of the model can be driven by theory and/or by statistics. Whether
a spatial lag or a spatial error (or both) should be included in a regression model from a
statistical point of view can be tested through a number of tests, which are introduced in
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Section 4.3 below.
4.2 The Spatial Weights Matrix
Besides the choice of a proper model in the presence of spatial dependence, a proper de-
sign of the spatial weights matrix W is also an important issue. Two main considerations
have to be made: Who is directly related to whom and to what extent? Generally, W
is designed such that wij 6= 0 if j is related to i and wij = 0 otherwise.27 The value of
wij 6= 0 can be either binary so that wij = 1 if j is related to i, or weighted by the distance
(dij) between i and j.28 To follow Tobler’s first law of geography (Tobler, 1970) a higher
weight is usually put on nearer neighbors, e.g. wij = 1/dij or wij = 1/d2ij . Usually W
is row-normalized in order to facilitate the interpretation of the parameters ρ and λ, and
the comparability of different models (Anselin, 2002, p. 257). In a row-normalized matrix,
w∗ij = wij/
∑
j wij , and 0 ≤ w
∗
ij ≤ 1. As a consequence, w
∗
ij = w
∗
ji is not a necessary
condition and W may become asymmetric. The main advantage of row-normalizing W
is that the values of the spatially lagged variable(s) can be interpreted as a (weighted)
average of the value of neighboring observations (Liu and Lee, 2010, pp. 99f).
In the literature three29 concepts have mainly been used to account for spatial depen-
dence between two observations i and j:
(i) wij 6= 0 if i and j are adjacent neighbors.
(ii) wij 6= 0 if j is located within a critical distance of i.
(iii) wij 6= 0 if j is among the k-nearest neighbors of i.
While neighborhood between two observations is necessarily mutual in the adjacent neigh-
bor criterion (i), this is not necessarily the case in (ii) and (iii). When applying critical
27Self neighborhood is usually excluded so that wii = 0.
28Distance does not only apply to spatial distance. Also concepts of economic distance, e.g. Conley and
Ligon (2002) and Conley and Topa (2002), and non-spatial distance have been used for the construction of
W . Examples for the latter are the similarity of different brands of beer through alcohol strength (Pinkse
and Slade, 2004), the proximity of juices through brand, flavor, sugar, etc. (Pofahl and Richards, 2009),
and the similarity of different brands of ice cream through their volume and nutrition facts (Richards
et al., 2010).
29See Getis and Aldstadt (2004) for a comprehensive survey of theoretical concepts of constructing spa-
tial weights matrices and Stakhovych and Bijmolt (2009) for a very recent literature survey on the
construction of W .
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distances between observations, a mutual direct relation is only given if Euclidean dis-
tances (radii) are used. If distance is measured by the driving distance on the road, for
instance, dij 6= dji may be a result of one-way streets. As for k-nearest neighborhood, if
j is among the k nearest neighbors of i and i is located at a rather remote place while j
is quite central and has at least k neighbors located closer to j than j to i, then wij 6= 0
while wji = 0. Thus, using the criteria (ii) and (iii) an observation may directly influence
another observation but not the other way around.
The choice of the criterion and the calculation of the weights depends on the context of
research but, as Anselin (2002, p. 257) puts it, the “specification of the weights matrix is a
matter of some arbitrariness . . . ”. A construction of W through an adjacent neighborhood
is most likely preferred when observations are regions like districts or countries.30 When
observations are points in space, e.g. the locations of firms, mostly criteria (ii) or (iii) are
applied. Anselin (2002, p. 258) argues that, in case of
“a high degree of heterogeneity in the spatial distribution of points or in the
areas of regions, there may be no satisfactory critical distance. In those in-
stances, a ‘small’ distance will tend to yield a lot of islands (or, unconnected
observations). Also, a distance chosen to ensure that each unit has at least one
neighbor may result in an unacceptably large number of neighbors”
for other observations. Thus, in case of a heterogeneous spatial distribution, the construc-
tion of W using a k-nearest neighborhood constraint may be preferable.31
4.3 Tests for Spatial Autocorrelation
As discussed in Section 4.1, spatial dependence leads to misspecification if ignored. The
literature provides a number of tests for the H0 of no spatial dependence against the H1
of spatial dependence (diffuse tests) or spatial dependence including suggestions about a
proper specification (focused tests). The following paragraphs provide a summary of the
most common tests of spatial dependence as discussed by Anselin et al. (1996) and Florax
and de Graaff (2004).
30For a recent example see Becker et al. (2009) who analyze a SAR model of corruption on a country level.
31See Pennerstorfer (2009) for a recent contribution using different critical distances to estimate spatial
error autocorrelation in retail gasoline prices and Lambert et al. (2010) for a recent empirical application
of a k-nearest neighbor spatial weights matrix to the locational choice of start-up firms.
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4.3.1 Moran’s I
The diffuse Moran’s I (Moran, 1950) tests the H0 of no spatial dependence against the
H1 of spatial dependence based on the OLS residuals of the model y = Xβ + ǫ. The test
statistic I is equal to
I =
n
S
×
ǫ′Wǫ
ǫ′ǫ
, (25)
where n is the number of observations, S is the sum of all elements of W and ǫ is the n×1
vector of the OLS residuals.32 A popular interpretation of the coefficient I is that it reflects
the coefficient of spatial autocorrelation (ρ). However, Anselin (1988b, p. 102) points out
that this interpretation is not correct. As illustrated in equation (25), I is equivalent to a
regression of Wǫ on ǫ and thus (loosely speaking) reflects the extent to which the spatially
lagged error terms Wǫ can be explained by the actual error terms ǫ. ρ, however, reflects
the extent to which a variable can be explained by a spatially lagged variable. For the case
discussed here, this would be equivalent to a regression of ǫ on Wǫ rather than a regression
of Wǫ on ǫ. Though I is not a good means of measuring ρ, especially if ρ is not close to
zero (Li et al., 2007), it can be used to detect spatial dependence, however, without the
possibility of drawing a specific conclusion other than its existence.
The expected value E of I in case of no spatial dependence is E(I) = 1/(n − 1). The
statistical inference for Moran’s I test can be based on z-values under the assumption of
normality or other assumptions (Florax and de Graaff, 2004, p. 35f). In a standard normal
distribution (see e.g. Greene (2008, pp.991f)), zI is equal to
zI =
I − E(I)
SD(I)
, (26)
where SD(I) is the standard deviation of Moran’s I from its expected value.
4.3.2 LM Tests
As a diffuse test, Moran’s I can be used to detect spatial dependence but it does not direct
towards a specific alternative specification (Florax and de Graaff, 2004, pp. 37). Thus, in
order to test whether a spatial lag or a spatial error model is more appropriate, tests that
32Note that in case of a row-normalized W with row-sums equal to one, n/S is also equal to one, as
S = n× 1 (Florax and de Graaff, 2004, p. 35).
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focus on either spatial model are necessary. A set of LM tests using the residuals (ǫ) and
the variance σ2 = ǫ′ǫ/n of an OLS regression model as denoted in equation (18) and with
W1 = W2 = W , where W1 (W2) is the spatial weights matrix for the spatial lag (error)33,
tests the H0 of no spatial dependence (i.e., ρ = 0, λ = 0) against the alternative hypothesis
defined by each LM test.34 All LM tests introduced here are asymptotically distributed as
χ21. The LM-error test (LMλ) was introduced by Burridge (1980), and tests the H0 of no
spatial autocorrelation against the H1: λ 6= 0, i.e. a spatial correlation in the error terms,
under the assumption of no spatial lag (ρ = 0):
LMλ =
(
ǫ′Wǫ/σ2
)2
T
, (27)
with the trace expression T = tr [(W ′ +W )W ]. Alternatively, there is a so-called ‘robust’
version of the LM error test (LM∗λ) introduced by Bera and Yoon (1993) testing the same
H1 including a nuisance parameter ρ which may or may not be zero.
LM∗λ =
[
ǫ′Wǫ/σ2 − T (nJ)−1 ǫ′Wy/σ2
]2
T
[
1− T (nJ)−1
] , (28)
with
J =
1
nσ2
[
(WXβ)′M(WXβ) + Tσ2
]
, (29)
where n is the number of observations andM = I−X(X ′X)−1X ′, with I being an identity
matrix of dimension n × n. LM∗λ also tests whether there is a spatial dependence in the
error, but in contrast to LMλ is robust to the existence (ρ 6= 0) or absence (ρ = 0) of a
spatial lag.
LM tests also exist for the H1: ρ 6= 0 under the assumption that λ = 0 for the classical
LM-lag test (LMρ) as introduced by Anselin (1988a), and for a ‘robust’ version (LM∗ρ )
that is robust to the existence (λ 6= 0) or absence (λ = 0) of a spatial dependence in the
error terms. The robust version (LM∗ρ ) of this test was also introduced by Bera and Yoon
33See Anselin et al. (1996) for the case of W1 6= W2.
34The tests here are introduced as in Anselin et al. (1996, p. 83f) using a slightly different notation which
is consistent with the notation of equations (19) to (23) above.
40
(1993):
LMρ =
[
ǫ′Wy/σ2
]2
nJ
, (30)
and
LM∗ρ =
[
ǫ′Wy/σ2 − ǫ′Wǫ/σ2
]2
nJ − T
. (31)
The literature provides guidelines on how to proceed if there is a presumption of spatial
dependence. The classical approach to test the correct specification in case of spatial
dependence using the LMρ and LMλ test can be formulated as follows (Florax et al., 2003,
p. 561):
1. Estimate the linear model y = Xβ + ǫ using OLS.
2. Test the H0 of no spatial dependence against an omitted spatial lag using the LMρ
test and against spatially autoregressive errors using the LMλ test.
3. If neither LMρ nor LMλ show significance, estimate the initial OLS specification as
in step 1.
4. If LMρ is significant but LMλ is not (LMλ is significant but LMρ is not), estimate
a SAR (SEM) model.
5. If both tests reject the H0 of no spatial dependence, estimate the model for which
the LM test shows a higher significance. In case LMρ > LMλ estimate a SAR model.
If, however, LMλ > LMρ, estimate a SEM specification.
The robust tests LM∗ρ and LM
∗
λ can be used instead of the classical versions LMρ and
LMλ. Florax et al. (2003, p. 562) suggest a hybrid strategy using both the classical and
the robust LM-tests using LM∗ρ and LM
∗
λ instead of the classical versions in step 5. Using
Monte Carlo simulations Florax et al. (2003) compare the approach of using the classical
with the approach of using the robust LM-tests. Their key finding is that the classical
strategy slightly dominates the robust one in power and accuracy. However, the results
also suggest that for large samples sizes and/or high degrees of spatial dependence both
approaches (asymptotically) yield the same results.
Besides these econometric guidelines in finding a proper specification, there may also be
reasons for choosing either a SAR or a SEM model based on economic theory. If the spatial
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lag itself is of particular interest as a variable, which is clearly the case in the estimation
of reaction functions of interacting firms, a spatial lag has to be included by necessity.
4.4 Consequences of Spatial Autocorrelation
While autocorrelation in time series is unidirectional (a time trend) and can be controlled
for by adding lagged variables in a linear regression model, (spatial) autocorrelation in a
cross-section is more complicated and multidirectional due to feedback effects (Pinkse and
Slade, 2010, p. 111). The price level in time period t is likely to depend on the price level
of period t−1, but not the other way around. However, the characteristics and decisions of
a firm i can affect a nearby firm j and the characteristics and decisions of firm j can affect
firm i. In other words, if I interact with my neighbors and my neighbor interacts with his
neighbors, then there will be feedback effects of my action as I am my neighbor’s neighbor.
While an omitted spatial lag will always lead to biased estimates, the omission of a spatial
error will not lead to a bias in the estimates but to inefficiency and thus to a bias in various
test statistics (Anselin and Rey, 1991, pp. 113f). The following Section 4.4.1 shows the
inconsistency of OLS estimates in case of spatial autocorrelation of the dependent variable.
Section 4.4.2 introduces alternative estimation techniques that properly account for spatial
dependence.
4.4.1 Ordinary Least Squares
The purpose of this section is to show why the multidirectional character of spatial auto-
correlation leads to biased and inconsistent OLS estimates. In contrast to autocorrelation
in time series, the inclusion of a spatial lag will still lead to biased OLS estimates, irre-
spective of a potential correction of the error correlation through the inclusion of the lag.
The following paragraphs are adopted from Anselin (1988b, p. 58). However, the notation
deviates from Anselin (1988b) to be consistent with the sections above. The case shall be
demonstrated using the pure spatial autoregressive model
y = ρWy + ǫ. (32)
The spatial lag shall be denoted as yL = Wy. Even if there are no exogenous regres-
sors, the effects can be illustrated without a loss of generality. The OLS estimate for the
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coefficient ρ is denoted as r and is equal to
r =
(
y′LyL
)−1
y′Ly. (33)
If y from equation (32) is substituted into equation (33), it can be rewritten as
r = ρ+
(
y′LyL
)−1
y′Lǫ, (34)
as the term ρy′LyL(y
′
LyL)
−1 cancels down to ρ. The OLS estimate r only equals the true
ρ if the second term on the right hand side of equation (34) cancels down to zero. This,
however, is only the case if there is no spatial correlation and thus only if ρ = 0.
In contrast to time series, the expected value E[y′Lǫ] 6= 0 even if the residuals are not auto-
correlated. As follows from equation (32), y = (I−ρW )−1ǫ and yL = Wy = W (I−ρW )−1ǫ.
Thus, E[y′Lǫ] = E{[W (I − ρW )
−1ǫ]′ǫ}, which again is only zero if ρ = 0. Also, the OLS
estimator will be inconsistent as the probability limit (plim) for y′Lǫ will be non-zero unless
ρ = 0 because plim n−1(y′Lǫ) = plim n
−1ǫ′W (I − ρW )−1ǫ, which will only equal zero if
ρ = 0.
To summarize the last paragraphs, except for the case of ρ = 0, the OLS estimator
will lead to biased and inconsistent parameters even if a spatial lag is included into the
model.35 In case of ρ = 0 with residual autocorrelation (λ 6= 0) the OLS estimator will
not be biased but inefficient (Anselin, 1988b, pp. 108f). Thus, approaches other than OLS
must be applied in order to obtain unbiased and efficient estimates. In the next section the
Maximum Likelihood approach will be introduced as a convenient and common estimation
technique for spatial models.
35Lee (2002) shows that in some cases OLS can be consistent if each unit has a very small spatial impact
on other units but is influenced aggregately by a large number of other units. In the usual case of
rather sparse spatial weights matrices, however, OLS will be inconsistent. In case of a purely spatial
autoregressive model y = ρWy + ǫ OLS will never lead to consistent estimates (Lee, 2002).
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4.4.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimations are popular in empirical applications of spatial
models.36 In general, ML is popular because of its large sample properties. The estimators
are consistent, asymptotically efficient and asymptotically normal (Greene, 2008, chap.
16.4). Anselin (1988b, p. 63) introduces a log-likelihood function for a SAC model that
additionally accounts for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Based on this function,
Lacombe (2004, p. 114) forms a log-likelihood function for a SAR model with two spatial
lags. LeSage and Pace (2009, p. 53) describe the log-likelihood function (ln L) for the
SAC model as follows:
ln L = −
n
2
ln
(
πσ2
)
+ ln |A|+ ln |B| −
ǫ′ǫ
2σ2
, (35)
ǫ = B (Ay −Xβ) ,
A = I − ρW1,
B = I − λW2.
Here n is the number of observations and σ2 is the (homoskedastic) variance of the residuals.
The model can also be implemented with W1 = W2 = W . The values for ρ, λ, σ2, and
the coefficients of β that maximize the log-likelihood function in (35) can be estimated in
an iterative process in which (ln L) is concentrated using software such as MATLAB.37 In
case of a SAR model (λ = 0), the log-likelihood function (35) is simplified to
ln L = −
n
2
ln
(
πσ2
)
+ ln |A| −
ǫ′ǫ
2σ2
, (36)
ǫ = (Ay −Xβ) ,
A = I − ρW,
as illustrated in LeSage and Pace (2009, p. 47). In case of the inclusion of a spatial lag
of X (SDM model), Xβ is replaced by Zδ where Z = [ι X WX], ι is a vector of ones
and X is the matrix of explanatory variables excluding the constant. δ is the vector of the
coefficients to be estimated and includes the constant, as well as the coefficients of X and
36In the context of spatial price competition the ML approach has been used e.g. by Netz and Taylor
(2002); Kalnins (2003); McMillen et al. (2007); Richards et al. (2008); Pennerstorfer (2009).
37See www.mathworks.com for details. For a large number of spatial econometric issues the website
www.spatial-econometrics.com provides a toolbox of functions and routines written for MATLAB.
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WX.38 For an application of multiple spatial lags in a SAR, SDM or SAC model the sim-
ple modification A = (I −
L∑
l
ρlWl) in the log-likelihood function (35) becomes necessary
(Lacombe, 2004, p. 114).39
Alternatives to the Maximum Likelihood approach in spatial models are two-stage least
squares estimates (2SLS) via instrumental variables (IV), generalized methods of moments
(GMM), or Bayesian models.40
4.5 The Spatial Multiplier
The feedback effects that occur in situations of spatial dependence have already been
discussed in Section 4.1. Section 4.5.1 illustrates the total impact of a shock (change) in
the dependent variable of one observation on the dependent variables of all observations.
Section 4.5.2 shows how the direct impacts of changes in the exogenous variables on the
dependent variable multiply through the spatial multiplier, and presents a method to
calculate the total impacts of exogenous variables that also include indirect (feedback)
effects.
4.5.1 Shocks in the Dependent Variable
The inverse (I − ρW )−1 as in equation (20) can be interpreted as a multiplier in the
change of the value of an observation’s variable. If there is a spatial lag, a change in the
dependent variable yi of observation i directly causes a change in the dependent variable yj
of a neighboring observation j. This reaction by observation j again causes a direct reaction
by observation i and so on. Assuming an equilibrium before the shock, the adjustment
process continues until a new equilibrium is reached. Let G be an n× n matrix with
G = (I − ρW )−1, (37)
then the element gij reflects the total change in the value of yi following a change in yj .
In the 1 × n vector s of the column-sums of G, the value of sj =
∑
i gij is the sum of
38The SLX model y = Xβ+WXγ+ǫ can be estimated via OLS because neitherW nor X are endogenous.
39Lacombe (2004) is one of very few empirical examples for a SAR model with multiple spatial lags.
Other examples include Kalnins (2003) and McMillen et al. (2007). Recent theoretical advances in the
specification of higher order SAR models come from Hays et al. (2010), and Lee and Liu (2010).
40See Lee (2007a) or Kelejian and Prucha (2010) for recent advances in spatial 2SLS and GMM models
and LeSage and Pace (2009, chap. 5) for an introduction into Bayesian spatial econometric models.
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changes in the values of the dependent variable y of all observations following a change in
yj by one, including the initial change itself. In making use of this multiplier one can for
instance compare the impact of different observations in a sample on equilibrium prices
and relate the findings to proposition 2 in Section 3.4, i.e. differences in the transmission
of individual shocks due to differences in the position within the market space.
4.5.2 Direct, Indirect and Total Effects
Similarly to yj , a change in the value of an exogenous variable xjr of j, with r = {1, 2, . . . , k},
where k is the number of exogenous variables in X, can have an impact on yi. In an SDM
specification a change in the value of an exogenous variable of j has a direct effect on yi
through the lagged WX. However, if there is a lagged dependent variable, there will also
be an effect of xjr on yi, even in the SAR model. This effect is of an indirect nature and
takes place via the effect of a change in an exogenous variable of j on yj . Because the
change in j’s dependent variable has a direct effect on i, the impact of xjr on i is indirect.
Formally, in the data generating process of the SAR model41 y = ρWy +Xβ + ǫ,
∂yi
∂xjr
=
[
(I − ρW )−1 (Iβr)
]
ij
. (38)
Thus, the column vector c containing the row sums of (I − ρW )−1 (Iβr) reflects the total
effect on yi for each of the n observations, if all observations change their value of the r-th
exogenous variable by the same amount. To obtain the average total effect of r on y if
all observations change the value by the same amount, the sum of the elements in c has
to be divided by the number of observations n. Similarly, the row vector s containing the
column sums of (I − ρW )−1 (Iβr) reflects for each observation j the total effect on all n
observations resulting from an individual change in the value of r by observation j. The
average total effect of a change in the rth variable from an observation is the sum of total
effects over all observations (the sum of all elements in s) divided by n.
The direct impact of a change in i’s own value of the exogenous variable xir on yi is
given by
∂yi
∂xir
=
[
(I − ρW )−1 (Iβr)
]
ii
. (39)
41The remaining paragraphs of this subsection are taken from LeSage and Pace (2009, pp. 34-38) but are
applied to a SAR model instead of a SDM model to keep the illustration simpler.
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The average direct effect of the rth exogenous variable on y is the trace of (I − ρW )−1 (Iβr)
divided by n. The average indirect effect of an exogenous variable is the difference between
the average total effects and the average direct effects. The average total effects, and thus
also the indirect effects, can be calculated from the coefficients obtained from the estimates
of the underlying model using software such as MATLAB.42 For a row-normalized W the
average total effect of the rth exogenous variable on y is equal to (1− ρ)−1βr.
42For technical details and computational issues see LeSage and Pace (2009, chap. 4.9).
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5 Centrality and Pricing in an Empirical Spokes Model: An
Application to the Austrian Retail Gasoline Market43
5.1 Introduction
The asymmetric spokes model presented in Chapter 3 leads to three propositions about
the pricing behavior of firms in spatially differentiated markets. These are, in a nutshell,
1) firms respond more strongly to price changes by a central firm than to price changes
by a remote firm; 2) the impact of individual exogenous (cost) shocks on market prices
depends on the centrality of the station(s) inducing the shock; 3) there is no clear-cut effect
of centrality on price levels. In the remainder of this thesis, these propositions are tested
in two empirical applications to the Austrian retail gasoline market using data on the geo-
graphical locations of the complete population of gasoline stations in Austria collected by
the company Catalist in August 2003.44 Using the GIS software ArcGIS, the geographical
coordinates of each gasoline station are located and plotted on a map. The routing tool
WiGeoNetwork by WiGeoGIS calculates the driving time from each gasoline station to all
other gasoline stations within a critical distance (time) in ArcGIS. These spatial data are
merged with station level pricing data and regional data (see Section 5.5). The empirical
application in this chapter is a ‘literal’ translation of the theoretical asymmetric spokes
model to an empirical econometric version.
At the beginning, some very important considerations must be taken into account not
only about the definition of local markets, but especially about the definition of a unique
center for each market which properly meets the criteria of the center in the theoretical
model. Also, finding an econometric specification to test the propositions made in Section
3.4 is quite a complex issue. Finally, while the results of the empirical asymmetric spokes
model presented in this chapter mainly confirm the theoretical model, this empirical ver-
sion of the model is associated with a number of strong assumptions and very little room
to check the robustness of the results. Because of these limitations the propositions of
43Earlier versions of this chapter were presented as “Pricing with asymmetric spatial competition: Evidence
from the retail gasoline market” by Firgo et al. (2010b) at the 4th World Conference of the Spatial
Econometrics Association (SEA) in Chicago in June 2010, and as “Pricing in spatially differentiated
markets with central and peripheral firms: The retail gasoline market” by Firgo et al. (2010a) at the
EBES 2010 Conference - Athens in October 2010.
44For company details see http://www.catalist.com.
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Chapter 3 are tested in an additional empirical application in Chapter 6.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 discusses different concepts and defini-
tions of local markets in the literature and describes how local markets are defined in this
empirical study. Section 5.3 illustrates how, once local markets have been defined, market
centers as well as central and remote firms are identified. Section 5.3 also gives informa-
tion on how centrality or remoteness is stored in spatial weights matrices and how this
information enters the econometric model. Section 5.4 introduces the econometric model,
while Section 5.5 describes the data used and provides some descriptive statistics. Section
5.6 discusses the the econometric results and simulates the impacts of individual shocks
on market prices based on these results. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes this first empirical
part and discusses the shortcomings of this approach, which leads to the second empiri-
cal application in Section 6, which relaxes some assumptions and analyzes the theoretical
asymmetric spokes model in the more general context of networks and network centrality.
5.2 Definitions of Local Markets
The asymmetric spokes model presented in Chapter 3 describes a local market with a sim-
ple spatial structure: An arbitrary number of roads intersect in a single central intersection.
The firm located closest to this intersection is considered to be the central firm; all other
firms are considered as remote firms. No firm is located in the hinterland of another firm
and no spoke leads to another intersection.
The empirical literature mainly provides two approaches to model localized competition
in retail markets. In the first approach researchers assume that each firm marks the center
of its own radial market and that the markets of neighboring firms may overlap. As a
consequence the industry becomes one big interconnected network in which competition
between firms takes place within a certain radius. Radii can be defined by Euclidean
distances (Shepard, 1991; Netz and Taylor, 2002; Barron et al., 2004; Lewis, 2008; Pen-
nerstorfer, 2009) or by driving distance (Hastings, 2004). This radial approach has been
mainly used to analyze the impact of spatial differentiation, i.e. the distance to nearby
firms, on price levels. However, the asymmetric spokes model rules out overlapping and
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interacting markets that arise in this radial approach.45
The second approach to defining local markets seeks to delimit markets by geographical
or political units. The number or density of firms within one census tract (Pinkse et al.,
2002), zip-code (Clemenz and Gugler, 2006), municipality (Asplund and Sandin, 1999) or
county (Clemenz and Gugler, 2006; Verlinda, 2008) has been used as a variable measuring
the intensity of competition. This approach has the advantage of a clear-cut definition of
what is considered a local market and which firms belong to it. Furthermore, different
political or geographical units can be used to test the robustness of the results obtained
(Clemenz and Gugler, 2006). However, such units cannot be used to identify local markets
in the present case for two reasons. First, in most cases these units are likely to result
in local market areas that are too big to describe the spatial structure of the asymmetric
spokes model. Second, what is usually considered as the center of such a unit (e.g. a main
square of a town or the biggest town in a county) does not meet the requirements of a
market center in the asymmetric spokes model.
Apart from these two main approaches, two studies use different ways of defining local
markets. Ning and Haining (2003) treat gasoline stations located on the same road and
nearby stations of intersecting roads as the same local market, which is “a somewhat sub-
jective classification” (Ning and Haining, 2003, p. 2147). Pinkse et al. (2002) construct
local wholesale gasoline markets via nearest-neighbor-relations. They connect each obser-
vation to its spatially nearest neighbor and assign all stations to the same local market
as long as they are connected through nearest-neighbor-relations. Figure 4 illustrates the
definition of local markets by Pinkse et al. (2002). Each arrow in Figure 4 indicates a
nearest-neighbor-relation between two stations. The arrow from observation k to obser-
vation i indicates that i is k’s nearest neighbor. The bidirectional arrow between i and j
implies that i and j are mutually nearest neighbors. As long as firms are connected through
arrows they share a common market. As there is no nearest-neighbor-relation between k
and l, they belong to different markets.
45Kalnins (2003) and Pennerstorfer (2009) use Thiessen Polygons (see Dale (2005) for detailed information)
to construct non-overlapping markets for each firm in which a firm’s location marks the centroid of its
market. In this approach competition is assumed to take place between adjacent polygons only. This
approach is also not applicable for the present analysis because it also leads to an interconnected network
of polygons which cannot be broken down into isolated markets.
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Figure 4: Definition of local markets
I follow the approach by Pinkse et al. (2002) because it leads to local markets that best
match the market structure of the asymmetric spokes model. The markets delimited this
way are small, ranging from 2 to 16 gasoline stations. Table 2 reports the distribution
of stations per local market for the Austrian retail gasoline market. A total of 761 local
markets are delimited. 241 of the 761 local markets identified (31.67%) consist of two
Table 2: Distribution of the number of gasoline stations per local market
# of Stations Freq. Ratio Cumm.
2 241 0.3167 0.3167
3 176 0.2313 0.5480
4 151 0.1984 0.7464
5 93 0.1222 0.8686
6 42 0.0552 0.9238
7 27 0.0355 0.9593
8 12 0.0158 0.9750
9 9 0.0118 0.9869
10 1 0.0013 0.9882
11 5 0.0066 0.9947
12 3 0.0039 0.9987
16 1 0.0013 1.0000
Total 761 1.0000
stations only. Markets with three and markets with four stations account for about 40%
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of all markets. 75% of all local markets include less than 5 stations.46 However, about
two thirds of all gasoline stations are operating in markets with more than three stations.
More than 40% of all stations belong to markets with more than four stations and 17% of
stations belong to markets with more than six stations.
5.3 Center and Periphery
Now that local markets have been delimited, further considerations have to be made re-
garding the definition of a center for each of these markets (section 5.3.1) and about the
translation of these considerations into the econometric specification (section 5.3.2) of the
model.
5.3.1 The Market Center – A Median Location Problem
The definition of a proper market center is a complex issue. In schematic diagrams like
Figure 2 and Figure 4, there is only one intersection in each market that can be naturally
treated as the market center. However, many of the 761 real world markets that were
delimited show spatial patterns that are more complex in terms of the locations of stations
and/ or in terms of the structure of the road network. The former problem implies that, for
example, two or more stations can be located at the same road (spoke), which is excluded
by assumptions in the theoretical model. The latter problem, a road system more complex
than in the theoretical model, implies that there may be more than one intersection in a
local market or some roads might be connected through several intersections. Thus, many
markets lack a “natural” center identifiable at a single glance.
Figure 5 plots a local market in a rural area of Lower Austria as an example. The light
blue (purple) lines mark primary (secondary) roads. Minor roads are not illustrated. The
winding gray lines mark the borders of municipalities. There are two major criteria for a
proper market center in the present setting. First, it has to be located on the road network
and not somewhere off the road. Thus, space is reduced to a graph. Second, it has to be
a unique point located on this graph. In a seminal paper Hakimi (1964) provides a graph-
46Markets with only two stations have to be excluded from the empirical analysis. See Section 5.3.1 for a
detailed discussion. These 241 markets times 2 stations per market account for 17% of the population
of 2,814 gasoline stations in Austria.
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Figure 5: An empirical example of a local market
theoretic solution to a problem similar to that of finding a market center in this context.
Hakimi (1964) describes the task of finding an optimum location for a switching center
in a telephone interconnection system, in which the “problem is to find the exact location
of the switching center [...] such that, say, the total length of the wires is a minimum”
(Hakimi, 1964, p. 450). While Hakimi names this location the absolute median of a graph,
his concept has been generalized to so-called p-median location problems, where p is the
number of points on a graph satisfying an optimization problem similar to Hakimi (1964).47
The definition of the market center as the 1-median location is straightforward and meets
the criteria for a market center. It is the point at which the sum of distances on the road
network to all gasoline stations in the market is minimized, thus
min dC +
n∑
i=1
di,
where dC (di) is the distance the central (a remote) station is located away from the center.
All distances calculated in this empirical application measure distance in terms of driving
47See Tansel et al. (1983) for more details on p-median location problems.
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time (in minutes). Using driving time rather than driving distance has the main advantage
of considering differences in speed limits. Ignoring differences in speed limits would lead to
a substantial bias in the measurement of distance, especially because the data used covers
urban as well as rural areas.
In Figure 5, the black dot and the two white dots are the three gasoline stations operat-
ing in the local market plotted. The three-digit number (601) refers to the index number of
the local market. The four-digit numbers are the index numbers of the individual gasoline
stations. The market center is located at the pinpoint of the red pin. The black dot is
the central gasoline station, as it is located closer to the center than all other stations (the
white dots).
For each market the location of the market center had to be calculated manually using
ArcGIS and the routing tool WiGeoNetwork.48 For this purpose, in each market a number
of pins are set exactly to and close to locations that look like potential median location
points at first glance. The distances to all gasoline stations in the same local market are
calculated for each of these pins. In a second step, a number of pins are set very close to
each other around the pin with the lowest sum of distances in the first step. Finally, the
pin with the lowest sum of distances in the second step is chosen as the market center, as
it is the 1-median location of the local market.
In some markets a unique median location does not exist. For example, in a market with
two gasoline stations, all points between these two stations are median location points.
The same logic applies to the two innermost stations in markets with any even number
of stations as long as they are located along the same road. All of these markets must
be excluded from the analysis. However, neither of these exceptions present a market
structure that is described by the asymmetric spokes model. Having a number of local
markets, a center for each market and the distances of gasoline stations to the market
center (and thus the division between central and remote stations) is all the information
required to set up the econometric specification of the asymmetric spokes model.
48At this point I would like to thank Mathias Knapp and Dimitri Kudrnofsky for their calculations.
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5.3.2 Spatial Weights Matrices for Central and Remote Gasoline Stations
This section provides a numerical example of how local markets and the information on
central and remote stations are stored in spatial weights matrices, which were discussed
in Section 4.2. Let us store the structure of the two markets schematically illustrated in
Figure 4 in the matrix W . Assume that the letters i to n attributed to every gasoline
station in Figure 4 correspond to the lines and rows of W , where wij = 1 if i and j belong
to the same market, and wij = 0 otherwise. Then,
W =


0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0


.
It can be easily noticed that, due to the delimited local markets, W is block-diagonal.49 As
pointed out by Anselin (2002, p. 259), a block diagonal structure in W does not allow for
high order neighborhood and contiguity across higher order levels. In other words, space
is broken into a number of islands where interaction only takes place within an island but
not across islands. Thus, a shock emanating from agents at one island does not diffuse
in space except for the own island. Anselin (2002, p. 259) further points out that in a
row-normalized block-diagonal weights matrix the effect of each neighbor will approach
zero if the number of neighbors in the group (block) becomes large in a row-normalized W
matrix, as wij = 1/ng, where ng is the number of units in group (block) g. Therefore, “in
the limit, the weights matrix becomes effectively zero, eliminating the effect of the spatial
correlation” Anselin (2002, p. 259). Lee (2007b, p. 335) also raises concerns about the
(weak) identification of interaction effects in large non-interacting groups. However, he
concludes that identification is not a problem if the sizes of groups vary sufficiently. In the
present empirical model, the groups (local markets) are rather small and vary in their size.
Therefore, the block diagonal structure of W is not expected to weaken the identification
49Empirical applications using block diagonal matrices in economics are sparse but some work has been
done in the field of new social economics and social interaction models. See Lee et al. (2010) for a short
review.
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of the spatial effects.
At this point it is worth mentioning the works of Lee (2007b) and Lin (2010). Lee (2007b)
theoretically and Lin (2010) empirically suggest de-group-meaning the values in y and X
in the setting of a block diagonal W matrix with non-interacting groups to account for
unobservable group specific effects.50 It is important to notice the strategy of de-group
meaning that, however, is not feasible in the present analysis. Markets are too small and
each member of a market has direct links to all other members in the market through
W . As an example: In a market of three stations, the own de-group-meaned price must
depend negatively on the de-group-meaned price of the other two stations by definition,
as the own de-group-meaned price is the deviation from the average of the own and the
other two prices. If the own price is below the average, the price of at least one other
neighbor has to be above average. Therefore, there has to be a negative direct impact of
rivals’ de-group-meaned prices on the own de-group-meaned price and the true effects (an
expected positive impact of rivals’ prices) cannot be identified. De-group-meaning in a
SAR model only works if the links in W are sparse compared to the group size (Lin, 2010,
p. 835).
Matrix W above describes the neighborhood relations of Figure 4 but does not yet
contain any information about centrality and periphery. Remember that three different
and asymmetric types of interaction are considered in the theoretical asymmetric spokes
model of Chapter 3:
1. How do remote stations influence central stations (R→ C)?
2. How do central stations influence remote stations (C → R)?
3. How do remote stations influence other remote stations (R→ R)?
In Figure 4 station i (first row/column in W ) and station m (fifth row/column in W )
50For this purpose a group matrix Jg of dimension ng × ng is constructed for every group g, where ng
is the number of members n in group g, so Jg = Ing −
1
ng
lgl
′
g. Here, Ing is an identity matrix of
dimension ng × ng and lg is a ng × 1 unit vector. Lee (2007b) and Lin (2010) include the block-diagonal
matrix J into their original SAR model. J is of dimension gng × gng and contains all g groups. Thus,
Jy = ρJWy + JXβ + Jǫ, and yˆ = ρJWyˆ + Xˆβ + ǫˆ, where yˆ, Xˆ and ǫˆ are the de-group-meaned values
of the original variables in y, X and ǫ. Both authors analyze the more general specification of a spatial
Durbin model (SDM) but the lags of the exogenous variables are not of interest for the present analysis
an can be omitted.
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are the central stations. All other stations are considered as remote. To include this
information in the analysis and to identify these three types of interaction, W has to be
split into the three matrices
WR→C =


0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0


,WC→R =


0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0


,
WR→R =


0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0


.
In matrix WR→C the element wR→Cij = 1 if i is a central and j is a remote station of
the same market. In matrix WC→R the element wC→Rij = 1 if i is a remote and j is
the central station of the same market. Finally, in WR→R the element wR→Rij = 1 if i
is a remote and j is another remote station of the same market. Further, it follows that
WR→C +WC→R +WR→R = W .
5.4 Econometric Specification
As it is the aim of this empirical analysis to estimate price reaction functions of central
and remote gasoline stations, I estimate a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model as discussed
in detail in Chapter 4. This model contains the prices of rivals on the explanatory side of
the equation as a so-called spatially lagged dependent variable. The spatial information
is stored in the matrix W . The data covers a total of 23 time periods, 22 of which can
be included into the estimation. The sample is analyzed as a repeated cross-section with
time period fixed effects rather than as a real panel because the data is extremely unbal-
anced due to missing data in the dependent variable (price). For each period, a market
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is only included into the estimation if information is available on the prices of all gasoline
stations in the market. Unfortunately, this requirement substantially reduces the number
of markets included in the estimation.51 However, having prices of all stations in a mar-
ket is necessary for two reasons: First, due to the split of W into the three sub-matrices
WR→C , WC→R and WR→R, missing data (and thus dropped observations) might result in
all-empty rows if they are not intended to be all-empty.52 Second, I want to analyze how
the influence of a single gasoline station changes with the number of stations per market.
Including observations with missing data would lead to a bias in the number of stations
per market. For example, if there are four stations in the market but data is only available
for three of them, the market would have to be treated either as a market of three stations
or a market of four stations overweighting a single station.
After cleaning out markets with missing data for each period, individual coefficients can
be estimated for markets with different numbers of stations. As a result of this reduction,
no markets with more than 6 stations remain in the sample. On the one hand, this fact
is bad news as markets with a relatively large number of stations are excluded from the
analysis. On the other hand it is also good news because it limits the complexity of the
econometric model and improves the presentability of the results.
I start out with a basic model assuming symmetric competition between all stations in
a market, irrespective of their centrality. This model corresponds to the usual empirical
approach of analyzing spatial competition and does not pay attention to the spatial het-
erogeneity of firms. This model is used as a benchmark for the econometric estimation of
the asymmetric spokes model. The benchmark model is given by
y =
6∑
m=3
ρmWmy +Xβ + Zγ + ǫ. (40)
y is the vector of prices, m indicates the number of stations in the market, ρm are the
coefficients of spatial autocorrelation and reflect the slopes of the price reaction functions
51For details on the data and descriptive statistics see Section 5.5.
52Note that the all-zero rows in WR→C for remote observations and the all-zeros rows in WC→R and
WR→R for central observations are not a problem because the explanatory variables include a dummy
which is equal to one if the observation is a central gasoline station and zero otherwise. See Getis and
Aldstadt (2004) and Aldstadt and Getis (2006) for details on consequences of all-zero rows in W .
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of gasoline stations in markets with different numbers of stations. For example, ρ3 is the
expected mean slope of the price reaction function of stations in markets with three sta-
tions. The weight matrices of different time periods are connected to a single block diagonal
matrix W of dimension N ×N , with N =
22∑
t=1
nt, where nt is the number of observations in
period t. X is of dimension N ×k and contains k exogenous variables including a constant
and some interaction terms of exogenous variables with a dummy variable set equal to
one if an observation is a central gasoline station. These interaction terms are included to
test for differences in the intercept of the price reaction functions of central and remote
stations if differences can be expected from the theoretical model. Observations of different
periods are added to X vertically. β is the k × 1 vector of coefficients of the exogenous
variables.53 Z is a N × f matrix of f fixed effects dummy variables and γ is the f × 1
vector of coefficients of the fixed effects. Finally, ǫ is a vector of i.i.d. errors.
Matrix W is then split into the three matrices WR→C , WC→R and WR→R as discussed
in the previous Section 5.3.2 to test differences in the pricing behavior of central and remote
gasoline stations:
y =
6∑
m=3
ρR→Cm W
R→C
m y +
6∑
m=3
ρC→Rm W
C→R
m y +
6∑
m=3
ρR→Rm W
R→R
m y +Xβ + Zγ + ǫ. (41)
The model now has a total of 12 spatial lags that are to be interpreted as follows: ρR→C3
is the expected price change by a central gasoline station as a response to a price change
of one unit by one remote gasoline station in a market of three stations.54 In the same
way, ρC→R4 is the amount a remote station is expected to react to a price change by the
central station in a market of four stations. While the theoretical model predicts positive
values decreasing in m for ρR→Cm and positive constant values for ρ
C→R
m , ρ
R→R
m should not
significantly differ from zero following the theoretical model.
53The reason for including these interaction terms already into the benchmark model that does not consider
asymmetries between central and remote gasoline stations may seem strange at first glance but facilitates
the comparability of the fit of this model with the asymmetric spokes model in equation (41). An exclusion
of these interaction terms from the benchmark model did not result in significant changes in the slope
parameters.
54Note that the spatial weights matrices in (41) are not row-normalized because different matrices are used
for observations with different numbers of neighbors.
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5.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
As already discussed briefly in the introduction of this chapter, the data on gasoline sta-
tions covers the entire population of gasoline stations in Austria as of August 2003. The
company Catalist55 collected a comprehensive set of data including stations’ postal ad-
dresses, geographical coordinates, brands, ownership, numerous characteristics such as
opening hours, services in addition to refueling, quality indicators, size, visibility, traffic
and other information on the facilities. The variables selected from the Catalist data for
this empirical analysis are summarized in Table 4 on page 64 and discussed below.
The Catalist data are merged with information on prices and addresses on a station level
collected by the Austrian Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammer) between October 1999 and
March 2005. Every three month, prices were collected within one to three days nationwide
for a total of 23 points in time, 22 of which are used in the estimations. One of the periods
does not contain enough observations to be included for reasons discussed below. Table 5
on page 67 summarizes the number of observations per period. The price data covers about
60% of all gasoline stations, but prices are not available for all of these stations for every
period. In addtition to observations elimininated because they belong to markets with two
stations only56 or because of an absence of a unique market center, a market is eliminated
from the sample in period t if price information of at least one station in the market is not
available in t. Especially for markets with many stations, the probability of having price
information available for every station is quite low. As a result, no markets ≥ 8 stations
can be included in the estimation, and the few remaining markets with 7 stations have to
be excluded for technical reasons.57 A total of 92 markets can be included in the repeated
cross-sectional analysis, for a total of 783 markets observed. Markets with 3 stations are
observed 392 times (50% of the sample), markets with 4 stations 254 times (32%), markets
with 5 stations 94 times (12%), and markets with 6 stations 43 times (6%). The 92 markets
cover a total of 343 different gasoline stations. Each of these stations/markets appears in
the sample 8.5 times on average (with a median of 7).
55See http://www.catalist.com for company details.
56In these markets the asymmetric spokes model does not apply (see Section 5.3.1).
57Sufficient data on markets with 7 stations is not available for every period. Due to the construction of
individual W matrices for markets of different numbers of stations, an inclusion of these markets would
have resulted in a W matrix with all-empty blocks in periods where no markets with 7 stations are
available.
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Additionally, some regional data provided by the Austrian Statistical Office (Statistik
Austria) on a municipality level are added to the data set. These data include numbers
on commuting behavior, population density, tourism, and the share of alpine surface and
woods, in order to model regional and local differences in demand and costs. The data set
also includes prices of business premises provided by the Austrian Chamber of Commerce
(Wirtschaftskammer) on a district level to further approximate differences in stations’
costs.
5.5.1 Price, Spatial and Regional Variables
Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics and definitions of the dependent variable, spa-
tial and regional data. The average sample mean of prices (variable PRICE) of one liter of
diesel is 75.6 Euro cents.58 The lowest price (61.9) was collected in 03/2002, the highest
(92.0) in 12/2004. Using the information on the locations of gasoline stations, the distances
between gasoline stations and the distances to the market center were calculated in ArcGIS
using a routing tool provided by WiGeoNetwork. C is a dummy variable set equal to one
if an observation is a central gasoline station. Central stations account for 26.82% of the
sample. DIST TO CENTER measures the driving time in minutes, from a gasoline station
to the center of the market it is assigned to. This distance ranges from zero (station is
located at the market center) to 23.6 minutes, with a mean of 2.46 minutes. Even though
the data covers urban and rural regions, the variance in the driving time to the center is
quite low – a standard deviation of 3.66 minutes – as markets tend to be very local. The
interaction term C*DIST TO CENTER measures DIST TO CENTER for central stations.
It is equal to zero if an observation is not a central station. Thus, the estimated coefficient
of C*DIST TO CENTER describes the deviation of the expected impact of changes in the
distance to the center if a station is central, from the impact of changes in the distance of all
non-central (remote) stations, which is remaining in the coefficient of DIST TO CENTER.
C*AV DIST REMOTE is the average driving time of all remote stations to the market cen-
ter for central observations. If an oberservation is a remote station, this variable is equal to
58I am using prices on diesel rather than gasoline as more prices are available for diesel. Using the smaller
number of price information available for regular or Super/ Eurosuper gasoline, the sample would shrink
to a unfeasibly small size. However, unlike in North America diesel-engined cars are very common in
European countries. Within the time period analyzed in this study the share of cars with diesel engines
increased steadily to more than 50% of all cars in 2005 (Statistik Austria, 2006).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics - price, spatial and regional data
Variable Description Mean Min
Std.Dev. Max
PRICE Price of 1 liter of diesel in Euro cents 75.5998 61.9000
6.4229 92.0000
C Dummy variable set equal to one if the 0.2682 0.0000
station is central 0.4431 1.0000
DIST TO CENTER Distance a station is located from the center 2.4679 0.0000
3.6600 23.6400
C*DIST TO CENTER DIST TO CENTER if the obs. is a central 0.0710 0.0000
station 0.2254 2.7200
C*AV DIST REMOTE Avg. distance of remote stations to center 0.8594 0.0000
if obs. is a central station 1.9766 16.2500
(1-C)*DIST CENTRAL Distance of market’s central station to center 0.1942 0.0000
if obs. is a remote station 0.3334 2.7200
(1-C)*AV DIST REMOTE Avg. distance of the other remote stations 2.3968 0.0000
to center if obs. is a remote station 3.1367 18.5100
COMMUTERS Ratio of incoming plus outgoing commuters to 35.0372 11.4818
population of a municipality in percent 13.8360 110.7596
TOURISM Number of touristic overnight stays in the 105,345.0000 0.0000
municipality in the month observed+ 223,714.9000 836,698.0000
LOW TOURISM Equal to one if TOURISM is n/a (report optional 0.1551 0.0000
if overnight stays per year < 1, 000) 0.3621 1.0000
POP DENSITY Population density per square kilometer 1,262.8060 4.1657
on a municipality level 2,534.8730 18,153.5200
PREMISES Average price for business premises per 116.4591 0.0000
square meter on a district level+ 69.5982 280.8000
N/A PREMISES Equal to one if PREMISES is n/a 0.0288 0.0000
0.1672 1.0000
ALPS+WOOD Ratio of alpine areas plus forests to total 38.3456 0.0000
surface of the municipality in percent 26.3590 87.2362
# of observations: 2,920
+ Missing values replaced by zeros
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zero. On the other hand, (1-C)*AV DIST REMOTE is only different from zero if a station
is considered to be remote. It describes the average distance of all other remote stations
(excluding the observation itself) to the market center. (1-C)*DIST CENTRAL is only
different from zero if an observation is a remote station. The value reflects the distance the
central station of the market a remote station is assigned to is located away from the center.
All of these distance-based variables are also found in the theoretical asymmetric spokes
model. From the theoretical model I expect a negative impact of DIST TO CENTER and
C*DIST TO CENTER on prices, but a positive impact of C*AV DIST REMOTE and
(1-C)*DIST CENTRAL. These expected negative impacts result from a loss of consumers
when moving further away from the center. The positive impacts result in an increase in
the (average) distance between the central and remote stations and thus leads to a higher
degree of market power. (1-C)*AV DIST REMOTE should not have a significant impact
as remote stations do not compete with each other in the theoretical model.
Three variables are included to approximate differences in local demand. COMMUTERS
is the ratio of incoming plus outgoing commuters in a municipality over the population
of the municipality in percent. TOURISM is the number of touristic overnight stays per
municipality in the month observed. The high numbers in the mean and variance are
mainly driven by a few big cities like Vienna and various touristic villages in the Alps.
Municipalities with more than 1,000 touristic overnight stays have to report the numbers
to the Austrian Statistical Office. For municipalities with less than 1,000 overnight stays
reporting is voluntary. For municipalities not reporting their numbers, the data are miss-
ing (15% of the sample). As the missing values depend on their own value and not on
the value of the dependent variable (PRICE), they can be considered as ‘missing at ran-
dom’(Greene, 2008, pp. 61ff). Observations (completely) missing at random can be either
deleted from the sample or transformed by the ‘modified zero-order regression’. In such
a regression missing values are replaced by zeros. For each variable containing missing
values, new dummy-variables are generated that are equal to one if the value is missing
for the observation, and zero otherwise. This approach is more efficient than dropping
an observation, but does lead to a measurement error. However, as Greene (2008, p. 63)
points out, the bias is likely to be very small if, among other things, the proportion of
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missing data is small. Also, given the far-reaching consequences of deleting observations
for the whole sample through the spatial interdependence of observations – deleting a few
observations would imply deleting the entire market to which an observation belongs –
deleting observations with missing data is not feasible due to the high level of inefficiency
involved.59 Thus, the dummy variable LOW TOURISM is set equal to one if TOURISM
is missing and set to zero otherwise. POP DENSITY is used to account for differences in
the degree of urbanization on a municipality level.
PREMISES is the district’s average price for business premises per square meter and is
included to approximate local differences in costs. For some districts no data on prices
for business premises are available. These values are again ‘missing at random’ because
whether they are missing or not depends on the location (district) but not on gasoline
prices. Missing values are again replaced by zeros and the dummy N/A PREMISES controls
for the missing values, which account for only 2.8% of the observations. ALPS+WOOD
is included as an additional proxy for local differences in costs. It contains the share of
alpine surface and woods of a municipality’s total surface and serves as an indicator for
the remoteness of a municipality and the acessibility of refineries. This variable is also
included as a cost proxy in Clemenz and Gugler (2006).
5.5.2 Site Characteristics
Table 4: Descriptive statistics - site characteristics
True Info n/a
Variable Description Freq. Share Freq. Share
BRANDED Equal to one if station 2,489 85.24% 0 0.00%
is branded
DEALER OWNED Equal to one if station 869 29.76% 91 3.12%
is owned by the dealer
HIGHWAY Equal to one if station is 33 1.13% 174 5.96%
located on a highway
SERVICE Equal to one if station 693 23.73% 228 7.81%
offers attendance service
SIZE > 2000 Equal to one if facility 981 33.60% 71 2.43%
surface is > 2, 000m2
TRAFFIC GOOD Equal to one if road- 2,060 70.55% 174 5.96%
traffic at site is heavy
# of observations: 2,920
Missing values replaced by zero
Dummy variables created for each variable with missing data; Dummy equal to one if data n/a
59For more details on missing data see the textbook by Little and Rubin (2002).
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Out of the multitudinous variables offered by Catalist, only a few main site character-
istics are selected as controls because the impact of different site characteristics on prices
are not of particular interest in this study. The variables included in the estimations are
illustrated and described in Table 4. Pennerstorfer (2008, 2009) includes a multitude of
these variables into his analysis of the Austrian retail gasoline market, but finds that only
a few of them have significant impacts on prices. However, the author does find a strong
impact of brands on prices: His results show that 9 out of 10 brands operating in Austria
charge significantly higher prices than unbranded stations. Only the prices of one minor
brand are not significantly different from unbranded stations. For reasons of efficiency,
different brands are therefore subsumed in the variable BRANDED. Branded stations ac-
count for 85% of observations in the sample. Some of the branded stations are not owned
by the respective company but by the dealer operating under licence of a brand. The
share of dealer-owned (variable DEALER OWNED) stations in the sample is 30%. While
unbranded (independent) stations are assumed to set prices independently, the degree of
self-government in pricing decisions of individual branded stations is unclear. Experts ex-
pect that at least the major brands decide on prices centrally, but, as Pennerstorfer (2008,
p. 69) puts it, there is no evidence.
Some other station characteristics that are likely to raise consumer demand are included
in the estimation: Gasoline stations located along a highway (HIGHWAY) are expected
to charge higher prices as consumers on a highway face high search costs and high trans-
portation costs when leaving the highway for refueling. The dummy variable TRAFFIC
GOOD is equal to one if traffic at the location of a station is considered heavy by Catalist
and is included as a proxy for differences in stations’ demand. Stations offering attendance
service (SERVICE) and large stations (SIZE > 2000) may be considered as qualitatively
superior, as fueling does not have to be done by oneself in the former case and the waiting
time is likely to be lower in the latter case.
For some stations one or several site characteristics are missing in the Catalist data.
However, correlations with brands, regions etc. did not show any significant patterns
for the missing values in Pennerstorfer (2008, pp. 74ff). Thus, the missing values can
be considered as ‘missing completely at random’ (Greene, 2008, p. 61). The fraction of
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missing values is very small for all of these variables as illustrated in Table 4 (between 2.4%
and 7.8%) and the variables are not of particular interest for this study. Thus, for reasons
of efficiency observations with missing data are again included in the sample applying
the ‘modified zero-order regression’ with dummy variables controling for originally missing
values, which are replaced by zeros.60
5.5.3 Fixed Effects
In addition to variables on space, regional/ local and site characteristics, some fixed effects
are included in the model. Dummies for the different time periods are included to control
for the substantial shifts in crude oil prices over time. The distribution of observations over
the 22 time periods is illustrated in Table 5. The last period is left out in the estimation as
a reference group. Further, fixed effects are included for markets with different numbers of
stations since the number of competitors may have an impact on price levels, which is not
captured by the slope parameters of stations’ price reaction functions. As depicted in Table
5, 40% (35%) of all observations belong to markets of three (of four) stations. Markets
with five or six gasoline stations account for about 25%. Markets with three stations are
left out as a reference group.
Table 5 also illustrates the fixed effects for Austria’s nine federal states, which are char-
acterized by a general increase in income and price levels from east to west. The rela-
tive majority (25%) of the observations are located in the federal state of Lower Austria
(Niederösterreich). The states of Burgenland, Upper Austria (Oberösterreich) and Vorarl-
berg each account for less than 2% of all observations.
5.6 Results and Discussion
5.6.1 Tests for Spatial Dependence
Section 4.3.2 introduced a number of tests to detect spatial dependence in the data. A
diffuse test for the pure existence of spatial dependence is the so-called Moran’s I test.
The (robust) LM-Lag and LM-Error tests are used to test whether the data used have the
characteristics of a spatial lag or a spatial error process, if spatial dependence is detected
60For HIGHWAY and TRAFFIC GOOD the missing values affect exactly the same observations. Thus, a
single dummy variable is sufficient to control for missing values of both variables.
66
Table 5: Descriptive statistics - fixed effects
Variable Freq. Share Variable Freq. Share
Time period pd0406 91 3.12%
pd9910 167 5.72% pd0409 86 2.95%
pd9912 159 5.45% pd0412 87 2.98%
pd0003 161 5.51% pd0503* 80 2.74%
pd0007 157 5.38% Gasoline stations per market
pd0010 98 3.36% STATIONS_3* 1,176 40.27%
pd0012 105 3.60% STATIONS_4 1,016 34.79%
pd0103 102 3.49% STATIONS_5 470 16.10%
pd0106 95 3.25% STATIONS_6 258 8.84%
pd0109 105 3.60% Federal state
pd0111 111 3.80% BURGENLAND 56 1.92%
pd0203 181 6.20% CARINTHIA 346 11.85%
pd0206 162 5.55% LOWER AUT 735 25.17%
pd0209 176 6.03% SALZBURG 536 18.36%
pd0212 202 6.92% STYRIA 534 18.29%
pd0306 107 3.66% TYROL 273 9.35%
pd0309 210 7.19% UPPER AUT 27 0.92%
pd0312 186 6.37% VIENNA* 359 12.29%
pd0403 92 3.15% VORARLBERG 54 1.85%
* Left out as a reference group
# of observations: 2,920
at all. Table 6 shows the results of the tests for spatial dependence using the OLS residuals
of the regression y = Xβ+ǫ based on the variables presented in Section 5.5 and the spatial
weights matrixW discussed in Section 5.4. The results of this OLS estimation are reported
in specification [5] of Table 16 in Appendix B.
Table 6: Tests for spatial dependence
I z-Stat. p-Value
Moran’s I 0.7713 46.0670 0.0000***
χ2-Stat. p-Value
LM-Lag 2264.0000 0.0000***
LM-Error 2314.6000 0.0000***
Robust LM-Lag 1.4445 0.1612
Robust LM-Error 51.9639 0.0000***
# of obs.: 2,920; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level
χ2: df = 1
The value of the Moran’s I test statistic is significantly different from zero. Thus, the
null-hypothesis of no spatial dependence has to be rejected and a simple OLS regression
of y = Xβ + ǫ leads to biased (SAR process) or inefficient (SEM process) estimates of β.
While the high coefficient of Moran’s I (0.77) indicates a high level of spatial dependence, it
does not give a hint on whether a spatial lag or a spatial error model should be estimated
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from a statistical point of view. This question is addressed by the Lagrange Multiplier
(LM)-tests also reported in Table 6.
The LM-Lag and the LM-Error tests are both significantly different from zero. The
value of the LM-Error tests is slightly higher than the value of the LM-Lag test but both
values are quite high. The robust LM-Lag (LM-Error) test allows for a spatial correlation
in the error terms (dependent variable) while testing for a spatial correlation in the de-
pendent variable (error terms). While the robust LM-Error test is highly significant, the
robust LM-Lag test is not. Thus, the robust LM-Tests recommends a SEM specification
over a SAR model, while the regular LM-test does not. However, this recommendation
is motivated from a purely statistical point of view. As the main goal of this study is to
estimate price reaction functions, a spatial lag – and thus a SAR model – is the preferred
specification from a economically motivated point of view. Table 16 in Appendix B pro-
vides the estimates of a SEM model (specification [6]) and a SAR model (specification
[7]) using W to account for spatial autocorrelation in the error terms and the dependent
variable, respectively. A comparison of the two specifications illustrates the robustness of
the results in terms of significance and positive/ negative signs with respect to these two
different specifications. Therefore, I stick to the SAR model as the main specification.
5.6.2 Results of the Maximum Likelihood Estimations
The main results of the ML-estimates of prices are reported in Table 7. Specification [1]
represents the benchmark model of equation (40) and does not consider asymmetries in the
competition between central and remote stations. The coefficients ρm estimated for Wmy
reflect the reaction to a price change of one competitor in the market under the assump-
tion of a symmetric competition between stations. The coefficient of 0.3261 for ρ3 can be
interpreted as follows: In markets with three stations, a station is expected to change its
price by 0.33 cents if one of the two other stations in the market change their price by
one cent. The impact of one station on the prices of competitors decreases steadily as the
number of stations in a market increases in specification [1]. In markets with four (five)
stations, the expected reaction to a price change of one cent by one competitor is equal to
0.22 (0.17) cents. In markets with six stations, a price change by one station leads to an
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expected reaction by other stations of 0.13 cents.
The results in specification [1] are estimated under the assumption that the reaction
functions of stations are symmetric with respect to both their own and the rivals’ locations
in the market. Specifications [2] to [4] relax the assumption of a symmetric competition
by stations and test for the asymmetries proposed by the theoretical asymmetric spokes
model of Chapter 3. The likelihood ratio test statistics at the bottom of Table 7 favor
specification [2] over specifications [3] and [4]. Thus, I will focus on discussing the main
results for the coefficients of specification [2].61 The slope parameters of the reaction
functions of specification [2] reveal that competition in markets with three stations seems
to be quite symmetric. Remote stations have the same impact on central stations as
the other way around. Also, remote stations seem to interact with one another with the
same intensity. The t-test based statistics of Table 8 confirm that there is no significant
asymmetry in the competition between central and remote stations in markets with three
stations. The same applies to markets with four stations. The coefficients for the slope
parameters do not significantly differ from those of the benchmark model in specification [1]
and are between 0.21 and 0.24. The t-tests reported in Table 8 also reject the asymmetry
implied by the asymmetric spokes model for markets with four stations.
The existence of an asymmetric competition described by the asymmetric spokes model,
however, becomes apparent when taking a closer look at the parameters for markets with
five and six stations. The reaction of remote stations to a price change of one cent by
the central station increases to a change of 0.53 cents in markets with five stations, while
the reaction of the central station (remote stations) to a remote station (another remote
station) decreases to 0.16 (0.05). In markets of six stations, the reaction of remote stations
to the central station is 0.37 while it is only 0.07 to another remote station. The reaction
of the central station to a remote station is equal to 0.12. Thus, for markets with 5 and
6 stations, the central station becomes a much more important reference in pricing. The
asymmetry is confirmed by the t-tests in Table 8, in which the null-hypothesis of symmetric
(identical) coefficients is rejected at a 99% significance level for markets with five and six
61The coefficients of specification [2] are very robust in size and significance with respect to the changes
made in specification [3] and [4]. Further, Table 7 only reports the results referring to the main proposi-
tions of this thesis. The complete estimation results including all control variables are reported in Table
14 and 15 in Appendix B.
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Table 7: Estimates of gasoline prices in the empirical spokes model
Dependent Variable: [1] [2] [3] [4]
PRICE Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
ρ3 0.3261 63.1889***
ρ4 0.2180 60.0520***
ρ5 0.1710 50.4335***
ρ6 0.1322 33.7559***
ρR→C3 0.3156 43.0588*** 0.3205 51.3948*** 0.3317 55.3943***
ρC→R3 0.3330 10.1115*** 0.3302 10.4689*** 0.3472 10.9618***
ρR→R3 0.3328 10.8469*** 0.3284 10.8176*** 0.3353 11.0055***
ρR→C4 0.2210 37.8511*** 0.2136 47.3359*** 0.2194 49.9567***
ρC→R4 0.2393 8.8033*** 0.2428 9.2115*** 0.2417 9.1492***
ρR→R4 0.2066 14.9435*** 0.2092 15.3416*** 0.2191 16.2003***
ρR→C5 0.1649 25.8326*** 0.1670 41.8240*** 0.1732 44.9208***
ρC→R5 0.5342 508.2663*** 0.5509 528.8856*** 0.5712 545.8985***
ρR→R5 0.0529 153.3454*** 0.0466 133.8640*** 0.0484 138.6314***
ρR→C6 0.1185 13.0787*** 0.1322 30.7012*** 0.1353 31.9087***
ρC→R6 0.3731 5.6716*** 0.3131 4.9365*** 0.3462 5.5594***
ρR→R6 0.0785 4.9800*** 0.0900 5.6935*** 0.0860 5.5599***
CONSTANT 27.9528 26.8731*** 26.7605 24.0149*** 27.3132 25.4109*** 25.4480 26.7097***
C 0.3770 3.0695*** 2.9808 2.4326** 1.6933 2.0423** 1.8277 2.1832**
STATIONS_4 -0.2721 -0.3610 0.8848 0.9539 -0.3308 -0.4398 0.0678 0.0910
STATIONS_5 -2.3934 -2.4567** -2.0061 -1.7277* -2.3803 -2.4448** -2.3865 -2.4711**
STATIONS_6 -1.3788 -0.9660 -2.3271 -1.3926 -1.8199 -1.2763 -1.3747 -0.9723
C*STATIONS_4 -0.2473 -1.6195 -3.6436 -1.9775**
C*STATIONS_5 -0.3644 -1.7550* -0.4749 -0.1914
C*STATIONS_6 0.4249 1.5124 4.8746 1.2191
DIST TO CENTER 0.0455 4.2338*** 0.0425 3.9686*** 0.0441 4.1202*** 0.0305 2.9773***
C*DIST TO CENTER -0.3535 -2.2473** -0.3847 -2.4621** -0.3759 -2.4040** -0.2744 -1.7909*
C*AV DIST REMOTE 0.0831 3.1748*** 0.0822 3.1592*** 0.0834 3.2056*** 0.0433 1.8447*
(1-C)*DIST CENTRAL 0.1036 0.9544 0.0548 0.5040 0.0631 0.5798 0.0998 0.9587
(1-C)*AV DIST REMOTE 0.0323 2.3505** 0.0345 2.5322** 0.0352 2.5830** 0.0144 1.1924
Regional & Site Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Federal State F.E. Yes Yes Yes No
Time Period F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
ℓ -4,795.2371 -4,774.3487 -4,778.0722 -4,832.1812
σ2 2.4084 2.3638 2.3684 2.3935
LR-Test (p-value)+ 7.4470 (0.0589)* 108.2180 (0.0000)***
# of obs.: 2,920; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level
+ H1: Specification [2]
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Table 8: Testing symmetric vs. asymmetric competition using t-tests
[2] [3] [4]
H0: X¯ = µ t-Stat. t-Stat. t-Stat.
ρR→C3 = ρ3 1.4221 0.8906 0.9399
ρC→R3 = ρ3 0.2107 0.1301 0.6679
ρR→R3 = ρ3 0.2205 0.0786 0.3048
ρR→C4 = ρ4 0.5097 0.9750 0.3127
ρC→R4 = ρ4 0.7832 0.9425 0.8972
ρR→R4 = ρ4 0.8260 0.6462 0.0821
ρR→C5 = ρ5 0.9492 0.9914 0.5767
ρC→R5 = ρ5 345.5981*** 364.7534*** 382.5020***
ρR→R5 = ρ5 342.4062*** 357.7189*** 350.7275***
ρR→C6 = ρ6 1.5125 0.0006 0.7135
ρC→R6 = ρ6 3.6613*** 2.8517*** 3.4363***
ρR→R6 = ρ6 3.4057*** 2.6701*** 2.9922***
ρR→R3 = ρ
C→R
3 0.0031 0.0295 0.1942
ρR→R4 = ρ
C→R
4 0.8148 0.8567 0.5762
ρR→R5 = ρ
C→R
5 39.1853*** 44.7594*** 48.4631***
ρR→R6 = ρ
C→R
6 5.7545*** 4.5835*** 5.4418***
# of obs.: 2,920; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level
stations in all specifications.62
In the theoretical asymmetric spokes model of Chapter 3, it was argued that centrality
does not only affect the strategic interaction in a pricing game, but also has an impact
on price levels, albeit this impact can be either positive or negative. The value of C – a
dummy variable equal to one if a gasoline station is considered central, and zero other-
wise – is significantly different from zero. In specification [1] the expected price of central
stations is 0.38 cents higher than the price of remote stations, ceteris paribus. However,
this difference increases to 1.69 ( 2.98) in specification [2] ([4]) when central and remote
stations are modeled more explicitly through spatial lags. I also test the impact of the
number of stations in the market on price levels – as competition might tighten with an in-
creasing number of stations – and find that prices in markets with more than four stations
(STATIONS_5 and STATIONS_6) are lower than in the reference group of markets with
three stations, but the effect is significant for markets with five stations only. Additionally,
I interact centrality and the number of stations in specifications [1] and [2] but I do not
find robust results confirming that centrality increases the pressure put on price levels if
62The fact that ρR→C5 = ρ5 and ρ
R→C
6 = ρ6 are not rejected by the t-tests in Table 8 does not weaken
these results because for the central gasoline station competition with remote stations does not change
compared to the assumption of symmetric competition in specification [1]. In either case the central
station’s competitors are all the remote stations in the market. Thus, the role of remote stations remains
unchanged from the perspective of the central station.
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the number of competitors (neighbors) increases.63
The theoretical asymmetric spokes model further suggests that a decrease in centrality,
i.e. a greater distance from the center, leads to lower equilibrium prices for both central
and remote stations. However, DIST TO CENTER indicates that the prices of remote
stations are expected to increase by 0.04 cents if the driving time to the center increases
by one minute, which contradicts the theoretical model. The coefficient of C*DIST TO
CENTER can be interpreted in the sense that an increase in the distance to the center of
a central station by one minute of driving time is expected to lead to a price that is 0.38
cents lower than the price change resulting from an increase in the distance to the center
by one minute for the group of remote stations.64 Thus, the net effect of an increase in the
distance to the center for central stations by one minute is equal to 0.04 − 0.38 = −0.34
cents. It is a common theoretical and empirical finding (see Chapter 2) that an increase
in spatial differentiation (i.e. an increase in the distance to rivals) increases prices. C*AV
DIST REMOTE indicates that prices of central stations are expected to increase by 0.08
cents if the average distance of remote stations to the center increases by one minute. Also,
the prices of remote stations increase by 0.03 if the distance of other remote stations to the
center increases by one minute (variable (1-C)*AV DIST REMOTE). This fact contradicts
the theoretical model, but is not very surprising given the empirical results, which show
a significant interaction between remote stations. On the other hand, a change in the
distance the central station is located from the center does not seem to affect the prices of
remote stations, as (1-C)*DIST CENTRAL is not significantly different from zero.
5.6.3 The Impact of Individual Shocks of Central and Remote Gasoline Stations
This section tests for asymmetries in the total impact on equilibrium prices following a
price change by an individual gasoline station. According to proposition 2 of Section 3.4,
an individual cost shock, e.g. due to a takeover, of a single central station has a stronger
effect on equilibrium prices of a local market than a shock of the same magnitude coming
from a remote station. The existence of asymmetries in the strategic interaction between
central and remote stations has already been discussed based on the t-tests in Table 8
63Specifications [3] and [4] leave out these interaction terms to check and confirm the robustness of the
coefficients of the market size variables STATIONS_4 to STATIONS_6.
64Through the interaction term C*DIST TO CENTER the coefficient of DIST TO CENTER reflects the
coefficient for remote stations only.
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above. These point estimates, however, only capture the direct effects (see Section 4.5)
of a price change. Starting from equilibrium prices in a local market, an increase in the
price of one station will raise prices of all direct competitors. Following these reactions,
the direct competitors of these direct competitors (and therefore also the station which
originally changed the price) again will adjust their prices. The process stops when a new
price equilibrium is reached. Assuming symmetric competition in specification [1] of Table
7, the average impact on prices of all stations in a local market is independent of whether
the shock emanates from the central or a remote station. However, as confirmed by the
results of this analysis, remote stations are more sensitive to the price of the central station
than to the price of other remote stations in markets with more than four stations.
For any local market of h stations three matrices H1, H2 and H3 of size h × h similar
to WR→C , WC→R and WR→R are defined, but for one representative local market only.
The element i, j of matrix H1 (H2) [H3] is equal to one if i is the central and j a remote
station (i is a remote and j the central station) [i and j are remote stations], and zero
otherwise. ∆pC is the shock coming from the central station and ∆pi the shock coming
from a remote station. Both vectors are of dimension h× 1 and can be written as
∆pC =


1
0
0
...


, ∆pi =


0
1
0
...


.
Without loss of generality I assume that the central station C is represented by the first
element of both vectors and that the price change by a remote station (Ri) comes from
the station represented by the second element of ∆pi. The change in equilibrium prices,
∆p∗, is a h× 1 vector and is given by:
∆p∗C = (Ih −
3∑
v=1
ρvHv)
−1∆pC ,
∆p∗i = (Ih −
3∑
v=1
ρvHv)
−1∆pi.
Ih is the identity matrix of dimension h and ρv are the spatial autoregressive coefficients
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of specification [2] of the econometric model.
The average increase in equilibrium prices in a local market is denoted as ∆p∗C (∆p
∗
i )
if the price shock comes from a central (remote) station and is equal to the sum of the
elements of ∆p∗C (∆
∗
i ) divided by h. ∆p
∗
C/∆p
∗
i > 1 indicates that the average impact of a
shock coming from C is higher than the average impact of the same shock emanating from
Ri, which would confirm the existence of asymmetries in the impact on local market prices.
A bootstrap simulation technique65 is used to account for the uncertainty of the parameter
values of the point estimates of the econometric model. Each parameter is drawn randomly
from a normal distribution with the mean and the standard errors of the ρs of specification
[2]. Repeating this process 10,000 times I can derive a probability distribution instead of
point estimates. The median (solid line) and the 99 % and 95% confidence interval (dashed
lines) are illustrated in Figure 6. The horizontal line at a value of 1 illustrates the case of
symmetric competition and serves as a reference.
Figure 6: Asymmetric vs. symmetric impacts of shocks
Figure 6 compares the ratio ∆p∗C/∆p
∗
i based on the simulation results to the symmetric
case of ∆p∗C/∆p
∗
i = 1 for markets with different numbers of stations. Again, a symmetric
impact cannot be rejected in markets with three and four gasoline stations. However, in
markets with more than four stations the central station has a higher impact than a remote
65See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for an introduction.
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station on equilibrium prices of a local market. In markets with five and six stations the
impact of an individual shock induced by the central station on equilibrium prices becomes
more than twice the size of the impact of a shock by a remote station.
Figure 7: The impact of shocks on equilibrium prices of remote stations
As the t-tests in Table 8 on page 71 reveal, the impact of one remote station on the
central station decreases proportionally with the number of remote stations in the market.
Figure 7 illustrates the difference in the impact of a shock coming from the central and a
remote station, respectively, on the equilibrium prices of remote stations. Again, the solid
line indicates the mean and the dashed lines the 90% confidence intervals. As in all tests
asymmetries in the influence of central and remote stations have to be rejected for markets
with three and four stations but are significant in markets with five and six stations. The
total change in equilibrium prices of a remote station following a price change of one
cent by the central or another remote station is about 0.75 cents including all feedback
effects in markets with three stations. The impact of one remote stations on other remote
stations decreases steadily to 0.27 in markets with five and to 0.24 in markets with six
stations. The total change in equilibrium prices of remote stations following a price change
of the central station by one cent increases to about 1.1 cents in markets with five and
to 0.8 cents in markets with six stations. The wide confidence interval in markets with 6
stations is a result of the ‘large’ standard errors of the point estimates of ρC→R6 and ρ
R→R
6
compared to the other parameters used in this simulation. The results obtained in this
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simulation confirm the existence of asymmetries between central and remote stations, also
for the transmission of individual shocks, but again only for markets with more than four
stations.
5.7 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter I have tested the implications and propositions of the asymmetric spokes
model in an empirical application to the Austrian retail gasoline market. I have specified
a spatial autoregressive model that accounts for and tests asymmetries in the strategic
interaction in pricing between central and remote gasoline stations. I have delimited a
number of local markets and have estimated the model for markets with three to six gaso-
line stations. While I cannot reject the symmetry in competition that is typically presumed
in the theoretical and empirical analysis of spatial price competition in markets with few
stations, I find significant evidence that the central station becomes the key reference in
pricing in markets with more than four gasoline stations. Even though I find that remote
stations compete with other remote stations as well, the econometric results confirm that
the price set by the central station serves as the main reference price for remote stations
in markets > 4 stations. Simulations based on the econometric results show that, with
an increasing number of stations in the market, the influence of the central stations on
equilibrium market prices also increases relative to the influence of remote stations. Fur-
ther, the econometric results provide evidence, that central gasoline stations charge higher
prices than remote stations.
This chapter provides an empirical model that follows the theoretical asymmetric spokes
model introduced in Chapter 3 as closely as possible. Clearly, this empirical model has
its limitations. Local markets have to be defined in order to assign a market center and
a central gasoline station to each market. Using nearest-neighbor-relations as a delimiter
for local markets may appear somewhat arbitrary, but leads to markets that are localized
enough to reflect the spatial patterns of the theoretical model. However, in this approach
markets are islands. Interaction takes place between stations within one market but cannot
occur between markets per definition. Even if a station of one market is relatively close to
a station of another market compared to another station of its own market, competition
is assumed to take place indirectly between the two stations of the same market but not
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between the two stations of the different markets. A weakness of this empirical model is the
binary division of stations into central and remote. The real world patterns often reflect
spatial structures that are more complex than the simple star-shaped graph representing
the theoretical spokes model. For instance, there might be several intersections within
one local market or several stations might be located along the same spoke (road). Thus,
there might exist a group of stations that are neither purely central nor purely remote as
assumed in this model but rather ‘semi-central’ or ‘semi-remote’. In these cases the binary
distinction between central and remote stations appears problematic.
The assumptions necessary for the empirical approach testing the asymmetric spokes
model in this chapter leave very little space for checking the results for their robustness
apart from the robustness checks made in the specifications presented in Section 5.6.2.
No alternative measures of centrality nor alternative concepts of the market center are
available. To account for the limitations of this empirical approach, I opt for a more general
approach in Chapter 6 below, which forms the second empirical part of this thesis. The
policy implications of the findings of the present empirical analysis and ideas for further
research are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 together with the findings of the analysis
presented in Chapter 6.
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6 Centrality and Pricing in the Retail Gasoline Market of
Vienna: A Network Approach66
6.1 Introduction and Motivation
The asymmetric spokes model introduced in Chapter 3 is a simple model leading to clear-
cut propositions about the pricing behavior of central and remote firms in spatially dif-
ferentiated markets. The empirical application of the asymmetric spokes model to the
Austrian retail gasoline market in Chapter 5 demonstrated that a market’s central gaso-
line station serves as the main reference for remote stations in markets with more than four
stations and that the influence of an individual remote station declines steadily with the
number of stations in the market. However, the empirical framework in Chapter 5 is sub-
ject to several strong assumptions and leaves very little room for modifications to check the
robustness of the findings. These limitations were already discussed in detail in Section 5.7.
This chapter allows for more complex spatial patterns and regards the market as one
big network of firms rather than assuming non-interacting local markets. The empirical
framework relaxes some of the strong assumptions made in the empirical model of Chapter
5 and provides a more general analysis of pricing in the context of spatial differentiation
and firms that are heterogeneous in their degree of centrality. The chapter is organized as
follows: Section 6.2 introduces a theoretical extension of the asymmetric spokes model. An
introduction into the characteristics of networks and network centrality in general is given
in sections 6.3 and 6.4. Section 6.5 describes how the concept of networks and network
centrality are applied to the retail gasoline market of Vienna. Section 6.6 discusses the
econometric specification. Section 6.7 provides information on the data used. The results
are presented and discussed in Section 6.8. Finally, Section 6.9 concludes the analysis.
6.2 An Extended Asymmetric Spokes Model
The theoretical asymmetric spokes model introduced in Chapter 3 describes a simple spa-
tial pattern in which one firm is regarded as the central firm and all other firms as remote
firms. However, the real world data very often show patterns that are much more complex,
e.g. markets with several intersections, or several firms along the same road (spoke). Thus,
66This chapter, except for the theoretical extension of the asymmetric spokes model, is based on the paper
“Centrality and pricing in differentiated markets: The case of gasoline” by Firgo et al. (2011).
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the dichotomy of central and remote firms sometimes appears inaccurate. In this chapter
I modify one of the key features of the asymmetric spokes model, i.e. several firms can be
located along the same spoke as illustrated in Figure 8. In this figure C again indicates the
Figure 8: An extended asymmetric spokes model
unique central firm as the firm closest to the market center. Rmi indicates a remote firm of
order mi, with mi = {1, . . . ,Mi}, where Mi is the number of remote firms located at spoke
i, with i = {1, . . . n}, where n is the number of spokes hosting remote firms. Thus, firm
R12 is the first (innermost) remote firm of M remote firms located at spoke 2. The dashed
lines in Figure 8 imply that there may be an arbitrary number of additional remote firms
along this dashed line that are omitted in the illustration. Under the same assumptions
as in section 3.1, there are now three categories of firms: 1) The central firm C with n
neighbors, 2) semi-remote firms Rmi , with mi < Mi, which have two neighbors, and 3)
remote firms RMi , which represent the outermost remote firm of their spoke and have one
neighbor only. dmi (dC) is the distance R
m
i (C) is located from the center and x
m
i with
m > 1 (m = 1) is the distance the marginal consumer is located from the center who is
exactly indifferent between purchasing the product at Rm−1i or at R
m
i (at C or at R
1
i ). l
is the standardized length of the spokes.
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The profit function πC and the profit maximizing price pC correspond to πC and pC in
the original asymmetric spokes model of Chapter 3:
πC = (pC − cC)
[
n∑
i=1
x1i + l (N − n)
]
, (42)
pC =
1
2


n∑
i=1
p1i
n
+ t


n∑
i=1
d1i
n
− dC

+ cC

+ tl
(
N − n
n
)
, (43)
where cC are constant marginal costs, N is the total number of spokes in the market, p1i
is the price of R1i and d
1
i is the distance R
1
i is located from the center. Finally, t are the
constant per unit transportation costs.
Semi-remote firms of order mi < Mi have two neighbors. Their profit function (πmi ) and
profit maximizing price (pmi ) are equal to
πmi = (p
m
i − c
m
i )
(
xm+1i − x
m
i
)
, (44)
pmi =
1
2
[
pm−1i + p
m+1
i
2
+ t
(
dm−1i + d
m+1
i
2
− dmi
)
+ cmi
]
,∀1 ≤ m < M,R0i = C. (45)
Thus, the price reaction function of a ‘semi remote’ firm is a function of the prices of and
distances to its two neighbors. These firms correspond to firms in the circular city model
by Salop (1979) that was discussed in Section 2.1.1, except for the fact that they are not
necessarily distributed equidistantly along their spoke.
Finally, the profits (πMi ) and the profit maximizing price (p
M
i ) of the outermost remote
firm of a spoke correspond to the ones of remote firms in the original asymmetric spokes
model of Chapter 3:
πMi =
(
pMi − c
M
i
) [
l − xMi
]
, (46)
pMi =
1
2
[
pM−1i + t
(
dM−1i − d
M
i
)
+ cMi
]
+ tl. (47)
If the slopes of the reaction functions are compared, the differences in the impact of
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central, semi-remote and remote firms on pricing decisions becomes obvious:
∂p1i
∂pC
=
1
4
,∀Mi > 2;
∂p1i
∂pC
=
1
2
,∀Mi = 1. (48)
∂pC
∂pmi
=
1
2n
,∀mi = 1;
∂pm±1i
∂pmi
=
1
4
,∀2 ≤ mi ≤Mi − 2;
∂pMi
∂pmi
=
1
2
,∀mi = Mi − 1.
∂pC
∂pMi
=
1
2n
,∀Mi = 1;
∂pM−1i
∂pMi
=
1
4
,∀Mi > 2.
The equations in (48) show that remote firms react more strongly to their semi-remote
or central neighbors than semi-remote or central firms react to remote firms. Also, semi-
remote firms react more strongly to central firms than central firms react to semi-remote
firms if n ≥ 3. This finding is very interesting in the context of the empirical results of the
original asymmetric spokes model discussed in Chapter 5, in which a significantly stronger
impact of central firms on pricing was only found in markets with more than four firms.
In comparison to the original asymmetric spokes model of Chapter 3, the impact of a firm
on the pricing decision of another firms does not only depend on the centrality of the firm
itself, but also on the centrality of the respective other firm. The reaction to price changes
by the central firm are different for semi-remote and remote firms. Also, the impact of price
changes by semi-remote firms are different for central, remote or other semi-remote firms.
Thus, a clear-cut trichotomy of central, semi-remote and remote gasoline stations similar
to the dichotomy of central and remote stations in the empirical analysis of Chapter 5 does
not seem to be a very appropriate alternative for the empirical approach in this chapter.
Thus, instead of dividing firms into three groups and repeating the empirical analysis of
Chapter 5, I will opt for a different approach to testing the hypotheses of the asymmetric
spokes model by considering a firm’s own position (centrality) within the market (network
of firms), but also the position (centrality) of their neighbors. Therefore, the market is not
split into several isolated sub-markets but treated as a single interconnected network. To
analyze the impact of centrality on pricing, I assign specific degrees of centrality to each
gasoline station based on different measures of network centrality. The following sections
present some basic information on networks and the measures of network centrality that
are applied in this analysis.
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6.3 Neighborhood and Degree in Networks
In many (retail) markets, as discussed throughout this thesis, firms and consumers are
scattered in space and are connected through a system of roads and intersections. Clearly,
when plotted schematically, such markets reflect networks. The firms are the network’s
nodes and the system of roads and intersections are the links (edges) between firms, which
can be defined by adjacency, critical distances or critical numbers, i.e. the criteria also
used for the construction of spatial weights matrices (see Section 4.2). Networks have
been analyzed extensively in various fields of science. The theory of graphs67 is an entire
discipline within mathematics dedicated to the analysis of networks. Social networks are a
major field of research in sociology and psychology. Economic research is actually dealing
with networks as well, if the units of interest are connected and interacting, even if they
are not perceived as networks by the researcher. This section presents some concepts and
characteristics of networks that are of special interest for the empirical analysis in this
chapter.
The neighborhood relations stored in matrix W of Section 4.2 describe a network with a
set of n nodes (firms). In case of binary ‘yes/no’ neighborhood, wij ∈ {0, 1}, with wij = 1
if i and j are neighbors and if i 6= j. Thus, wij = 1 indicates a direct link between the
nodes i and j. Goyal (2009, p. 10ff) presents a number of different types of networks and
discusses their characteristics. Out of those, Figure 9 selects networks that represent some
of the models introduced in Section 2.1.
67The term ‘graph’ is used synonymously for ‘network’.
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Figure 9: Types of networks
(a) Degree 1 network (b) Degree 2 network (c) Complete network
(d) Star network
(e) Line network
The number of links merging in a node is equivalent to the node’s number of direct
neighbors. This number is the node’s so-called ‘degree’ (d). The connections (links) be-
tween two nodes in the networks described in Figure 9 can be illustrated in a network
matrix (G) similar to a spatial weights matrix (see Section 4.2) based on the adjacency of
observations.
Ga =


0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0


, Gb =


0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0


, Gc =


0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0


,
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Gd =


0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0


, Ge =


0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0


.
Figures 9(a), 9(b) and 9(c) describe networks in which every node has the same number of
neighbors. These networks are illustrated in the respective matrices Ga, Gb and Gc. The
number of neighbors is equal to one in a degree 1 network, equal to two in the degree 2
network and equal to n − 1 in the complete network. The theoretical models in Section
2.1.1 reflect these symmetrical types of networks. In a degree 1 network as depicted in
Figure 9(a), nodes can only be connected to pairs because in all other networks at least
one node would have a degree d ≥ 2. Thus, a degree 1 network is divided into several sub-
networks that are not connected to one another, which results in a block diagonal matrix
(Ga). An economic degree 1 network is described by Hotelling (1929) and is the special
case of n = 2 in the spokes model by Chen and Riordan (2007). Figure 9(b) describes a
network in which each node is of degree 2. The circular city model by Salop (1979) is a
degree 2 network. The symmetric spokes model by Chen and Riordan (2007) is described
in Figure 9(c). All nodes are connected to all other nodes, which is the characteristic of a
‘complete network’. This completeness is reflected in the adjacency matrix Gc, in which
all elements off the main diagonal are equal to one.
A star network as in Figure 9(d) consists of an arbitrary number of links which intersect
in a single node at the center of the star. In the star network all nodes have a degree of 1
except for the central node, which has a degree of n− 1. Some of the spatial competition
models presented in Section 2.1.2 have the characteristics of a star network. Although it
appears similar to a star network, the asymmetric spokes model introduced in this thesis
(Section 3) has to be interpreted in a slightly different way. As the central firm may be
located off the central intersection there are links not only from the central to all remote
nodes (firms), but also between remote nodes. Thus, strictly speaking, the asymmetric
spokes model in Chapter 3 reflects a complete network. However, in terms of the market
area of each firm, the asymmetric spokes model has the characteristics of a star network.
The market area of the central firm is adjacent to the market areas of all other (remote)
firms while the market area of each remote firm is adjacent to the market area of the central
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firm only. In a line network as depicted in Figure 9(e), there are also two different groups
of nodes. The two outermost nodes have a degree of one; all other interior nodes have a
degree of two. A line network is analyzed by Fik and Mulligan (1991) (see Section 2.1.2).
In the matrices Ga to Ge above, an element in these matrices is equal to one if two nodes
are directly connected and zero otherwise. Thus, all links between nodes are assumed to
have the same length, which implies that adjacent nodes are distributed equidistantly.
Networks with a binary adjacency of 0 and 1 are referred to as ‘unweighted’ networks.
All theoretical models presented in Chapter 2, except for Fik (1991b), are unweighted
networks. In the asymmetric spokes model of Chapter 3, however, the assumption of an
equidistant distribution of nodes is relaxed. Thus, the length of a link between two nodes
can have any positive value. Networks of this kind are known as ‘weighted’ networks. In
a weighted network two nodes are closer the lower the length of the link between the two
nodes (Jackson, 2008, p. 21).
In all theoretical models presented so far, connections have been symmetrical in the
sense that gij = gji. However, in some networks the possibility of an asymmetric situation
of gij 6= gji may occur. For example, in a network of roads there might be a one-way street
between two nodes. Thus, the direct connection (link) between the two would be true in
one direction but not in both. If gij = gji is true for all nodes, the network is ‘undirected’.
If gij 6= gji occurs at least once, the network is ‘directed’ (Jackson, 2008, p. 21).
Some very helpful characteristics of a network can be detected by using adjacency ma-
trices like Ga to Ge.68 One very important feature of a matrix G storing information on
the links of a network is its ability to measure a node’s centrality within a network. The
following Section 6.4 discusses some aspects of network centrality that are crucial to the
empirical analysis in this chapter.
6.4 Network Centrality
Information on the centrality of a node within a network structure can be of interest in
many cases. It might be helpful to identify a ‘key’ person within a social network, to find
68See (Jackson, 2008, pp. 23ff) for details.
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the most central position for a new hospital within the road network, or to identify a central
firm in a spatial market. However, how to measure centrality properly mainly depends on
the subject of research. The following types of centrality and their interpretation are
considered most prominently in the literature (Jackson, 2008, pp. 37f):
1. Degree centrality: How connected is a node within a network?
2. Closeness centrality: How easily can a node reach all other nodes in a network?
3. Betweenness centrality: How important is a node as a connection between other
nodes?
4. Neighbors’ characteristics centrality: How important is a node depending on the
importance of its neighbors?
The first three types of centrality and a measure for each type were proposed in a seminal
paper by Freeman (1979). The latter type of centrality is measured by concepts based on
the former three. Degree centrality simply counts the number of direct connections a node
has, but does not necessarily give any information about the importance of node. For the
decision about where to construct a hospital in a city network, it is rather crucial that the
hospital is easily accessible by all citizens. The concept of closeness centrality measures
the longest distance a node i is located from any other node in the network, which thus
detects a concept of centrality relevant for these kind of questions. The node with the
highest closeness-centrality in a network is the network’s median location.69 Betweenness
centrality measures how many shortest paths from every node j to any other node k pass
through a particular node i, which may be of particular interest for the maintenance of a
technical network or for the flow of information as nodes with a high betweenness centrality
are important for the connection of different parts of a network. All of these centrality
measures can be standardized so that their values range from zero to one. Based on the
measure of degree centrality, a node’s influence on the total network not only depends on
its own centrality, but also on the centrality of adjacent nodes. In a network matrix G the
total impact (see Section 4.5.2) of a particular node on the entire network highly depends
on the connectivity of adjacent nodes directly linked to the focal node. Thus, the total
importance of a node with a relatively high degree of centrality may be smaller compared
69The concept of the median location was used to define the center of local markets in the empirical analysis
of Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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to a node with a relatively lower degree centrality if the adjacent nodes of the former have
a relatively lower degree centrality compared to the latter. A number of measures based
on the degree of a node look at the total impact of one node on the entire network.70
Even though degree centrality only measures one aspect of centrality, it is the concept
that best meets the criteria of measuring centrality in the context of a localized spatial
competition model. Localized competition is defined through competition in the market
space between adjacent firms, which are equivalent to adjacent nodes in a network. The
theoretical propositions made in Section 3.4 are related to the number of direct competitors
(neighbors). Thus, a criterion measuring a firm’s centrality in the market (network) in this
analysis should be based on the concept of degree centrality.
6.4.1 Degree Centrality in Unweighted and Weighted Networks
The concept of degree centrality (dc) is similar to the degree of a node. In unweighted
networks the degree centrality of node i is equal to
dci =
n∑
j=1
gij , gij ∈ {0, 1}. (49)
In small networks or networks with a high degree of connectivity, a standardized version
of degree centrality can be useful. The standardized degree centrality of node i is equal to
dc∗i = dci/(n−1), which is the ratio of the actual degree of a node to the maximum degree
possible in a network of n nodes. Due to the standardization it follows that 0 ≤ dc∗i ≤ 1.
Thus, the standardization helps to facilitate the interpretation and comparability of the
centrality of individual nodes. However, for networks characterized by low degrees of con-
nectivity and/ or a high number of nodes, dc∗i may become unfeasibly small for most nodes.
In a weighted network the links between nodes may be of different lengths or different
weights. While a higher weight of a link indicates a higher importance, a greater length
indicates a greater distance between nodes, which usually implies a lower weight. In either
case wij is not binary as in an unweighted network, but may have any nonnegative value.
70For a recent survey of modifications and extensions of the centrality measures introduced by Freeman
(1979) see Borgatti and Everett (2006).
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Thus, degree centrality in a weighted network (wdc) is equal to
wdci =
n∑
j=1
gij , gij ∈ {R≥0}. (50)
6.4.2 Degree Centrality in Directed Networks
In directed networks, links between nodes are not necessarily reciprocal. Thus, the numbers
of outgoing and incoming links of a node are not necessarily the same. For social networks
Opsahl et al. (2010, p. 247) interpret the out-degree of a node as the node’s degree
of activity as it counts the number of links emanating from a node. The in-degree is
interpreted as a proxy for the node’s popularity as it counts the number of links leading
to the node. In a directed network G is not symmetric; thus, gij 6= gji is true at least for
one pair of elements. If gij 6= 0 indicates a link from i to j, then
dcouti =
n∑
j=1
gij (51)
measures the out-degree centrality of node i and
dcinj =
n∑
i=1
gij (52)
measures the in-degree centrality of node j, with gij ∈ {0, 1} in unweighted and gij ∈ {R≥0}
in weighted directed networks.
Translated into the context of centrality in a pricing game, the out-degree counts the
number of strategically relevant neighbors a particular firm has, while the in-degree mea-
sures the number of firms of which a particular firm is a relevant neighbor.
6.4.3 Closeness Centrality
Closeness centrality (cc) measures centrality in terms of a node’s closeness to all other
nodes in the network. Thus, the closeness centrality of node i is given by
cci =

 n∑
j=1
d(i, j)


−1
(53)
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where d(i, j) is the (shortest path) distance between nodes i and j. In an unweighted
network, d(i, j) is the number of links it takes to get from i to j. In a weighted network,
d(i, j) is the sum of weights attributed to each link it takes to get from i to j. To compare
networks of different sizes, Freeman (1979, p. 226) again suggests a standardized version
(cc∗) of cc:
cc∗i =


n∑
j=1
d(i, j)
n− 1


−1
(54)
In large networks with a low degree,
n∑
j=1
d(i, j) becomes very large.
n∑
j=1
d(i, j) = ∞ for
every single node if the graph is unconnected, i.e. at least one node (a group of nodes) is
(are) not connected to at least one other node (a group of other nodes) (Freeman, 1979,
p. 226).
6.5 The Retail Gasoline Market of Vienna as a Network
Unlike in the empirical analysis of Chapter 5, the analysis in this chapter is reduced to
the metropolitan area of Vienna, which is the largest urban area available, as the net-
work approach chosen requires a rather homogeneous spatial structure that would not be
given if rural areas are included. I treat the Viennese retail gasoline market as a network
of stores that are connected through a system of roads. Therefore, the information on
geographical coordinates of the gasoline stations are linked to the road network and the
distances between nearby stations are calculated using the GIS-software ArcGIS and the
routing tool WIGeoNetwork. Distance is measured in driving time (minutes) rather than
driving distance as the latter does not contain information on speed limits and may thus
be an inaccurate measure of consumer transportation costs, which are mainly time costs.
An exact application of the existing graph theoretical measures of centrality and a trans-
formation of the network of roads and gasoline stations into a graph is not feasible for the
following reasons: First, there are two types of graph theoretical nodes in the network,
namely gasoline stations and intersections of roads. However, only gasoline stations shall
be treated as ‘real’ nodes, and intersections shall not. Second, roads reflect the links be-
tween nodes (stations) in this network, but stations are never located exactly on a road,
but at a varying distance next to them. Therefore, the network of roads, intersections and
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Figure 10: Example: Construction of a simple network for H = 2
(a) Unconnected Nodes (b) Network based on H = 2 nearest neighbors
gasoline stations has to be transformed into a network in which gasoline station are the
only nodes and the links between these nodes reflect a neighborhood relation relevant for
strategic interaction. A link is the schematic illustration of the shortest path between two
gasoline stations on the road network, which may include intersections of roads that are
not illustrated in the link.
Freeman (1979) argues that a proper measure of centrality must attain its maximum
value in the center of a star-shaped graph, which is the most centralized of all graphs. I
adopt the measures of degree centrality (dc), weighted degree centrality (wdc) and closeness
centrality (cc) discussed in Section 6.4 so they match with the definition of the network
and comply with Freeman’s criterion for centrality measures.
6.5.1 Construction of the Network
In constructing the network of gasoline stations in Vienna, I start with the locations of
gasoline stations, which are the nodes of the network. Thus, I start with an unconnected
graph of 273 gasoline stations. Next, a link is added from node i to node j if j is among the
H-nearest neighbors of i in terms of driving time from i to j. As this neighborhood relation
is not necessarily reciprocal71, the graph is directed. H links originate from every node;
thus, all nodes have the same out-degree H. Therefore, all measures of centrality have to
be based on a node’s in-degree, which is the number of links leading to a node (Jackson,
2008, p. 29). Figure 10 illustrates a simple example of how the network is constructed.
The set of previously unconnected nodes in Figure 10(a) are connected based on first and
second nearest neighborhood (H = 2) in Figure 10(b). An arrow indicates a directed link,
71i is not necessarily among the H-nearest neighbors of j just because j is among the H-nearest neighbors
of i.
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while lines without arrows indicate an undirected (reciprocal) link. The numbers reflect
the distance between two nodes (the length of the link). The arrows from A to B and C
indicate that B and C are the two nearest neighbors of A, but that A is among the two
nearest neighbors of neither B nor C.
Any network can be transformed into a matrix. Let G of dimension m × m reflect a
network of m nodes. The element gij = 1 if there is a link from node i to node j. In the
present case, gij = 1 if station j is among the H-nearest neighbors of station i and gij = 0
otherwise. In a next step G is split into H matrices Gh, with h = 1, . . . , H, so matrix Gh
reflects a hth-nearest neighborhood relation, and G =
H∑
h=1
Gh. For the example in Figure
10, the network with H = 2 can be expressed by
G =


0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0


, G1 =


0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0


, G2 =


0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0


,
so G = G1 + G2. Based on the matrix G and the matrices Gh, the different measures
of centrality are applied to the retail gasoline market of Vienna in order to evaluate the
importance of centrality for the pricing decisions of gasoline stations.
6.5.2 Measuring Degree Centrality
The degree centrality (dc) of station j in network G is given by
dcHj =
H∑
h=1
m∑
i=1
ghij , (55)
where ghij = 1 if station j is the h
th-nearest neighbor of station i and ghij = 0 otherwise.
Thus, as G =
H∑
h=1
Gh, the degree centrality of station j is simply the sum of all elements
in column j of matrix G. In the example above dcH=2 = [0 3 3 2] for the nodes A, B, C
and D. As mentioned above, I am interested in the stations’ in-degree of centrality, as the
out-degree is equal to the sum of all elements of row i in matrix G, which is the same (H)
for all nodes.
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6.5.3 Measuring Weighted Degree Centrality
A generalization of degree centrality is suggested by Opsahl et al. (2010) for the case of
weighted networks. Following the authors I define the weighted degree centrality (wdc) as
wdcHj =
H∑
h=1
m∑
i=1
(H − h+ 1)ghij . (56)
Unlike in the simple degree centrality dc, wdc puts a higher weight on closer neighbors.
For the present analysis there are two options for weighting the degree: either by the
distance between neighbors or by their order. Weighting by distance has the disadvantage
of internalizing differences in the density of gasoline stations. Stations in regions with a
higher density would be weighted differently from stations in regions with a lower density.
Differences in the density, however, are not of particular interest in this analysis. Thus, I
weight the degree by the order of the H-nearest neighbors. The nearest neighbor of station
i is stored in matrix G1 and is weighted by H−1+1 = H. The second nearest neighbor of
i is stored in G2 and weighted by H − 2+ 1 = H − 1, etc. In the example of H = 2 above,
node B is the nearest neighbor of one node (C), which accounts for a weight of 2× 1 and
the 2nd-nearest neighbor of two nodes (A and D), which accounts for a weight of 1 × 2.
Therefore, wdc2B = 4. Thus, in the above example wdc2 = [0 4 6 2].
6.5.4 Measuring Closeness Centrality
An additional measure of centrality is ‘closeness centrality’ (cc), which relies on the close-
ness of a node to all other other nodes in the network. I adopt this measure of centrality;
However, it is necessary to make a few changes in the original measure proposed by Free-
man (1979) as the retail gasoline market of Vienna is a very large network characterized
by a relatively low connectivity due to the restriction of H out-degrees per node. As a
consequence, cc in equation (53) and the standardized version cc∗ in equation (54) become
very small for all nodes and are not feasible measures of centrality. Thus, I modify this
centrality measure by measuring the closeness of a station j, if it is among the H-nearest
neighbors of another station i relative to the closeness of i’s remaining (H − 1)-nearest
neighbors. Closeness centrality cc is the sum of the relative closenesses72 over all nodes of
72I am interested in the relative closeness rather than in the absolute closeness because absolute closeness
is highly correlated with the density of stations, which may well vary across space.
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which j is a neighbor:
ccj =
m∑
i=1

 gijwijm∑
j=1
gijwij

 . (57)
In equation (57) the element wij is the squared inverse driving time from node i to node
j stored in the spatial weights matrix W .73 In the numerical example above and W based
on the squared inverse driving time, W is equal to
W =


0 (1/4)2 (1/3)2 (1/5)2
(1/4)2 0 (1/1)2 (1/3)2
(1/3)2 (1/1)2 0 (1/2)2
(1/5)2 (1/3)2 (1/2)2 0


.
The above measure of ‘closeness centrality’ requires the row normalized version Gcc
∗
of the
Hadamard product Gcc = G⊙W , which is equal to
Gcc
∗
=


0 0.3600 0.6400 0
0 0 0.9000 0.1000
0 0.8000 0 0.2000
0 0.3077 0.6923 0


.
The closeness centrality (cc) of node j is the sum of weights it has as a neighbor of m sta-
tions, which corresponds to the sum of column j over all rows i in the transformed network
matrix Gcc
∗
. Therefore, in the present analysis, closeness centrality has to be interpreted
as another approach to weight the degree centrality of a node. For this numerical example,
cc2 = [0.000 1.4677 2.2323 0.3000].
6.6 Econometric Specification
6.6.1 The Spatial Weights Matrix
For the empirical analysis of this chapter, I use several specifications of the spatial weights
matrixW as proposed by Anselin (2002, p. 259), to check the robustness of the results and
to compare the fit of different specifications. The first question in specifying W is how to
73For a detailed description of the construction of W in this analysis see Section 6.6.1.
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define neighborhood (see Section 4.2). In their survey Ning and Haining (2003) conclude
that a great majority of gasoline stations not only consider the price of the closest station,
but also the prices of other nearby stations. A critical cut-off distance is used rather than a
critical number of k-nearest neighbors because the area analyzed is a rather homogeneous
urban region. Therefore, I do not force stations into a constraint of an identical number
of neighbors.
The critical distance is defined as 5 minutes of driving time for the main specifications
of W , but to check the robustness of the results I also set the value to 10 minutes. Both
values are somewhat arbitrary but are similar to critical distances used in previous studies
analyzing retail gasoline markets in urban areas. André and Hammarstroem (2000, p.
327f) find that the average speed in urban areas in Europe is between 20 and 30 km/h.
Therefore, a driving time of 5 (10) minutes corresponds to a distance of 1.67 to 2.5 (3.33 to
5) kilometers. In the literature on competition in retail gasoline markets in metropolitan
areas, values of 0.5 to 2 miles (0.8 to 3.2 kilometers) were used to model competition (Shep-
ard, 1991; Netz and Taylor, 2002; Ning and Haining, 2003; Barron et al., 2004; Hastings,
2004; Verlinda, 2008; Lee, 2009).74 In general, the shorter the critical distance chosen,
the higher the number of observations with zero neighbors within this critical distance.
These observations are unconnected and result in all-zero rows in W , i.e. observations
which are not influenced by neighbors. All-zero rows are not feasible when the main goal
of the analysis is the estimation of reaction functions. A larger critical distance increases
the number of observations with at least one neighbor, but may increase the number of
neighbors included as relevant to an unfeasibly large number for many observations.
Finally, the weights of neighboring stations have to be defined. According to Tobler’s
first law of geography (Tobler, 1970), nearby neighbors – all other things equal – are more
important than neighbors further away. Therefore, for wij 6= 0 stations are weighted by
the (squared) inverse of the driving time from station i to station j.
74Except for Hastings (2004) and Lee (2009), who use the driving distance on the road, all studies use
Euclidean radii.
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6.6.2 The Centrality Matrix
It is important to notice that the construction of the spatial weights matrix W already
accounts for centrality to some degree, although only implicitly. Central observations in a
network are connected to a higher degree and thus appear inW more often than less central
observations. The sum of appearances in the W matrix itself is closely related to some
centrality measures based on the total effects of the spatial multiplier (I−ρW )−1.75 Thus,
a simple spatial autoregressive model usingW already puts a higher weight on more central
observations. However, W alone does not reveal the differences in the impacts of centrality
on pricing decisions of rivals. Thus, to analyze the impact of centrality on both the level
of prices and price reactions by rivals, the three different measures of centrality elaborated
above enter the econometric model through the centrality matrix C of dimension m×m.
C is diagonal, with the element cii equal to the value of the respective centrality measure
calculated for observation i. C is calculated for each centrality measure and for different
values of H. I set H = 5 for the main specifications, but I also experiment with different
values for H to check the robustness of the results.
6.6.3 The Spatial Autoregressive Model
The modified asymmetric spokes model suggests that the pricing decisions of station i are
influenced ont only by i’s own degree of centrality, but also by the degree of centrality of
neighboring stations. The specification of the empirical model, which accounts for both
effects, is given by the following spatial autoregressive (SAR) model:
y = ρ1Wy + ρ2WCy +Xβ + γCι+ ǫ. (58)
In equation (58) y is theM×1 vector of prices, whereM is the total number of observations
in a repeated cross-section of t = 22 periods. The matrices W and C are of dimension
M×M . W is the block diagonal spatial weights matrix containing t blocks of dimensionmt,
where m is the number of observations in period t. C is a diagonal matrix with the element
cii measuring the degree of centrality of station j. To facilitate the interpretation of the
spatial autoregressive parameter ρ1 (ρ2), W (WC) is row-normalized in order to obtain a
spatially weighted (spatially and centrality weighted) average price of rivals. The parameter
75See Friedkin (1991) for a survey of centrality measures based on the spatial multiplier.
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estimate of ρ1 measures the (spatially weighted) price interaction between neighboring
stations (i.e. the slope of the price reaction function). An asymmetry in price adjustment
between neighboring rivals is captured by the parameter ρ2. A positive parameter estimate
of ρ2 implies that prices respond more strongly to price changes by central stations, as
suggested by the modified spokes model. X is an M × k matrix of k explanatory variables
including a constant and β is the k×1 vector of coefficients of the exogenous variables in X.
ι is an M ×1 unit vector and γ measures the impact of centrality on a station’s price level.
Finally, ǫ is the M × 1 vector of i.i.d. error terms. For the econometric analysis I estimate
the reduced form of equation (58) using the maximum likelihood estimator described in
Chapter 4.
6.7 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on the same data as in Chapter 5 above. The data was
collected by the Austrian Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammer) within one particular day
every three months between October 1999 and March 2005 (a total of 22 points in time).
The number of price observations available ranges from 144 to 152 per period. This data
set is merged with data on the geographical location (and other characteristics) of all 273
gasoline stations in Vienna. Using data from ArcData Austria and the ArcGIS extension
WIGeoNetwork, the geographical location of each gasoline station is linked to informa-
tion on the Viennese road system. This allows the generation of accurate measures of
distance (driving time) as well as the neighborhood relations between all gasoline stations
in the network of roads. The following sections provide some descriptive statistics of the
centrality measures (Section 6.7.1) and of the other variables used in the econometric anal-
ysis (Section 6.7.2). Variables on location characteristics were collected by the company
Catalist76. Information on demography and commuting behavior is obtained from the
Austrian Statistical Office (Statistik Austria). Prices for business premises, which are used
to approximate differences in the costs of gasoline stations, are provided by the Austrian
Chamber of Commerce (Wirtschaftskammer).
76For company details see http://www.catalist.com.
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6.7.1 Centrality Measures
Table 9 reports the descriptive statistics for the centrality measures of gasoline stations in
Vienna, which were discussed in detail in Section 6.5. I setH = 5 in the main specifications,
but I also set H = 2 and H = 10 to check the robustness of the results with respect to
the construction of the network. The measure of degree centrality (dc) ranges from 0 to
21, with a mean of 5.26 for H = 5. This means that a station is among the five nearest
neighbors of other stations around five times on average. The standard deviation indicates
that stations with a high degree of centrality relative to the maximum of 21 are scarce. The
weighted degree centrality (wdc) has a mean of 15.24 and a maximum of 55; the measure
of closeness centrality (cc) has a mean of 0.98 and a maximum of 3.22. The values for
cc indicate the sum of weights a station has as a neighbor of other stations in the spatial
weights matrix W based on the neighborhood criterion H.
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of the centrality measures
Centrality (H) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
dc (5) 5.256 3.712 0.000 21.000
wdc (5) 15.242 10.663 0.000 55.000
cc (5) 0.982 0.660 0.000 3.220
dc (2) 1.960 1.575 0.000 7.000
wdc (2) 2.934 2.394 0.000 13.000
cc (2) 0.976 0.770 0.000 4.020
dc (10) 10.982 7.740 0.000 42.000
wdc (10) 58.700 39.967 0.000 216.000
cc (10) 0.992 0.618 0.000 3.140
# of gasoline stations: 273
The variations of H to H = 2 and H = 10 show that the distribution of dc and wdc
remains constant relative to the mean compared to the values for the preferred H = 5.
The variance in cc increases (decreases) proportionally to the mean if H is set to ten (two).
The correlations between the different centrality measures and for different values of H are
reported in Table 10. The correlation of dc and wdc for the same value of H is between
0.96 and 0.97, while the correlation of cc and dc (wdc) ranges from 0.85 to 0.9 (0.86 and
0.96). The correlation between the same measure of centrality for different measures of H
is slightly lower, but above 0.75 for all and above 0.8 for most pairs. Also, the correlation
of different measures for different values of H is always higher than 0.74 and higher than
0.8 in most cases.
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Table 10: Correlation of the centrality measures
dc (5) wdc (5) cc (5) dc (2) wdc (2) cc (2) dc (10) wdc (10) cc (10)
dc (5) 1.000 0.975 0.865 0.806 0.830 0.801 0.890 0.955 0.814
wdc (5) 0.975 1.000 0.878 0.887 0.899 0.863 0.890 0.958 0.820
cc (5) 0.865 0.878 1.000 0.762 0.810 0.880 0.843 0.881 0.960
dc (2) 0.806 0.887 0.762 1.000 0.961 0.900 0.766 0.829 0.699
wdc (2) 0.830 0.899 0.810 0.961 1.000 0.956 0.850 0.885 0.743
cc (2) 0.801 0.863 0.880 0.900 0.956 1.000 0.839 0.865 0.819
dc (10) 0.890 0.890 0.843 0.766 0.850 0.839 1.000 0.977 0.855
wdc (10) 0.955 0.958 0.881 0.829 0.885 0.865 0.977 1.000 0.865
cc (10) 0.814 0.820 0.960 0.699 0.743 0.819 0.855 0.865 1.000
6.7.2 Price, Location Characteristics and Fixed Effects
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimations are reported in Table
11. The total number of observations is 3,051 within 22 time periods. Table 11 reports
the descriptive statistics for this sample rather than for the cross-section of 273 gasoline
stations because the frequency of appearances in the sample varies highly across stations.77
The mean price of one liter of diesel78 over all time periods is 75.5 cents, with a standard
deviation of 6.4. The lowest price observed is 62.4 cents, the highest one 92.9 cents. Price
variations are higher over time than across space.
The centrality measures are again plotted in this table for the main specifications using
H = 5 because the distribution in the repeated cross-section deviate from the distribu-
tion of the cross-section reported in Table 9. However, these deviations are quite small.
Table 11 also reports the descriptive statistics for the location characteristics included in
the estimations as controls. DISTANCE NEXT measures the driving time to the nearest
neighbor in minutes. This variable reflects the degree of spatial differentiation indicated
by the distance to the center in the theoretical model. The mean driving time to the
nearest neighbor is 1.67 minutes. Four stations do not have neighbors within five minutes
of driving time. These stations are excluded from the sample as five minutes is the cut-
off distance in the spatial weights matrix W .79 The variables on the share of commuters
77A number of stations cannot be included into the estimations at all due to a total absence of price data.
78As in the first empirical analysis of Chapter 5 prices of diesel are used rather than prices of gasoline
because much more price observations are available for diesel prices. The share of diesel-engined cars
was about 50% of all cars in Austria in 2005 (Statistik Austria, 2006).
79For technical reasons stations are excluded from the sample for period t if prices in t are unavailable
for all neighbors within the cut-off distance. To check the robustness of the results, the model is also
estimated using a cut-off distance of ten minutes of driving time. This increases the sample from 3,051
to 3,188 observations.
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics for the main specifications
Mean Min
Std. Dev. Max
Dependent Variable
PRICE Price of one liter of diesel in Euro cents 75.515 62.426
6.449 92.900
Centrality measures
DEGREE (dc) Degree centrality for H = 5 5.915 0
3.399 17
WEIGHTED (wdc) Weighted degree centrality for H = 5 16.897 0
9.675 47
CLOSENESS (cc) Closeness centrality for H = 5 1.136 0
0.561 3.137
Location characteristics
DISTANCE NEXT Driving time to the nearest neighbor in minutes 1.668 0.050
0.980 4.680
COMMUTERS Ratio of incoming plus outgoing commuters to 43.897 34.942
population in percent on a district level 5.680 78.071
log POP DENS Log of the population density in the district in 8.495 7.196
inhabitants per square km 0.804 10.127
log PREMISES Log of the average price for premises in the 0.167 0
district in Euros per square meter∗ 0.373 5.638
TRAFFIC Dummy variable set equal to one if road 0.768 0
traffic at the location is heavy 1
DEALER Dummy variable set equal to one if the location 0.210 0
is owned by the dealer∗ 1
SERVICE Dummy variable set equal to one if the location 0.334 0
offers attendance service 1
SMALL Dummy variable set equal to one if the ground 0.287 0
surface of the site is < 800m2∗ 1
Dummies for missing at random variables
MISS PREMISES Dummy variable set equal to one if information 0.167 0
on prices for premises is missing 1
MISS OWNER Dummy variable set equal to one if information 0.033 0
on ownership is missing 1
MISS SERVICE Dummy variable set equal to one if information 0.053 0
on attendance service is missing 1
MISS SIZE Dummy variable set equal to one if information 0.011 0
on the ground surface is missing 1
Fixed effects
Brands 9 brands, unbranded stations left out as a
reference group
Time Periods 22 periods, first period left out as a
reference group
# of observations: 3,051
∗ missing values replaced by zeros
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(COMMUTERS), the population density (POP DENS) and the average prices for factory
premises (PREMISES) are collected on a district level. TRAFFIC is a 0/1 dummy variable
set equal to one if traffic at the site is considered heavy by Catalist. DEALER (SERVICE)
[SMALL] is a 0/1 dummy set to one if the station is owned by the dealer rather than the
company (offers attendance service) [has a ground surface of less than 800 square meters].
For some districts the prices of premises are unavailable, and so is the information on
ownership, attendance service and size for some stations. For each of these variables, a
0/1 dummy variable is created (variables with the prefix MISS) which takes the value of
one if the information is unavailable. Table 11 illustrates that the share of missing values
is very small (16,7% for PREMISES and less than 6% for the other three variables with
missing data). Stations with missing values are included because the missing values can
be considered to be (completely) missing at random.80
I further include brand fixed effects for the nine brands operating gasoline stations in
Vienna. Unbranded (independent) stations are left out as a reference group. The major
brands BP (26%), OMV (12%) and Shell (10%) account for nearly half of the stations
in the sample. 21% of stations in the sample belong to the group of unbranded stations.
It is worth pointing out that no significant correlation can be detected between brands
and the centrality of stations but (major) brand stations are likely to charge higher prices
(Pennerstorfer, 2008, 2009). I also control for shifts in price levels due to shifts in crude oil
prices by including a dummy variable for each time period (with the first period left out
as a reference group).
6.8 Results and Discussion
6.8.1 Tests for Spatial Dependence
In the econometric analysis, different specifications of the spatial weights matrix W are
used for two reasons. First, the use of several weights matrices allows a comparison of the
fit of each matrix, and further allows one to find the ‘best’ specification of W . Second,
the different specifications can be used to test the robustness of the results with respect
to the construction of neighborhood. Table 12 reports the tests for spatial dependence for
80See Little and Rubin (2002) for details on missing data.
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four different specifications of W . The tests use the residuals of the OLS estimation of the
model in equation (58) assuming ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.
Table 12: Tests for spatial dependence
W -Matrix Test
Critical Distance Moran’s I LM -Error LM -Lag LM -Error LM -Lag
(Inverse) Robust Robust
5min Statistics 0.552 1407.848 1428.252 28.144 48.549
(Squared) p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
5min Statistics 0.505 1744.230 1718.973 62.558 37.302
(Single) p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
10min Statistics 0.456 1931.478 1923.394 59.440 51.356
(Squared) p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
10min Statistics 0.339 3412.470 3130.482 312.345 30.358
(Single) p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
The spatial weights matrix W is modified by two main characteristics: On the one hand
I vary the cut-off distance by including neighbors within five and ten minutes of driving
time. An increase from five to ten minutes increases the sample size. However, the number
of neighbors included also increases and for some stations the number of neighbors becomes
quite large. In these cases the weights of individual stations become very small due to the
row-normalization ofW . Also, as the density ofW increases, the variance inWy decreases
as Wy converges to the sample mean. As a result, a rather dense matrix W decreases the
explanatory power of the spatial lag.
On the other hand I also vary the weight of individual neighbors by using the (single)
inverse and the squared inverse of the driving time between stations. The squared inverse
puts a higher weight on closer neighbors than the single inverse, which becomes relevant
if the number of neighbors is high and the matrix is row-normalized. Table 11 shows
that all tests confirm the existence of spatial dependence on a 99% significance level. The
coefficient of Moran’s I is higher for the 5 minutes cut-off distance and for the squared
inverse of driving time. The values of the LM -Lag and the LM -Error tests are of similar
size for all specifications of W , the robust versions of these tests diverge to a higher degree
but are still highly significant. The LM -Lag tests are higher than the LM -Error tests only
for W based on a five minutes cut-off distance and the squared inverse of the driving time
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as weights. However, it is the economic motivation of the analysis to model price reaction
functions of gasoline stations. Therefore, I model a spatial lag model rather than a spatial
error model in all specifications. W is based on the five minutes cut-off distance and the
squared inverse is chosen as the preferred spatial weights matrix.
6.8.2 Results of the Maximum Likelihood Estimations
The main regression results of the econometric model are illustrated in Table 13. This
table only reports the results for the key variables. A discussion and tables of the results
of the control variables are available in Appendix C (Table 17 and 18). This appendix also
provides evidence for the robustness of the results with respect to a number of variations
in the spatial weights matrix W and the centrality measures.
The parameter estimates of a benchmark model that does not explicitly control for dif-
ferences in centrality (assuming ρ2 = 0 and γ = 0) are reported in column [1]. Similar
to previous SAR models conducted on the retail gasoline market (Netz and Taylor, 2002;
Pennerstorfer, 2009), I find a positive parameter estimate of ρ1, which is significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 1%-level. A gasoline station reacts to a spatially weighted average
price increase by all relevant neighbors of 1 cent with a price increase of 0.632 cents per
liter in this benchmark model, irrespective of the neighbors’ centrality.
Columns [2] - [4] report parameter estimates of the asymmetric model using the three
different measures of centrality introduced above. The inclusion of centrality significantly
improves the explanatory power of the models: a likelihood ratio (LR)-test clearly re-
jects the restricted benchmark model [1] in favor of the models including degree centrality
(model [2]) and weighted degree centrality (model [3]) at the 1%-level of significance. The
LR-test also rejects model [1] in favor of model [4], which uses closeness centrality at the
10%-level of significance.
The parameters estimating the impact that centrality has on price levels are positive and
very small, but only significant at the 10%-level for the weighted degree centrality (variable
WEIGHTED) in model [3]. In the theoretical model it was argued that centrality – mea-
sured as the distance to the market center – increases prices, ceteris paribus, but that no
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Table 13: Results of the maximum likelihood estimations
Dependent variable: PRICE
Specification [1] [2] [3] [4]
Centrality None Degree Weighted Closeness
Variables Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
ρ1 0.632 0.013
∗∗∗ -0.044 0.114 0.130 0.120 0.370 0.130∗∗∗
ρ2(dc) 0.680 0.113
∗∗∗
ρ2(wdc) 0.504 0.119
∗∗∗
ρ2(cc) 0.263 0.129
∗∗
CONSTANT 18.223 1.735∗∗∗ 17.101 1.748∗∗∗ 17.240 1.750∗∗∗ 17.806 1.767∗∗∗
DEGREE (dc) 0.010 0.008
WEIGHTED (wdc) 0.005 0.003∗
CLOSENESS (cc) -0.060 0.057
Locational characteristics yes yes yes yes
Brand fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Time period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
ℓ -4,428.272 -4,409.280 -4,417.770 -4,425.682
σ2 1.851 1.852 1.856 1.854
LR-Test of specification [1] against [2] to [4] 37.984 21.005 5.180
p-value (χ2, 2) 0.000 0.000 0.075
# of observations: 3,051; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%;
Centrality measures based on H = 5;
Construction of W : Squared inverse of driving time to neighbors within 5 minutes driving time;
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general conclusions can be drawn about centrality and price levels. The positive effect of
centrality on the level of prices in the theoretical model results from the demand enhancing
effect of an increase in centrality. Since the empirical models reported in Table 13 control
directly for differences in consumer demand by including several locational characteristics,
centrality does not turn out to to have a significant impact on prices levels in most of the
estimations.
Centrality, however, does have a significant impact on the strategic pricing interactions
between competitors. As reported in columns [2] - [4] of Table 13, the parameter (ρ2)
estimating the impact of centrality through WCy is positive and significantly different
from zero at the 1%-level (5%-level) for dc and wdc (for cc). The intensity of the pricing
interaction clearly increases with the centrality of neighbors. A particular gasoline station
reacts more strongly to prices of a central competitor than to prices of a remote one.
For WCy with C based on degree centrality (dc) and weighted degree centrality (wdc)
the slope parameter (ρ1) that does not account for the neighbor’s centrality loses its signifi-
cance if the slope parameter accounting for centrality (ρ2) is included. It remains significant
if closeness centrality (cc) is applied as a centrality measure. The identification of the slope
parameters might be weaker in specification [2] and [3] than in specification [4] because the
correlation between Wy and WCdcy (WCwdcy) is higher than the correlation between Wy
and WCccy.81 Specifications [5] to [7] of Table 17 in Appendix C report the results for a
set of specifications based on a spatial weights matrix for WCy, which weights neighbors
binary (0/1) rather than by distance. In these specifications the coefficients of ρ2 are of
similar size as in specification [4] (about 0.2) and significant on a 99% significance level.
These alternative specifications improve the identification but are likely to underestimate
the effect of centrality because it is rather unlikely that the ‘true’ spatial weights matrix
W is based on binary instead of distance based weights. All specifications of Table 13, and
Tables 17 and 18 in Appendix C show positive and highly significant effects of centrality
on the slope parameter of stations’ price reaction functions.
81Anselin (2001, p. 117) points out that the inclusion of multiple spatial weights matrices sharing common
elements may lead to identification problems but does not provide an alternative solution.
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6.8.3 The Impact of Individual Shocks on Equilibrium Prices
It is important to note that the parameter estimates of ρ1 and ρ2 only account for the
direct response of prices to price changes of neighboring stations. To address the third
implication of the asymmetric spokes model, i.e. the effect of centrality on the transmis-
sion of individual shocks to the general price level, it must be considered that each price
change also triggers feedback effects to and from all neighbors in the market. Starting with
equilibrium prices, a shock in costs of a focal station i will not only change i’s own price,
but also the prices of its first-order (direct) neighbors, which again triggers price adjust-
ments by the neighbors’ neighbors (second-order neighbors of station i) including feedback
effects to station i itself. To calculate the total effect of individual shocks on equilibrium
prices, I use the values of ρ1 and ρ2 of specification [2] of Table 13, which is the model
with the best fit according to the value of the concentrated log-likelihood function ℓ. To
account for the uncertainty of the parameter values estimated, I use a bootstrap simulation
technique similar to the simulation in Chapter 5. Each parameter is drawn randomly from
a normal distribution with the mean and the standard deviation obtained from regression
[2]. ρ1 and ρ2 are normalized so they sum up to ρ1 of specification [1] for each draw.
This assumption is justified as I cannot reject the restriction that ρ1 in specification [1]
is significantly different from ρ1 + ρ2 in specification [2]. Figure 11 shows the effects of a
price change (e.g. due to a takeover) by one particular gasoline station. The total impacts
(including all feedback effects) are depicted on the vertical axis on the left; the centrality
of the gasoline station is depicted on the horizontal axis (based on dc for H = 5). The
distribution of the degree of centrality (dc) in the population of gasoline stations in Vienna
82 is plotted on the vertical axis on the right.
According to Figure 11(a), an exogenous cost shock which triggers a price increase of 1
cent by a station with a median degree of centrality of 5 leads to an additional increase in
its price (after considering all feedback effects to and from neighboring stations) of 14 %.
Thus, the total price increase of this station is 1.14 cents per liter. In contrast, the price
increase is 1.08 (1.18) in case of a remote gasoline station with a degree centrality of 3 (in
case of a central station with a degree centrality of 8). Similarly, Figure 11(b) shows that
a price increase of 1 cent by a gasoline station with a degree centrality of 3 (5) [8] leads to
82The simulations are based on the cross-section of all 273 gasoline stations in Vienna as the simulation
does not require the actual price data.
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Figure 11: The total impact of shocks on equilibrium prices by centrality
(a) Total impact on the initiator of the shock
(b) The aggregated total impact on all other gasoline stations
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an aggregate increase in the prices of all other stations in the market by 0.75 (1.59) [3.43]
cents. Again, this price effect on all other gasoline stations in the market increases with
the degree of centrality of the station initially inducing the shock. Gasoline stations with a
higher degree of centrality tend to be the neighbors of more stations, to be relatively closer
to other stations, and are thus more influential in how they affect neighboring stations.
6.9 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the retail gasoline market in the metropolitan area of Vienna. I test
an extension of the theoretical asymmetric spokes model of Chapter 3 in a network approach
which allows for a calculation of different measures of network centrality for each gasoline
station rather than a restrictive binary division into central and remote stations. The
results show a positive and significant impact of centrality on the slope of the price reaction
function of neighboring gasoline stations. There is evidence that the slope of a station’s
price reaction function increases with the centrality of its neighbors. It is worth noting that
these findings are not an artifact of the specific functional form used to measure spatial
competition or the degree of centrality. Several modifications in the measures of centrality
as well as different functional forms for the measure of localized competition (different
specifications of W ) prove the robustness of the results. Furthermore, a large number of
explanatory variables are used as controls. The results provide evidence for the importance
of the location within a spatially differentiated market relative to other firms/stores, when
the market space is characterized by a network of roads and intersections. Implications
of these results, shortcomings of the models and some suggestions for further research are
discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
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7 Policy Implications, Outlook and Conclusions
7.1 Summary and Policy Implications
In this thesis I have introduced an asymmetric spokes model to account for spatial asymme-
tries among firms in markets with localized competition. The theoretical approach provides
a simple spatial framework that allows for the identification of differences in the pricing
behavior of central and less central (remote) firms. Only a few theoretical models have
analyzed spatial competition in the context of spatially heterogeneous firms, i.e. firms that
differ in their number of neighbors or in the distance they are located from their neighbors.
The novelty of this theoretical approach is that it is – at least to my knowledge – the
first attempt to model spatial competition including both of these aspects. Additionally,
the framework of the spokes model allows for leaps in firm’s demand through consumers
located on unshielded empty spokes.
Analyzed as a Nash-Bertrand pricing game, this theoretical model suggests that 1) a
remote firm is more sensitive to the price set by a central firm than vice versa, that 2) the
impact of an individual (cost) shock of the central firm has a stronger aggregated impact
on equilibrium market prices than an individual shock of a remote firm and that 3) no
general statements can be made on differences in the price levels of central and remote
firms. On the one hand a firm located close to a central intersection (considered as the
market center) has more neighbors with which to compete for consumers than a remote
firm. On the other hand a central firm faces a higher demand than remote firms. The
question of whether central firms charge lower or higher prices in the asymmetric spokes
model depends on the ratio of demand (number of spokes) to firms in the market.
In two empirical applications the implications of the theoretical model are tested for the
retail gasoline market using data on the geographical locations of gasoline stations, the
road network, station level prices, and station and local (regional) characteristics. Price
reaction functions of gasoline stations are estimated applying spatial autoregressive (SAR)
models. The first empirical approach seeks to transform the theoretical model into an
empirical one as closely as possible. For this purpose, the Austrian retail gasoline market
is divided into numerous local sub-markets. A center is defined for each local market and
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within each market stations are divided into one central and a number of remote stations.
The econometric results of this approach illustrate that 1) in local markets with more than
four stations, the central station serves as a main reference in the pricing decision, while in
markets with less than five stations asymmetries in the slopes of the price reaction functions
cannot be detected; 2) The total impact of an individual shock on equilibrium emanating
from a central gasoline station is more than twice as high as the impact of the same shock
coming from a remote station in markets with more than four stations; 3) Prices charged
by central gasoline stations are significantly higher than prices of remote stations, ceteris
paribus; Unfortunately the data used restricts the analysis in this empirical approach to
local markets with three to six stations only.
To address the limitations of the first empirical application, I opt for a more general anal-
ysis of the role of centrality in a spatial market. The retail gasoline market of the Vienna
metropolitan area is transformed into a network of gasoline stations based on neighborhood
relations between stations, again calculated by the actual driving distance (time) between
the stations. Using this network structure three different measures of network centrality,
which are standard tools in the literature on (social) networks, can be calculated for each
gasoline station. This approach also allows a wide range of checks for robustness of the re-
sults with respect to different measures of centrality, different functional forms of localized
competition and different distance-based weights of rivals’ prices. The results confirm that
gasoline stations are more sensitive to prices set by more central stations than by rather
remote stations, and that the impact on equilibrium prices increases with a station’s cen-
trality. However, the results obtained in this approach only find a weak positive impact of
centrality on the price levels of stations.
The literature on industrial organization typically identifies asymmetries in the strategic
interaction between firms as leader-follower relations in the context of time (e.g. Stack-
elberg leadership). The price leader changes its price first and the followers react to the
price change by adopting their own prices after observing the price change. The asym-
metric spokes model puts price leadership in a spatial context, as the results obtained in
this thesis provide strong evidence for the fact that central suppliers serve as a stronger
reference in the pricing decisions of other suppliers than remote suppliers.
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In line with previous research I find that the degree of spatial differentiation (i.e. the
distance to the next neighbor) increases prices, ceteris paribus. This result also confirms
the findings of previous research on (parts of) the Austrian gasoline market conducted by
Clemenz and Gugler (2006) and Pennerstorfer (2009). Clemenz and Gugler (2006) inter-
pret the positive significant impact of the distance to rivals on prices as evidence against
collusive behavior because it is the effect predicted by models of price competition.
While the locations of firms are ‘equally different’ and symmetric in models that follow
the tradition of Salop (1979), the results obtained in this thesis clearly reject assumption of
a symmetric competition between firms in space, at least for the industry studied. These
findings have several important implications for policy makers. I have shown that a firm
is able to gain a relatively higher importance in the strategic pricing decisions of other
firms not only due to a higher market share or due to technological or cost advantages,
but also through its position within the market space relative to other firms. Obtaining
central (key) positions in a spatially differentiated market may lead to an increase in the
market power of a firm. Therefore, it is insufficient to only consider the number of stores
(stations) operated by the same firm to evaluate its market power, but also the positions
of these stores relative to stores operated by other firms and independent retailers. A firm
operating a smaller number of stores at central locations may have more market power
than a firm operating a larger number of stores at rather remote locations.83
Therefore, unlike in the Salop (1979) model, not only the decision whether to enter
the market or not becomes an important decision, but also the decision where to locate
in the market. Firms, however, can increase their market power not only through the
establishment of a(nother) new store, but also by a takeover of individual stores or another
firm (brand). Simulations based on the econometric results obtained in this thesis have
shown that a shock from an individual gasoline station due to a takeover has a much
higher aggregated effect on equilibrium market prices if the station taken over is located at a
central position than if the takeover affects a rather remote station. Thus, the asymmetries
in space and competition are of great importance for policy makers and antitrust authorities
83Note again, that in this thesis centrality is not related to demand but to the location relative to other
firms in the road network.
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evaluating mergers and acquisitions. The impact of a merger or an acquisition on market
prices and social welfare strongly depends on the locations of the stores involved. If the
stores acquired are at rather central (remote) locations, a takeover has strong (little) effects
on social welfare. If the abandoning (closure) of individual stores in order to reduce the
market concentration is a condition for the approval of a merger or acquisition – as was the
case in Germany, for instance, when BP took over E.ON/ARAL in 2001 (Bundeskartellamt,
2001) – antitrust authorities should consider the centrality of relevant stations.
7.2 Ideas for Future Research
The research conducted in this thesis is a first attempt to highlight the importance of
spatial centrality in differentiated markets if space is analyzed as a network of roads and
intersections. The theoretical as well as the empirical approaches are subject to several
limitations. In the theoretical model the locations of firms are fixed. Thus, the theoretical
analysis can be interpreted as a short-run analysis, with price being the only strategic
variable. However, as illustrated in a numerical example, the profits of the central firm
can be much higher than the profits of remote firms. Thus, in the long run firms may have
incentives to move towards the center and a Nash-equilibrium in locations may not exist.84
An important extension of the asymmetric spokes model to a long-run analysis would be
that firms decide about locations in a first stage and about prices in a second stage of the
game.
The spokes model in the original version by Chen and Riordan (2007), as well as the
modified version in this thesis, assumes a uniform distribution of consumers in space. As
the market space equals the road network in this thesis, the assumptions of a uniform dis-
tribution of consumers and an address model with fixed consumer locations are somewhat
counterfactual. Most recently Houde (2011) provides a theoretical framework in which
consumer locations are defined as commuter paths. The author shows the “distribution
of gasoline sales within the market is shown to be poorly correlated with the distribution
of local population, and significantly more so with the distribution of work commuters”
(Houde, 2011, p. 37). The strategic decisions of firms in such a framework not only depend
on the structure of the road network, but also on the distribution of consumers. Relaxing
84Braid (1989) points out the absence of a Nash-equilibrium in locations for a spatial model similar to the
spokes model (see Section 2.1.2).
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the assumption of a uniform distribution of consumers results in two types of centrality:
1) centrality as the relative position in the network, i.e. the number of neighbors or the
degree of a firm, as subject to the analysis in this thesis; 2) centrality measured by the
closeness and access to demand hot spots (e.g. a main commuter path or highway). The
present empirical analysis controls for differences in the price levels due to differences in
consumer demand by including variables on population density, the share of commuters
in the population and a dummy variable for heavy traffic at the location of a station.
However, the access to roads with a high level of demand may also have an impact on the
strategic interaction between firms. Therefore, it would be an interesting extension of the
network approach to measure centrality also by the distance to roads or intersections with
a heavy traffic. Such an approach would allow one to disentangle the effects of ‘relative’
centrality measured by the location within a network kind of space and ‘absolute’ centrality
measured by the distance to demand hot spots, not only on price levels but also on the
strategic interaction between firms.
The theoretical analysis can be further extended to more complicated spatial patterns
and to graphs in general. In a recent working paper Soetevent (2010) introduces an algo-
rithm to calculate the locations of marginal consumers, profit maximizing prices and profits
in a pricing game with two firms for any kind of graph and for any given pair of firm loca-
tions. In principle his analysis can be extended to scenarios with more than two firms, but
such an extension raises computational issues. Through dynamic simulations Soetevent
(2010) demonstrates that small changes in the location of one firm may have far-reaching
consequences for the pricing behavior of both firms in certain spatial structures. Stable
equilibria may convert into Edgeworth price cycles and vice versa if one firm changes its
location. The work of Soetevent (2010) is motivated by the question of why some gasoline
stations engage in price cycles and why some do not. The author concludes that, apart
from circumstances favoring or limiting incentives to engage in cycles that were discussed
in Section 2.2.4 of this thesis, the positions of gasoline stations within the market space
may be an important factor for the phenomenon of price cycles. The role of centrality can
also be analyzed in the context of this phenomenon and related to the findings of Atkinson
et al. (2009), who associate price leadership in Edgeworth cycles with stations of certain
brands. It would be interesting to analyze whether central stations are more (less) likely
112
to be the first stations to change prices and whether centrality plays a different role in
price increases than in price decreases. However, only highly frequent pricing data allow
for a sequential and dynamic analysis of the impact of centrality. The quality of the data
on prices and the lack of highly frequent data, of course, is a shortcoming of the present
empirical work and restricts the analysis to static games. Eckert and West (2004, p. 271)
point out that monthly or weekly data are not enough to detect the dynamics of pricing
in retail gasoline markets. Since August 2, 2011, gasoline stations in Austria are legally
obligated to frequently report prices change to the federal authorities (Republic of Austria,
2011a,b). This creates a unique data base for future research on the Austrian retail gasoline
market, which is of great value, not only for research on pricing in spatially differentiated
markets.
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A Justification of the Modified Zero Conjectural Variation
Assumption
This section serves as an illustration of why the Modified Zero Conjectural Variation
(MZCV) assumption is justified in the asymmetric spokes model of Section 3. In or-
der to facilitate the analysis, but without a loss of generality, I assume that all remote
firms are located equidistantly at distance dR from the center, that the length of a spoke
is normalized to l = 1 and that marginal costs are normalized to c = 0. Assuming Nash-
Bertrand equilibrium prices, R’s demand is equal to 1 − x and the demand for C equals
N − n + nx. Further, I denote d = dR − dC . The profits of C (R) in the Nash-Bertrand
equilibrium, πNC (π
N
R ), and the location of the marginal consumer (x
N ) are given by
πNC =
((d− 2)nt+ 4N)2 t
18n2
, (59)
πNR =
((d− 2)nt+ 2N)2 t
18n2
,
xN =
1
6
(
4 + d−
2N
n
)
> 0.
In general, R might be able to increase its profit by undercutting pC at the market
center. However, even if it is profitable for R to undercut C in a first step, it will do so
if and only if C is not expected to respond to the undercutting by undercutting R again
to gain back the extra demand lost to R. In the counterfactual experiment that one firm
R undercuts the Nash equilibrium prices of all other firms by setting its price to pUR, the
profits (πUR) of this firm are given by:
πUR =
(
pNC − t
(
d− 2xU
)) (
N − n− xU + (n− 1)xUR
)
, (60)
xU =
(
pUR − p
N
C + td
)
2t
< 0,
xUR =
(
pNR − p
U
R
)
2t
> 0.
where xU (xUR) corresponds to the location of the marginal consumer at the spoke of C
(of the other remote firms). max πUR , s.t. x
U < 0, leads to two solutions: πUR1 = f(p
U
R1
) for
4n−2N
−n+3n2
< d ≤ 1 or N = 2n, and πUR2 = f(p
U
R1
) for 0 < d ≤ 4n−2N
−n+3n2
and N < 2n. While
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πUR2 > π
N
R is always true under the conditions leading to π
U
R2
, πUR1 > π
N
R if and only if
n(n(−4− d(14 + d) + 2(−2 + d)(1 + d)n) + 4(7 + d+ (4 + d)n)N) < 4(1 + 4n)N2. (61)
The profit of C sticking to the Nash equilibrium price pNC when being undercut is equal
to πUC = p
N
C (1 + x
U ) < πNC . C may increase its profit again by undercutting R to π
UC
C
determined by
πUCC =
(
pUR + t
(
d− 2xUC
)) (
N − n+ xUC + (n− 1)xUCR
)
, (62)
xUC =
pUR − p
UC
C + td
2t
> 0,
xUCR =
pNR − p
UC
C + td
2t
> 0,
if and only if πUCC > π
U
C . Inserting p
U
R1
and pUR2 , respectively, for p
U
R into (62), max π
UC
C ,
s.t. xUC > 0 leads to πUCC1 > π
U
C1
unconditionally true for pUR = p
U
R1
and to πUCC2 > π
U
C2
for
pUR = p
U
R2
if and only if
4(−2 + d)2n4 + 8
√
(n(4 + d− 3dn)− 2N)2N + 8nN(3 + 4N)+ (63)
n2
(
3d(4 + d)− 16(11 + 2d)N + 64N2
)
+ 2dn
√
(n(4 + d− 3dn)− 2N)2 >
2(−2 + d)n3(20 + 5d− 16N) + 4n
√
(n(4 + d− 3dn)− 2N)2 + 12N2.
These results imply that for 0 < d ≤ 4n−2N
−n+3n2
and N < 2n, an attempt by any firm R
to undercut C will result in an undercutting by C as a response. For 4n−2N
−n+3n2
< d ≤ 1
or N = 2n, R can increase its profits by undercutting C if inequality (61) holds but the
undercutting will again result in an undercutting by C as a response if inequality (63)
holds. However, it can be proved that (63) holds if (61) holds. Thus, in either case C will
respond to an undercutting of R by undercutting R again.
The paragraphs above imply that an undercutting by R leads to a tit-for-tat response by
C. A concept to calculate the highest prices that can be set by C and R that guarantees
each firm that it will not be undercut by a rival, are the so-called undercut-proof equilibrium
prices (Morgan and Shy, 2000; Shy, 2007). The undercut-proof equilibrium price is the
highest price each firm can set which guarantees the other firms higher profits if they
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do not undercut their rivals than the profits they would gain in case of undercutting
(ignoring rivals responses to the undercutting). Morgan and Shy (2000) apply the concept
of the undercut-proof equilibrium, among other scenarios, to the Hotelling (1929) linear
city model. The concept of undercut-proof equilibrium prices can also be adopted to the
asymmetric spokes model. Assume that two firms are located along a linear city of length
l = 1. A firm which serves the consumer at the center (at location 1/2) receives a premium
Z additional to the demand on the linear city. This premium Z can be interpreted as the
additional demand a firm receives in the asymmetric spokes model if it serves consumers
located on empty spokes and on spokes occupied by other firms. Firm C is located left of
the market center at distance 0 < a ≤ 0.5 from the left end of the line. Firm R is located
right of the center at distance 0 ≤ b < a from the right end of the line. As b < a, firm
C is located closer to the center and is thus regarded as the central firm. For simplicity
I assume that marginal costs are normalized to zero (c = 0), and thus all prices are to
be interpreted as net of marginal production costs. A consumer located at x is indifferent
between purchasing the product at C or at R if the net utility of buying at C (left hand
side of equation (64)) is equal to the net utility of buying at R (right hand side of equation
(64)).
s− pC − t(x− a) = s− pR − t(1− b− x). (64)
The location of this marginal consumer x is given by
x =
1
2
+
td+ pR − pC
2t
, (65)
d = a− b,
where d corresponds to the difference in the distance to the center between C and R, and
can be interpreted similarly to dR−dC in the asymmetric spokes model. The highest price
C can set without making it profitable for R to undercut C at the center and receive Z is
given by
πR = pR (1− x) ≥ (pC − t(d)) (1− x+ Z) . (66)
The highest price R can set without making it profitable for C to undercut R at the center
and receive Z is given by
πC = pC (x) ≥ (pR + t(d)) (x+ Z) . (67)
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Substituting (65) into (66) and (67), and solving (66) and (67) as equations leads to the
undercut-proof equilibrium prices pUPEC and p
UPE
R , and to the location of the marginal
consumer in the undercut-proof equilibrium (xUPE).
pUPEC =
td(1 + z(3− d+ 2z))
2(1 + z)2
, (68)
pUPER = −
td(1 + z(3 + d+ 2z))
2(1 + z)2
,
xUPE =
1 + (1− d)Z
2 + 2Z
.
(69)
Under the assumption of transportation costs normalized to unity (t = 1), a graphical
solution of the undercut-proof equilibrium is given in Figure 12. Obviously, unless d = 0
Figure 12: Undercut-proof equilibrium prices
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implying a = b (dC = dR), and/or t = 0, each case is ruled out in the asymmetric spokes
model by assumption, pUPER < 0 while p
UPE
C > 0. This means that the highest price that
guarantees R not being undercut at the center by C is negative and leads to a loss, while
the highest price C can set without being undercut at the center by R is positive and thus
leads to positive profits.
All the results in this section indicate that starting a price war by undercutting C is
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not profitable for R as C makes higher profits when matching the undercutting of R than
when accepting R’s undercutting. Further, unlike R, C still earns positive profits in the
undercut-proof equilibrium. In a nutshell, undercutting C’s gross consumer price (includ-
ing consumer transportation costs) at the market center does not increase R’s profits.
Undercutting will start a price war which completely erodes the profits of R because C
will match any undercutting, which drives pR down to zero (marginal costs).
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B Complete Estimation Results of Chapter 5
Table 14: Complete regression results of Chapter 5 part I
Dependent Variable: [1] [2]
PRICE Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
ρ3 0.3261 63.1889***
ρ4 0.2180 60.0520***
ρ5 0.1710 50.4335***
ρ6 0.1322 33.7559***
ρR→C
3
0.3156 43.0588***
ρC→R
3
0.3330 10.1115***
ρR→R
3
0.3328 10.8469***
ρR→C
4
0.2210 37.8511***
ρC→R
4
0.2393 8.8033***
ρR→R
4
0.2066 14.9435***
ρR→C
5
0.1649 25.8326***
ρC→R
5
0.5342 508.2663***
ρR→R
5
0.0529 153.3454***
ρR→C
6
0.1185 13.0787***
ρC→R
6
0.3731 5.6716***
ρR→R
6
0.0785 4.9800***
CONSTANT 27.9528 26.8731*** 26.7605 24.0149***
C 0.3770 3.0695*** 2.9808 2.4326**
STATIONS_4 -0.2721 -0.3610 0.8848 0.9539
STATIONS_5 -2.3934 -2.4567** -2.0061 -1.7277*
STATIONS_6 -1.3788 -0.9660 -2.3271 -1.3926
C*STATIONS_4 -0.2473 -1.6195 -3.6436 -1.9775**
C*STATIONS_5 -0.3644 -1.7550* -0.4749 -0.1914
C*STATIONS_6 0.4249 1.5124 4.8746 1.2191
DIST TO CENTER 0.0455 4.2338*** 0.0425 3.9686***
C*DIST TO CENTER -0.3535 -2.2473** -0.3847 -2.4621**
C*AV DIST REMOTE 0.0831 3.1748*** 0.0822 3.1592***
(1-C)*DIST CENTRAL 0.1036 0.9544 0.0548 0.5040
(1-C)* AV DIST REMOTE 0.0323 2.3505** 0.0345 2.5322**
COMMUTERS 0.0043 1.2860 0.0045 1.3262
logTOURISM -0.0371 -1.5601 -0.0352 -1.4859
logPOP DENSITY -0.0171 -0.4206 -0.0160 -0.3948
logPREMISES 0.2212 2.8283*** 0.2276 2.9299***
ALPS+WOOD 0.0041 1.9903** 0.0044 2.1674**
TRAFFIC GOOD 0.1162 1.3782 0.1118 1.3351
BRANDED 0.8482 7.1566*** 0.8379 7.0991***
DEALER OWNED -0.1812 -2.1034** -0.1707 -1.9978**
SIZE > 2000 0.3202 4.4258*** 0.3016 4.1907***
HIGHWAY 5.3571 18.6939*** 5.3316 18.7579***
SERVICE -0.0284 -0.3125 -0.0038 -0.0421
LOW TOURISM -0.3358 -1.8550* -0.3312 -1.8356*
N/A PREMISES 1.1739 3.0240*** 1.1924 3.0838***
N/A OWNERSHIP 0.0257 0.0983 0.0702 0.2706
N/A HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 0.2178 0.7166 0.2188 0.7247
N/A SIZE 0.6444 2.3618** 0.6226 2.2972**
N/A SERVICE -0.0119 -0.0525 -0.0467 -0.2069
Federal State F.E. Yes Yes
Time Period F.E. Yes Yes
ℓ -4795.2371 -4,774.3487
σ2 2.4084 2.3638
# of obs.: 2,920; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level
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Table 15: Complete regression results of Chapter 5 part II
Dependent Variable: [3] [4]
PRICE Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
ρ3
ρ4
ρ5
ρ6
ρR→C
3
0.3205 51.3948*** 0.3317 55.3943***
ρC→R
3
0.3302 10.4689*** 0.3472 10.9618***
ρR→R
3
0.3284 10.8176*** 0.3353 11.0055***
ρR→C
4
0.2136 47.3359*** 0.2194 49.9567***
ρC→R
4
0.2428 9.2115*** 0.2417 9.1492***
ρR→R
4
0.2092 15.3416*** 0.2191 16.2003***
ρR→C
5
0.1670 41.8240*** 0.1732 44.9208***
ρC→R
5
0.5509 528.8856*** 0.5712 545.8985***
ρR→R
5
0.0466 133.8640*** 0.0484 138.6314***
ρR→C
6
0.1322 30.7012*** 0.1353 31.9087***
ρC→R
6
0.3131 4.9365*** 0.3462 5.5594***
ρR→R
6
0.0900 5.6935*** 0.0860 5.5599***
CONSTANT 27.3132 25.4109*** 25.4480 26.7097***
C 1.6933 2.0423** 1.8277 2.1832**
STATIONS_4 -0.3308 -0.4398 0.0678 0.0910
STATIONS_5 -2.3803 -2.4448** -2.3865 -2.4711**
STATIONS_6 -1.8199 -1.2763 -1.3747 -0.9723
C*STATIONS_4
C*STATIONS_5
C*STATIONS_6
DIST TO CENTER 0.0441 4.1202*** 0.0305 2.9773***
C*DIST TO CENTER -0.3759 -2.4040** -0.2744 -1.7909*
C*AV DIST REMOTE 0.0834 3.2056*** 0.0433 1.8447*
(1-C)*DIST CENTRAL 0.0631 0.5798 0.0998 0.9587
(1-C)* AV DIST REMOTE 0.0352 2.5830** 0.0144 1.1924
COMMUTERS 0.0046 1.3813 0.0018 0.6620
logTOURISM -0.0355 -1.4973 -0.0380 -2.0550**
logPOP DENSITY -0.0125 -0.3098 -0.0998 -2.8099***
logPREMISES 0.2240 2.8809*** 0.3877 6.3985***
ALPS+WOOD 0.0045 2.2128** 0.0040 2.1108**
TRAFFIC GOOD 0.1138 1.3594 0.2999 3.8069***
BRANDED 0.8319 7.0614*** 0.8461 7.5190***
DEALER OWNED -0.1653 -1.9334* -0.2402 -2.9461***
SIZE > 2000 0.3028 4.2070*** 0.2134 3.2059***
HIGHWAY 5.3030 18.6602*** 5.2048 18.2889***
SERVICE -0.0167 -0.1837 -0.0992 -1.1193
LOW TOURISM -0.3286 -1.8214* -0.5276 -3.3021***
N/A PREMISES 1.1696 3.0236*** 1.5814 4.8805***
N/A OWNERSHIP 0.0609 0.2344 0.2374 0.9177
N/A HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 0.2112 0.6990 0.2897 0.9631
N/A SIZE 0.6485 2.3926** 1.0385 3.9996***
N/A SERVICE -0.0435 -0.1924 -0.3791 -1.7279
Federal State F.E. Yes No
Time Period F.E. Yes Yes
ℓ -4,778.0722 -4,832.1812
σ2 2.3684 2.3935
# of obs.: 2,920; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level
132
Table 16: Regression results of OLS, SEM and SAR specifications of Chapter 5
Dependent Variable: [5] [6] [7]
PRICE Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
ρ 0.6577 72.2986***
λ 0.6640 125.4900***
CONSTANT 82.8644 84.1348*** 83.5166 951.6379*** 27.5496 28.6542***
C 0.3067 1.4752 0.2737 2.9180*** 0.3787 3.0806***
STATIONS_4 -0.2846 -1.8932* -0.2608 -1.2258 -0.1355 -1.5243
STATIONS_5 0.0451 0.2437 0.0908 0.3309 0.0244 0.2230
STATIONS_6 -1.0365 -4.2341*** -1.0127 -2.8894*** -0.6942 -4.7943***
C*STATIONS_4 -0.1390 -0.5377 -0.1762 1.4911 -0.2480 -1.6223
C*STATIONS_5 -0.3301 -0.9390 -0.1951 -1.4702 -0.3662 -1.7622*
C*STATIONS_6 0.3486 0.7330 0.4920 -1.1355 0.4204 1.4949
DIST TO CENTER 0.0804 4.4248*** 0.0941 6.4963*** 0.0454 4.2208***
C*DIST TO CENTER -0.6957 -2.6160*** -0.6610 -2.7103*** -0.3472 -2.2076**
C*AV DIST REMOTE 0.2120 4.7958*** 0.2080 5.7765*** 0.0822 3.1363***
(1-C)*DIST CENTRAL -0.1026 -0.5602 -0.3548 -1.5151 0.1139 1.0515
(1-C)* AV DIST REMOTE 0.1186 5.1210*** 0.1174 5.8111*** 0.0313 2.2811**
COMMUTERS -0.0021 -0.3594 0.0103 2.3825** 0.0041 1.2279
logTOURISM -0.0260 -0.6481 -0.0314 -1.0108 -0.0355 -1.4946
logPOP DENSITY -0.0208 -0.3019 -0.0894 -1.6238 -0.0189 -0.4648
logPREMISES 0.2819 2.1316** 0.2719 2.5391** 0.2169 2.7742***
ALPS+WOOD 0.0109 3.1682*** 0.0045 2.0508** 0.0039 1.8938*
TRAFFIC GOOD 0.0983 0.6901 0.0640 0.8115 0.1252 1.4877
BRANDED 0.6828 3.4050*** 0.8300 7.8070*** 0.8434 7.1125***
DEALER OWNED -0.0344 -0.2361 -0.1930 -2.5860*** -0.1805 -2.0940**
SIZE > 2000 0.3987 3.2577*** 0.2790 4.2096*** 0.3208 4.4335***
HIGHWAY 5.0409 10.4055*** 5.0379 19.1209*** 5.3235 18.5860***
SERVICE 0.1103 0.7163 -0.1520 -1.8619* -0.0214 -0.2353
LOW TOURISM -0.3882 -1.2718 -0.3775 -1.7503* -0.3198 -1.7723*
N/A PREMISES 1.7690 2.6998*** 1.1714 2.1528** 1.1180 2.8855***
N/A OWNERSHIP -0.3616 -0.8169 0.0527 0.2306 0.0457 0.1748
N/A HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 0.2754 0.5354 0.4014 1.3544 0.2149 0.7067
N/A SIZE 0.4533 0.9821 0.4984 2.0181** 0.6390 2.3416**
N/A SERVICE 0.5670 1.4811 -0.2765 -1.1512 -0.0011 -0.0048
BURGENLAND 1.3687 2.5512** 0.4041 0.5640 0.0980 0.3086
CARINTHIA 0.2897 0.9517 0.3521 0.9699 -0.0631 -0.3507
LOWER AUT 0.0148 0.0451 -0.3796 -1.0749 -0.3482 -1.7909*
SALZBURG 2.1183 8.3090*** 2.0224 6.0780*** 0.2832 1.8530*
STYRIA 1.3834 4.3389*** 1.1935 3.6101*** 0.2969 1.5700
TYROL 4.1326 13.5887*** 3.9460 9.5012*** 1.1015 5.9663***
UPPER AUT -1.2572 -1.8690* 0.2082 0.3610 -0.2647 -0.6652
VORARLBERG 4.8292 10.1325*** 4.3225 6.2679*** 1.0825 3.7786***
Time Period F.E. Yes Yes Yes
ℓ N/A -4,749.0231 -4,798.6171
σ2 6.9022 2.3179 2.4124
# of obs.: 2,920; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level
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C Complete Estimation Results of Chapter 6
The estimates for the different measures of centrality have already been analyzed in Chapter
6. This section provides a description of the modifications of the basic specifications to
check the robustness of the results, as well as an interpretation of the estimation results of
some other variables used in the empirical specifications. The complete estimation outputs
are plotted in Tables 17 and 18.
C.1 Robustness Checks
In addition to the specifications [1] to [4] listed in Section 6.8.2, some more specifications
were made using a critical distance of 5 minutes in the construction of W , and the squared
inverse distances for the weights of the elements in W . Specifications [5] to [7] show the
results if the centrality matrix C is interacted with a binary weights matrixW based on un-
weighted neighborhood (wij = 1 if j is within a 5 minutes driving distance of i and wij = 0
otherwise) rather than with a spatial weights matrix based on distances. In specifications
[5] to [7] the coefficient of the second spatial lag (ρ2) solely accounts for the centrality of
neighbors but not for the relative distances to these neighbors. Thus, it is not surprising
that the share of the slope of the reaction function relying on the centrality of neighbors
is smaller in specifications [5] to [7] compared to specifications [2] to [4]. However, the
coefficients are still positive and significantly different from zero and identification may be
stronger compared to specifications [2] to [4] because of the alternative construction of W
in WCy. The likelihood ratio tests reject the benchmark model in specification [1] in favor
of each of the respective alternative hypotheses (specifications [5] to [7]).
I also check the robustness of the results with respect to the construction of the network
matrix G, which determines a station’s centrality. In specification [8] ([9]) H is set to
H = 2 (H = 10). The slope parameter of ρ2 in specification [8] is much smaller (but still
significant) than in specifications [2] and [9], but H = 2 seems to be an extremely narrow
criterion to construct the network G. The coefficient in [9] is very similar to the coefficient
in [2] and is thus very robust with respect to the variation of H = 5 to H = 10. Again,
the likelihood ratio test rejects [1] in favor of [8] and [9].
The robustness of the results are also checked with respect to the construction of W . In
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Table 17: Complete regression results of Chapter 6 part I
Dependent variable: PRICE
Specification [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Critical distance in W 5 min 5 min 5 min 5 min 5 min 5 min 5 min
Inverse of distance in W Squared Squared Squared Squared Squared Squared Squared
Centrality (H) None dc (5) wdc (5) cc (5) dc (5)a wdc (5)a cc (5)a
Variables Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
ρ1 0.632 0.013*** -0.044 0.114 0.130 0.120 0.370 0.130*** 0.465 0.030*** 0.474 0.030*** 0.474 0.030***
ρ2 (dc) 0.680 0.113*** 0.213 0.033***
ρ2 (wdc) 0.504 0.119*** 0.202 0.034***
ρ2 (cc) 0.263 0.129** 0.201 0.034***
CONSTANT 18.223 1.735*** 17.101 1.748*** 17.240 1.750*** 17.806 1.767*** 13.727 1.842*** 13.808 1.848*** 14.025 1.869***
DEGREE 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.008
WEIGHTED 0.005 0.003* 0.006 0.003*
CLOSENESS -0.060 0.057 -0.043 0.057
DISTANCE NEXT 0.174 0.027*** 0.177 0.029*** 0.188 0.029*** 0.153 0.033*** 0.182 0.029*** 0.188 0.029*** 0.154 0.033***
COMMUTERS 0.014 0.006** 0.012 0.006** 0.012 0.006** 0.014 0.006** 0.013 0.006** 0.013 0.006** 0.014 0.006**
log POPDENS -0.001 0.042 -0.026 0.043 -0.018 0.043 -0.019 0.043 0.014 0.042 0.013 0.042 0.003 0.043
log PREMISES 0.828 0.262*** 1.047 0.265*** 1.021 0.266*** 0.952 0.271*** 1.059 0.265*** 1.072 0.265*** 1.076 0.266***
DEALER -0.878 0.236*** -0.892 0.236*** -0.884 0.237*** -0.896 0.237*** -0.840 0.236*** -0.843 0.237*** -0.852 0.237***
SMALL -0.212 0.072*** -0.203 0.072*** -0.211 0.072*** -0.211 0.072*** -0.207 0.072*** -0.205 0.072*** -0.204 0.072***
TRAFFIC 0.177 0.067*** 0.170 0.069** 0.161 0.068** 0.197 0.069*** 0.164 0.069** 0.159 0.068** 0.201 0.069***
SERVICE 0.874 0.120*** 0.811 0.121*** 0.813 0.121*** 0.857 0.121*** 0.833 0.121*** 0.821 0.121*** 0.835 0.121***
PREMISES N/A 4.728 1.400*** 5.943 1.416*** 5.787 1.420*** 5.411 1.449*** 5.933 1.414*** 6.001 1.416*** 6.022 1.420***
DEALER N/A -0.992 0.258*** -1.063 0.260*** -1.049 0.259*** -0.994 0.259*** -0.949 0.260*** -0.950 0.259*** -0.907 0.259***
SIZE N/A -0.176 0.294 -0.203 0.294 -0.191 0.294 -0.158 0.294 -0.274 0.294 -0.269 0.294 -0.248 0.294
SERVICE N/A 1.479 0.195*** 1.527 0.196*** 1.508 0.195*** 1.479 0.196*** 1.463 0.196*** 1.453 0.195*** 1.432 0.196***
BRAND_AGIP 1.097 0.273*** 1.101 0.273*** 1.107 0.273*** 1.052 0.274*** 1.160 0.273*** 1.157 0.273*** 1.102 0.273***
BRAND_ARAL 2.322 0.333*** 2.246 0.334*** 2.281 0.334*** 2.251 0.335*** 2.284 0.334*** 2.289 0.334*** 2.234 0.335***
BRAND_AVANTI 0.221 0.256 0.255 0.256 0.249 0.256 0.201 0.256 0.320 0.256 0.315 0.256 0.291 0.257
BRAND_BP 1.817 0.260*** 1.754 0.260*** 1.769 0.261*** 1.781 0.261*** 1.856 0.260*** 1.846 0.260*** 1.832 0.260***
BRAND_ESSO 1.182 0.273*** 1.095 0.273*** 1.106 0.274*** 1.132 0.274*** 1.194 0.273*** 1.178 0.273*** 1.182 0.273***
BRAND_JET 0.549 0.295* 0.526 0.296* 0.548 0.296* 0.494 0.297* 0.592 0.296** 0.589 0.296** 0.525 0.297*
BRAND_OMV 1.511 0.265*** 1.458 0.265*** 1.468 0.265*** 1.469 0.265*** 1.526 0.265*** 1.515 0.265*** 1.506 0.265***
BRAND_SHELL 1.481 0.267*** 1.464 0.267*** 1.468 0.268*** 1.444 0.268*** 1.553 0.267*** 1.540 0.267*** 1.507 0.268***
BRAND_STROH 0.186 0.243 0.113 0.244 0.140 0.244 0.156 0.244 0.227 0.243 0.229 0.243 0.229 0.243
Time Period F.E. yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Obs. 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051
ℓ -4,428.272 -4,409.280 -4,417.770 -4,425.682 -4,406.697 -4,408.190 -4,409.948
σ2 1.851 1.852 1.856 1.854 1.852 1.853 1.854
LR-test 37.984 21.005 5.180 43.149 40.164 36.648
p-value (χ2, df = 2) 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%;
LR-tests of the respective nested specification without centrality (H0) against the particular H1;
a In [5] to [7] the centrality matrix is interacted with a W matrix containing zeros and ones only instead of distances;
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Table 18: Complete regression results of Chapter 6 part II
Dependent variable: PRICE
Specification [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Critical distance in
W
5 min 5 min 5 min 5 min 10 min 10 min
Inverse of distance
in W
Squared Squared Single Single Squared Squared
Centrality (H) dc (2) dc (10) None dc (5) None dc (5)
Variables Coef Std.Err. Coef Std.Err. Coef Std.Err. Coef Std.Err. Coef Std.Err. Coef Std.Err.
ρ1 0.394 0.101*** 0.027 0.126 0.685 0.014*** -0.012 0.109 0.780 0.014*** 0.212 0.137
ρ2 (dc) 0.239 0.100** 0.607 0.126*** 0.698 0.108*** 0.564 0.135***
ρ2 (wdc)
ρ2 (cc)
CONSTANT 17.851 1.740*** 16.812 1.765*** 13.878 1.791*** 12.331 1.804*** 6.349 1.789*** 6.143 1.795***
DEGREE 0.035 0.018* 0.003 0.004 0.014 0.008 0.005 0.008
WEIGHTED
CLOSENESS
DISTANCE NEXT 0.188 0.029*** 0.178 0.030*** 0.165 0.028*** 0.180 0.029*** 0.119 0.025*** 0.124 0.026***
COMMUTERS 0.013 0.006** 0.014 0.006** 0.015 0.006*** 0.011 0.006** 0.016 0.005*** 0.013 0.005**
log POPDENS -0.009 0.043 -0.024 0.043 0.023 0.043 -0.004 0.043 -0.006 0.041 -0.027 0.041
log PREMISES 0.893 0.263*** 1.108 0.269*** 0.925 0.265*** 1.267 0.270** 1.226 0.254*** 1.368 0.257***
DEALER -0.869 0.237*** -0.859 0.237*** -0.826 0.239*** -0.852 0.239*** -1.047 0.219*** -1.049 0.219***
SMALL -0.199 0.072*** -0.203 0.072*** -0.219 0.073*** -0.210 0.072*** -0.189 0.068*** -0.189 0.068***
TRAFFIC 0.161 0.067** 0.174 0.068** 0.200 0.068*** 0.183 0.069*** 0.171 0.064*** 0.176 0.066***
SERVICE 0.816 0.122*** 0.831 0.121*** 0.824 0.122*** 0.798 0.122*** 0.865 0.117*** 0.829 0.117***
PREMISES N/A 5.087 1.406*** 6.247 1.437*** 5.196 1.417*** 7.072 1.441*** 6.798 1.359*** 7.602 1.373***
DEALER N/A -0.972 0.259*** -1.036 0.259*** -0.826 0.261*** -0.954 0.262*** -0.954 0.253*** -1.003 0.254***
SIZE N/A -0.162 0.294 -0.203 0.294 -0.328 0.297 -0.344 0.297 -0.324 0.291 -0.313 0.291
SERVICE N/A 1.437 0.196*** 1.510 0.196*** 1.391 0.197*** 1.496 0.198*** 1.477 0.186*** 1.497 0.186***
BRAND_AGIP 1.094 0.273*** 1.071 0.275*** 1.128 0.276*** 1.163 0.276*** 0.920 0.246*** 0.920 0.246***
BRAND_ARAL 2.308 0.334*** 2.247 0.335*** 2.272 0.337*** 2.226 0.337*** 2.017 0.317*** 1.987 0.317***
BRAND_AVANTI 0.253 0.256 0.234 0.256 0.354 0.259 0.370 0.258 0.021 0.238 0.029 0.238
BRAND_BP 1.790 0.261*** 1.768 0.261*** 1.865 0.263*** 1.825 0.263*** 1.580 0.241*** 1.547 0.241***
BRAND_ESSO 1.150 0.273*** 1.122 0.273*** 1.227 0.276*** 1.142 0.276*** 0.963 0.254*** 0.900 0.255***
BRAND_JET 0.554 0.296* 0.509 0.297* 0.549 0.299* 0.572 0.299* 0.271 0.275 0.268 0.276
BRAND_OMV 1.482 0.265*** 1.479 0.265*** 1.531 0.268*** 1.502 0.267*** 1.309 0.245*** 1.278 0.246***
BRAND_SHELL 1.457 0.268*** 1.477 0.268*** 1.545 0.270*** 1.551 0.270*** 1.288 0.248*** 1.290 0.248***
BRAND_STROH 0.183 0.243 0.130 0.244 0.291 0.246 0.187 0.246 0.028 0.230 -0.002 0.230
Time Period F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Obs. 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,188 3,188
ℓ -4,423.672 -4,416.161 -4,433.833 -4,411.083 -4,571.913 -4,562.817
σ2 1.853 1.855 1.896 1.888 1.818 1.819
LR-test 9.199 24.222 45.501 18.192
p-value (χ2, df = 2) 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%;
LR-tests of the respective nested specification without centrality (H0) against the particular H1;
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specifications [10] and [11] the inverse of the driving time is used instead of the squared
inverse to determine the weights in W . The coefficients hardly change compared to the
equivalent basic models in [1] and [2]. Finally, specifications [12] and [13] show the results
if a critical distance of 10 minutes of driving time is used instead of 5 minutes for the
construction of W . A 10 minutes radius raises the number of observations from 3,051 to
3,188, as stations with no neighbors within 5 minutes are dropped from the sample in
specifications [1] to [11]. On the other hand, for many stations the number of neighbors
included in W using a 10 minutes radius increases to an unfeasibly high number. Using
a 10 minutes radius slightly raises the slope of the reaction function. The LR-Test again
rejects the benchmark model ignoring centrality in favor of the extensions.
C.2 More Details on the Estimation Results
In line with previous empirical findings in spatially differentiated markets, I find that an
increase in spatial differentiation has a positive and significant impact on prices. An in-
crease in the distance to the next neighbor (DISTANCE NEXT) by one minute is expected
to directly increase the price of a station by 0.12 to 0.19 cents.85
To approximate demand and cost in the different districts of Vienna, I use the variables
COMMUTERS, log POPDENS and log PREMISES. An increase in the rate of commuters
in a district by ten percentage points is expected to directly increase the price by 0.12 to
0.15 cents. These results are interesting in a sense that commuters increase the per capita
demand for gasoline/ diesel on the one hand, but on the other hand have lower search costs
than the average consumer because they frequently observe prices along their commuting
paths. The positive sign of the coefficient indicates that the demand effect outweighs the
search cost effect. The results are significant and robust in all specifications. The popula-
tion density (log POPDENS) in a district, however, does not have a significant impact on
prices. The variable log PREMISES accounts for differences in costs across districts. An
increase in the price for business premises by one percent directly increases the price of
gasoline by about one cent (0.82 to 1.36). This impact is also significantly different from
85I only report and interpret the estimates of the direct impact of the explanatory variables. The total
effects include the direct effects and feedback effects due to spatial dependence and are equal to (1 −
ρ1 − ρ2)
−1β. See LeSage and Pace (2009) for details.
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zero in all specifications.86
A number of dummy variables account for various characteristics of the locations of
gasoline stations. The price at a station is expected to be lower by about 0.9 cents per liter if
it is owned by the DEALER. Small stations (SMALL) tend to charge lower prices by about
0.2 cents compared to bigger stations. The coefficient of TRAFFIC indicates that prices
are about 0.2 cents higher if the station is located along a road with heavy traffic. Stations
offering attendance service (SERVICE) charge higher prices by about 0.8 cents compared
to stations exclusively offering self service. The three major brands operating in Austria
(BP, OMV and SHELL) charge significantly higher prices than unbranded stations. Some
minor brands (AGIP, ARAL, ESSO and JET) also charge higher prices than unbranded
stations.
86For the districts I to IX and district XIX no prices for premises are available. The dummy variable
PREMISES N/A accounts for missing prices for premises in these districts. The coefficient is strong
in magnitude and significance. However, this is not a surprise as the districts I to IX are very central
districts in which prices of premises tend to be higher than in other districts. District XIX hosts some
of the most exclusive neighborhoods of Vienna and thus premises can also be expected to be high.
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